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In 1S75 I was completing my Master's degree in 
Political Science at St. Louis University along with 
satisfying requirements in the Department of Education 
in order to obtain certification as a secondary school 
instructor. At this time I also was employed as a 
residence counselor and lived in a college dormitory. 
This employment provided numerous opportunities for 
interactions with young adults. Through conversations I 
noted that late adolescents' discussions of moral issues 
and their questions regarding the morality of their 
personal behaviors were closely linked to developmental 
issues. As a seminarian I was naturally attracted to 
discussions about morality. In addition, however, I 
sensed my own academic interests were in a state 
of transition. I became increasingly dissatisfied with 
the content of my Political Science courses; rather, 
what did stimulate my intellectual interests were 
counseling issues as well as questions pertaining to 
human development. 
During my assignment as an instructor in social 
science and as a counselor at a Jesuit secondary school 
1 
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in Denver Colorado, I observed that high school youth, 
at a more rudimentary level than their college 
counterparts, shared the same developmental issues. 
That is, moral questions and concerns frequently were 
tied to developmental issues. For me, this observation 
proved a catalyst for later academic pursuits. I began 
to read avidly in the area of developmental psychology 
in general, and moral development in particular. 
specifically the writings of Lawrence Kohlberg began to 
occupy my time. Yet, while I was reading, I sensed 
a growing discontent with the framework in which 
psychology, particularly the cognitive-developmental 
approach, interpreted morality. My own observations of 
and interactions with adolescents led me to conclude 
that another approach needed to be pursued. Moreover, 
the adolescent's moral development, I thought, was more 
properly viewed as an attempt to develop and sustain 
caring responses in the midst of everyday functioning. 
Throughout my three-year teaching assignment in Denver 
and subsequent four years of graduate theological 
studies leading to my Master of Divinity degree as well 
as through my first three years of doctoral studies in 
Clinical Psychology, I have reflected on the issue of 
adolescent moral development, particularly how such 
development can be reconciled with the Christian 
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religious tradition and, more specifically, the efforts 
of religious educators to focus on the development of 
the moral self. In essence, this dissertation sets 
forth, from a psychological perspective, a way to 
conceptualize morality that brings together 
psychological theories of morality and the concerns of 
religious education. 
Recently, few topics have generated as much 
interest among psychologists and educators as 
"morality." The questioning of cultural norms in the 
seventies (as exemplified by the Vietnam War and 
Watergate), youth's demand for "honesty" and 
"authenticity" in relational concerns, and the 
questioning and challenging of formerly sacrosanct 
values (e.g., traditional sex-roles, interpersonal and 
sexual behaviors, acceptance of legal and political 
authority) have converged to stimulate questioning as to 
what constitutes morality for youth today. Answers to 
the question--what is morality?--continue to occupy the 
time of developmental psychologists, theologians, and 
educators. 
Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) cognitive-developmental 
view represents the most theoretically advanced and 
empirically scrutinized perspective on morality advanced 
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thus far. Even so, numerous criticisms of his theory 
(e.g., Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1984) have led theorists to 
consider other approaches. In order to delineate 
everyday morality in adolescence, attention must first 
be given to the merits and limitations of this dominant 
theoretical perspective as set forth by Kohlberg. 
Chapter II provides a critical reading of this theory. 
By exploring the tenets of Kohlberg's theory and 
addressing salient criticisms, the need for an 
alternative view of morality emerges. Moreover, a 
critical examination of Kohlberg's theory suggests that 
explicit attention be given to the religious dimensions 
of human experience. Recently, Bergin (1980) has 
criticized the non-religious character of clinical and 
counseling psychology. It is equally important, 
however, that developmental theory, particularly moral 
developmental theory, be asked to address this 
challenge. 
More recently, Rest (1983, 1984, 1985; Carroll & 
Rest, 1982) has proposed that a fully developed view of 
morality must incorporate four components. 
components of morality are: 
These 
1. Recognition and sensitivity: translating and 
disambiguating a given social situation so as to be 
aware that a moral problem exists; to be sensitive 
enough to recognize that someone's welfare is at 
stake; 
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2. Moral judgment: determining what ideally ought 
to be done. in the situation, what one's moral 
ideals call for or which moral norms apply in the 
given circumstances; 
3. Values and influences: devising a plan of 
action with one's moral ideal in mind but also 
taking into account non-moral values and goals 
which the situation may activate; 
4. Execution and implementation of moral action: 
behaving in accordance with one's goal despite 
distractions, impediments, and incidental 
adjustments; organizing and sustaining behavior to 
realize one's goals. (Carroll & Rest, 1982, p. 
434) 
Rest (1983) maintains that psychologists have opted 
to view only one or more of these components, yet have 
neglected to consider all four components of morality 
simultaneously as integral for morality; consequently, 
the complexity of morality is underestimated. At the 
same time, religious educators' focus on prescriptive 
behaviors (Component II) most likely narrows their own 
vision and precludes them from discerning the numerous 
factors suggested in Rest's model which undoubtedly 
influence a person's moral behavior. Rest asserts that 
''we need to attempt a fuller, more complicated, more 
integrated picture of morality and to envision how the 
part processes are organized'' (p. 558). 
From another perspective, Martin Hoffman has 
provided a different focus for morality. According to 
Hoffman, empathy emerges as a catalyst for stimulating 
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prosocial behavior. The contrast of Kohlberg's and 
Hoffman's theories highlights a fundamental limitation 
of each approach. Though Kohlberg defines a valued 
ideal (the justice principle), there exists no human 
mechanism in his theory to account for why people 
behave morally. On the other hand, Hoffman adequately 
explores the human element required for prosocial 
responding (i.e., empathy), yet he fails to provide a 
valued principle which directs one's prosocial 
responses. Chapter III delineates Hoffman's theory of 
empathic morality as well as the limitations of his 
approach. Relatedly, Chapter IV formulates a perspective 
of morality termed everyday morality (Shelton, 1985, 
Shelton & McAdams, in press) which incorporates 
Hoffman's empathic perspective and addresses Rest's 
concerns for a more integrated and fully developed view 
of morality. Moreover, this chapter critically examines 
the similarities and differences between everyday 
morality and what Haan (Haan, Aerts & Cooper, 1985) has 
come to call interactional morality. 
Nonetheless, there remains the need to reorient 
everyday morality in terms of Rest's call for a more 
fully integrated view of morality. A critical reading 
of his writing points out both the merits of his 
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conceptual scheme and the need to set forth "processes" 
that fulfill his criteria. Chapter Vis an examination 
of "processes" which allow for the development of the 
adolescent's everyday morality. Situated within the 
context of an everyday morality, these processes 
reconcile Kohlberg's need for a human mechanism as well 
as Hoffman's lack of a directional focus for empathic 
responding. Furthermore, these processes are sensitive 
to the concerns of religious educators (e.g., Groome), 
which heretofore have been absent in the developmental 
literature. An application of this process is provided 
in Chapter VI with special emphasis given to adolescent 
social morality. 
In sum, this study will look to a different focus 
of morality than Kohlberg's moral orientation which is 
centered around one's understanding of justice. 
Specifically, in contrast to the notion of justice, 
morality will be framed in a prosocial context and be 
concerned with prosocial acts as they commonly occur in 
everyday life (thus this morality is termed everyday 
morality). In order to study everyday morality during 
the adolescent years, Rest's component process model is 
utilized. Moreover, the features set forth in the 
examination of Rest's model will be termed "morality 
of the heart. 11 It is the morality of the heart whi.ch 
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fosters and sustains the adolescent's attempt to care 
for others. 
A Final Comment 
Finally, this dissertation provides a broad view of 
adolescence. An acceptable definition of adolescence is 
stated by the American Psychiatric Association (cited in 
Nicholi, 1978): 
a chronological period beginning with the 
physical and emotional processes leading to 
sexual and psychosocial maturity and ending at 
an ill-defined time when the individual 
achieves independence and social productivity. 
This period is associated with rapid physical, 
psychological and social changes. (p. 519) 
More specifically, however, this dissertation is focused 
on secondary school youth; as a consequence, adolescence 
is limited to this population. As a result, given this 
focus, the meaning of this study for specific segments 
or sub-populations of adolescents (e.g., the mentally 
retarded, drop outs) is unclear. 
In addition, morality (which will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter IV) is defined as behavior which 
benefits others. The word "religious" is consonant with 
the theistic value system as set forth by Bergin (1980). 
Numerous ideas as to the nature of morality as well 
as the enormous research findings necessitate the need 
to develop some means for organization. More to the 
point, Rest has proposed what he terms a component 
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process model for investigating morality. In this 
study, Rest's means of conceptualizing morality will be 
utilized. 
The integration of disciplines has become the norm 
rather than the exception for research pertaining to 
morality (Carroll & Rest, 1982; Kurtines & Gewirtz, 
1984). Increasingly, approaches to the study of 
morality must seek to incorporate psychological, 
educational, and philosophical concerns. "Altogether, 
investigation of everyday morality is a trans-
disciplinary venture that best includes psychology 
and philosophy as well as those social science 
disciplines that focus on human collectivities" (Haan, 
1982, p. 1103). With an eye towards this end, this 
study provides an integration of the available 
literature and sets forth a view of morality that is 
germane to the adolescent's experience and which 
addresses the research concerns of psychologists and 
educators. In turn, it is hoped that this study will 
generate future empirical research as well as stimulate 
constructive interventions for professionals who work 
with adolescents. 
CHAPTER II 
THE KOHLBERG LEGACY 
Questions of moral meaning have always been an 
essential focus for human inquiry (Staub, 1978). At 
the same time, emphasis on the function, maintenance, 
and continuity of human societies necessitates 
discussion as to the nature of morality. (Rest, 1983; 
Staub, 1978). Thus, "although the specific definitions 
may vary, there is an acknowledgment that morality 
constitutes the basic fabric of societal and 
interpersonal relations" (Colangelo, 1985, p. 244). 
Pointing to this universal consensus, Berkowitz and Oser 
(1985) observe that in any poll-taking venture, few 
people would vote against morality although considerable 
disagreement would ensue as to what are morality's 
essential elements. 
Moreover, psychologists note that individuals 
attempt to view themselves as moral persons (Guidano & 
Liotti, 1983; Haan, et al., 1985; Kagan, 1984). The 
importance of morality for people's lives has not gone 
unnoticed in social science theorizing. Psychology's 
relationship to the study of morality has led Haan 
(1982) to conclude that "issues concerning moral 
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meanings in people's lives can not be ignored if social 
science is to be complete and competent" (p. 1096). 
Among psychological explanations of morality, Lawrence 
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach has been 
dominant, although other approaches have surfaced 
(e.g., Kurtines & Greif, 1984). In earlier writings, 
Haan gives credit to Kohlberg's empirically rich 
formulation of the justice principle, but in her most 
recent work it is dismissed as ill-defined; furthermore, 
the meaning of morality, she maintains, lacks a unified 
consensus in the social science community. Having 
rejected Kohlberg 1 s cognitive-structural approach, Haan 
has championed a notion of morality which she terms 
"everyday morality." Haan construes this morality as 
meaning how individuals act morally in their everyday 
lives (Chapter IV sets forth a definition of everyday 
morality for the present study). She cautiously offers 
the hope that social science in general, and psychology 
in particular, can profit from a redirected effort to 
investigate the importance of morality for people's 
everyday lives. 
Haan's call for an everyday morality has heuristic 
appeal; recently, she has offered a more understanding 
yet equally incisive crjtigue of Kohlberg's theory (Haan 
et al., 1985). Still, any psychological discussion of 
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morality can ill afford to take lightly Kohlberg's 
contribution. Indeed, discussion of the psychological 
meaning of morality must proceed from an understanding 
of both the merits and inadequacies of Kohlberg's 
approach. His significance for a psychology of morality 
arises for two reasons. First, Kohlberg has provided 
psychological research with the most theoretically 
integrated and empirically tested theory of morality. 
Thus, psychological investigations of morality must 
consider his approach before offering alternatives. 
Secondly, Kohlberg 1 s moral theory, among all 
psychological theories of morality, enjoys broad support 
in educational, philosophical, and religious circles 
(Berkowitz & Oser, 1985; Muson, 1979). Woodward and 
Lord (1976) report that over 5,000 school districts have 
utilized aspects of Kohlberg's theory in their 
curricula. Accordingly, in order to explore a 
psychological understanding of morality for the 
adolescent's everyday life, attention must first be 
given to Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view. 
The Bac~round for Kohlb~'s Theo;:-y 
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach (1975, 
1978, 1981, 1984) is the most ambitious attempt to date 
at delineating a psychological view of morality. A 
catalyst for Kohlberg's research was the apparent 
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previous failure of psychologists and educators to set 
forth a universal and empirically valid moral theory. 
According to Kohlberg, two movements in particular 
typified the failure to generate a viable moral theory. 
These movements were the character studies undertaken by 
Hartshorne and May {Hartshorne & May, 1928; Hartshorne, 
May, & Maller, 1929; Hartshorne, May, & Shuttleworth, 
1930) and the value education movement of the 1960s 
(e.g., Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972). In regards 
to the latter, Kohlberg has rejected the values 
clarification approach (e.g., Martin, 1982; Simon, Howe, 
& Kirschenbaum, 1972). Briefly stated, this approach 
objected to moralizing in the classroom and advocated 
student participation as a way to foster the child or 
adolescent's personal value system. In other words, 
this approach attempts to develop the child's 
recognition of specific values and an awareness as to 
how these personal values correspond to the child's 
behavior. Essentially, this approach encourages 
students, through a method of value process, to prize, 
to choose, and to act on values they deem appropriate 
for a given situation. The inadequacy of value 
clarification approaches, says Kohlberg, resides in the 
relativity to which all values are reduced. 
Consequently, any and all values are options for 
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students. Kohlberg (1981) notes that a value 
clarification approach, in order to be consistent, must 
even allow cheating to be a legitimately chosen option 
for the child. 
In the l920's Hartshorne and May embarked upon a 
massive character study of over ten thousand elementary 
and secondary school students. These researchers 
employed over thirty behavioral tests to measure 
behaviors associated with a ''virtuous" character. 
Having surveyed religious leaders and educators, 
Hartshorne and May constructed an agreed upon list 
of behaviors which virtuous children and adolescents 
would be apt to carry out (e.g., altruistic acts, 
instances of self-control). In addition to these tests, 
teachers rated students on lists of virtuous 
characteristics. Intercorrelations among the various 
tests yielded low relationships, generally in the .20 to 
.30 range. These findings led Hartshorne and May to 
conclude that positive behaviors such as altruistic acts 
are situation specific. In other words, these 
researchers found no evidence of a ''moral character" 
which influenced one's moral behavior across a variety 
of situations. Thus, they concluded that positive 
behavior was contingent upon the situation. 
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When commenting upon these disappointing results, 
Kohlberg (1981) has noted "it is a fair statement of the 
history of psychological research in the field to say 
that the study of character as a set of virtues has not 
been a flourishing or successful research paradigm" (p. 
2). As a general comment, Kohlberg has characterized 
the Hartshorne and May studies as exemplifying a "bag of 
virtues" approach to morality. 
In contrast to an approach which focuses on the 
behavioral study of traditionally accepted positive 
behaviors, Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1984) has insisted that 
there exists an "internal component" (p. 500) involved 
in "moral action". Kohlberg's own research has 
attempted to redress the disillusionment fostered by 
Hartshorne and May's findings that moral behavior is 
situation-specific. Throughout his nearly thirty 
years of research, Kohlberg (1981} has maintained there 
exists a "universal ontogenetic trend toward the 
development of morality" (p. 105) as it has been set 
forth by Western moral philosophers. In effect, 
Kohlberg's writings underscore his acceptance of a 
deontological ethical position. Essentially, this 
position argues that morality is not based on rules 
(e.g., the Ten Commandments), but on principles that are 
universally binding on all human beings. Thus, Kohlberg 
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(1984) maintains 
The focus of Piaget and myself on morality as 
deontological justice springs, in part, from a 
concern with moral and ethical universality in 
moral judgment. The search for moral universality 
implies the search for some minimal value 
conception(s) on which all persons could agree, 
regardless of personal differences in detailed aims 
or goals. (p. 248) 
Kohlberg has set forth a three level-six stage 
theory of morality that is invariant, sequential, and 
cross-cultural. Individuals tend to prefer the highest 
stage in which they can reason. These stages have been 
empirically validated in longitudinal studies by 
Kohlberg and his associates. The three levels and six 
stages which make up Kohlberg's theory are given below. 
Recently, Kohlberg (1984) has responded to critical 
comments and challenges to his theory. When 
appropriate, Kohlberg's responses are presented as a way 
to expand on the theory and his current thinking. 
I. Preconventional Level 
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural 
rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, 
but interprets these labels either in terms of the 
physical or hedonistic consequences of action 
(punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in 
terms of the physical power of those who enunciate 
the rules and labels. The level is divided into 
the following two stages: 
Stage l: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. 
The physical consequences of action determine its 
goodness or badness, regardless of the human 
meaning or value of these consequences. 
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stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. 
Right action consists of that which instrumentally 
satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the 
needs of others. 
II. Conventional Level 
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the 
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived 
as valuable in its own right, regardless of 
immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude 
is not only one of conformity to personal 
expectations and social order, but of loyalty to 
it, of actively maintaining, supporting and 
justifying the order, and of identifying with the 
persons or group involved in it. At this level, 
there are the following two stages: 
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good 
boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that 
which pleases or helps others and is approved by 
them. There is much conformity to stereotypical 
images of what is majority or ''natural" behavior. 
Stage 4: The ''law and order" orientation. There 
is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and 
the maintenance of the social order. Right 
behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing 
respect for authority, and maintaining the given 
social order for its own sake. 
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled 
level 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define 
moral values and principles that have validity and 
application apart from the authority of the groups 
or persons holding these principles and apart from 
the individual's own identification with these 
groups. This level also has two stages: 
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic 
orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. 
Right action tends to be defined in terms of 
general individual rights and standards which have 
been critically examined and agreed upon by the 
whole society. There is a clear awareness of the 
relativism of personal values and opinions and a 
corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for 
reaching consensus. 
18 
Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle 
orientation. Right is defined by the decision of 
conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical 
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, 
universality, and consistency. These principles 
are abstract and ethical (The Golden Rule, the 
categorical imperative); they are not concrete 
moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, 
these are universal principles of justice, of the 
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of 
respect for the dignity of human beings as 
individual persons (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 671). 
This central, underlying principle which forms the 
basis for morality is the individual's understanding of 
justice. Kohlberg (1974) has stated "there is a natural 
sense of justice intuitively known by the child" (p. 5). 
Accordingly, an individual reasons about values, life 
dilemmas, and personal choices in the context of an 
understanding of justice which is appropriate for his or 
her stage. Firmly placing himself within the 
cognitive-deveopmental tradition of Piaget, Kohlberg 
(1981) has argued 
A cognitive-developmental theory of 
moralization holds that there is a sequence of 
moral stages for the same basic reason that there 
are cognitive or logicomathematical stages; that 
is, because cognitive-structural reorganizations 
toward the more equilbrated occur in the course of 
interaction between the organism and the 
environment. 
Kohlberg (1984) states that "stage notions are 
essentially ideal-typological constructs designed to 
represent different psychological organizations at 
varying points in development'' (p. 39). Kohlberg 
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distinguishes his own stage theory of moral development 
from other stage theories. He labels, for example, 
Erikson's theory of life cycle development as a 
functional stage; that is, Erikson's theory focuses on 
individual functioning within a variety of cultural 
roles. Another type of stage theory (Kohlberg also 
describes these theories as models) is that of a soft 
structural stage. A soft structural stage is 
characterized by the inclusion of "elements of affective 
or reflective characteristics of persons, 
characteristics not easily assimilated to the Piagetian 
paradigm" (p. 237). Kohlberg offers Loevinger's theory 
of ego development as an example of a soft stage 
structure. In contrast, Kohlberg presents his theory as 
being a hard stage structure; in essence, a hard 
stage structure is one which meets Piagetian stage 
criteria. In brief, there are four criteria for a 
stage: (1) the structure of each stage is 
distinguishable from other stages; (2) these stages form 
an invariant, sequential ordering in human development 
wherein cultural factors can influence the rate of 
development but are unable to alter the sequence; (3) 
each stage represents a "structural whole''--a 
distinctive "underlying thought organization"; (4) 
stages are hierarchically integrated thus a higher stage 
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incorporates all lower stage structures. 
According to Kohlberg, Erikson's functional theory 
lacks three of the four Piagetian criteria. Erikson 1 s 
functional stages delineate a variety of ego functions 
in response to crises rather than focus on a single form 
of activity such as moral reasoning which is constant 
across situations and experiences (criterion three). 
Further, a functional stage theory addresses 
psychological aspects of the ''self's concern" and can, 
therefore, be culturally relative. In contrast, hard 
stage structures separate the forms of reasoning from 
psychological accounts of self and thus can be tested 
cross-culturally (criterion two). Finally, Erikson's 
stages lack hierarchical integration; in reality, says 
Kohlberg, the ego takes on a new function at each stage. 
On the other hand, hard structural stages "replace 
earlier stages in the sense that each succeeding stage 
transforms the previous one into a more adequate 
reorganization" (p. 239} (criterion four). 
In summary, the differences between Eriksonian 
functional stages and hard structural stages 
are relatively straightforward. These 
differences concern not only the nature of the 
stages but also the focus of the theories they 
are based upon. The focus of functional stage 
models on the self coincides with the notion 
of developing stages of an ego, viewed as an 
executor or chooser that uses cognitive and 
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other structures. In contrast, the focus of 
hard structural stages is upon forms of manifest 
reasoning rather than upon the ego's processes of 
affirming or defining itself. (p. 240) 
Kohlberg, likewise, uses Piagetian stage criterion 
to distinguish his theory from Loevinger's "soft stage" 
theory of ego development. Kohlberg finds similarities 
between the tw0 theories. Even so, Kohlberg states his 
theory is viewed as a focus on forms of thinking whereas 
"Loevinger's scheme consider structure less as a form of 
thinking and more in terms of fairly stable personality 
functions and contents" (p. 242) (see criterion three). 
Moreover, Loevinger's theory, says Kohlberg, addresses 
the self's definition, its unity, and its "enhancement 
and defense". This type of thinking is labeled second 
order thinking and is contrasted by Kohlberg to the 
Piagetian hard structural stage thinking which is 
thinking logically related to a set of operations. 
"The Kohlberg stage model, then, represents the 
different hierarchically integrated forms of the 
operations of reciprocity, equality, and equity" (p. 
244) . 
All in all, Kohlberg sees clear distinctions among 
the three differing views of stages. 
In sum, we have attempted to elaborate a set of 
distinctions between functional, ~oft structural, 
and hard structural stage models. We have argued 
that a rigorous application of the Piagetian 
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criteria for a hard structural stage can 
distinguish three stage models, and that only a 
hard structural stage model can actually meet these 
criteria. (p. 248) 
Kohlberg believes that moral growth, like cognitive 
development, allows for increasingly moral structural 
transformations. These transformations are the result 
of life experience, increasing capacity for role-taking, 
encounters with and discussions about hypothetical 
dilemmas, and most recently, his belief on the 
importance of the existence of a socio-moral 
environment which fosters a just community (Kohlberg, 
1984, 1985). All in all, given the foregoing 
experiences, an individual encounters a greater degree 
of disequilibrium which engenders stage advancement. 
"In essence, there is a "deep logical structure" of 
movement from one stage to the next; a structure tapped 
by both a psychological theory of movement and by 
families of philosophical argument" (1981, p. 182). 
Moreover, each stage reflects a more adequate 
understanding of the justice principle because inherent 
in each stage of moral development is a greater degree 
of differentiation and integration. That is, each 
stage, because of its differentiated and integrating 
capacities is, in essence, a more mature structure 
capable of meeting the complexity and variability 
inherent in life dilemmas, conflicts, and differing 
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points of view. "These combined criteria, 
differentiation and integration, are considered by 
developmental theory to entail a better equilibrium of 
the structure in question" (p. 135). Even so, though 
each stage underscores a distinctive understanding of 
the justice principle, it is only at stage six that 
justice embraces the attributes of fairness, equality 
and reciprocity. Only at this stage does justice become 
universally acceptable because only stage six morality 
incorporates a view of justice which all rational 
persons regardless of cultural background or existential 
situation could agree upon. 
Some Salient Criticisms of Kohlberg's Theory 
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach has 
been the subject of numerous critiques. Accordingly, in 
this section, major criticisms are highlighted which 
elucidate the limitations of Kohlbergts theory in light 
of the need for a morality for everyday life (e.g., 
Shelton, 1985). 
1. Methodological shortcomigg_s of his approach with 
special emphasis on the validi!Y._of stage six. 
Among all the critiques directed against his 
theory, few have been as pointed as the criticism of 
methodological inadequacies. These shortcomings 
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include: flawed scoring procedures, lack of 
reliability, and the validity of a post-conventional 
morality (Kurtines & Greif, 1974; Wonderly & Kupfersmid, 
1980). 
Recently, Kohlberg and his associates (1984) have 
attempted to address these criticisms. In effect, 
Kohlberg has introduced a standard issue scoring that 
obtains a more objective and reliable scoring system by 
specifying exact criteria requisite for each stage. In 
turn, these measures have produced an extremely high 
degree of reliability as well as a clear demarcations of 
content from structure. The subject responds in an 
interview format to a group of dilemmas constructed by 
Kohlberg and his colleagues. Once a response is given, 
a series of questions are asked in order to probe the 
respondent's level of moral reasoning and to expunge 
content. To summarize briefly, Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 
1984; Rest, 1983) utilizes a classifying procedure in 
which the subject's open ended responses are first 
classified by issue. The issue is then divided according 
to one of twelve possible norms and then classified 
further according to one of seventeen elements. Only 
then is the open ended response scored. Commenting on 
these new efforts, Rest (1983) notes that Kohlberg has 
been able to purge "content with a vengeance" {pp. 
25 
58 2-583). One must wonder, however, that in purifying 
his stages, Kohlberg is left with a narrowly based 
view of morality--a morality so concerned with its 
structural purity that is eschews other significant 
factors (e.g., emotion, personal meaning to the moral 
agent). On the other hand, although the new scoring 
format has rectified many previous shortcomings, the new 
scoring format has failed to satisfy all of Kohlberg's 
critics (e.g., Cortese, 1984; Montemayor, 1985; 
Villenave-Cremer & Eckensberger, 1985). 
Nonetheless, the most damaging criticism leveled 
against Kohlberg's theory is the inability to validate a 
sixth stage. In earlier formulations of the theory 
(Kohlberg, 1969), Kohlberg spoke convincingly of the 
obtainment of principled morality and the exciting 
possibilities that such a post-conventional world view 
had for human society. Heretofore, when discussing the 
adolescent years, Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971) 
optimistically maintained that the adolescent's develop-
ment would lead to a questioning and relativistic stance 
leading some (albeit a minority of adolescents) to adopt 
a principled (post-conventional) solution to life 
issues. By the late seventies, however, Kohlberg was 
less sanguine in regard to the adolescent's achievement 
of a principled morality. A reanalysis of his original 
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data led Kohlberg to reject his assertion as to the 
likelihood or even the possibility of stage six moral 
reasoning. Commenting in a critical way on his own 
research he noted 
Empirical research between 1968 and 1976 did not 
confirm my theoretical statements about a sixth and 
highest stage (Kohlberg, 1979). My longitudinal 
subjects, still adolescents in 1968, had come to 
adulthood by 1976, but none had reached the sixth 
stage. Perhaps all the sixth stage persons of the 
1960s had been wiped out, perhaps they had 
regressed, or maybe it was all my imagination in 
the first place. (1980, p. 457). 
In a similar vein, Kohlberg argued that the 
American secondary school could no longer accede to his 
challenge to foster a principled morality among its 
students. By the late seventies Kohlberg called instead 
for the development of stage 5 thinking as a goal for 
the secondary school. Yet, in 1980, Kohlberg admitted 
that further "retrenchment'' was necessary and that only 
stage 4 thinking was a realistic possibility for the 
secondary school student. By the mid-eighties 
(Kohlberg, 1984} maintained that moral reasoning above 
stage 4 was unobtainable for adolescents and most young 
adults. Stage advancement up through stage four 
requires a more adequate conceptualization of role-
taking which allows the student to comprehend the social 
system. However, movement beyond Stage 4 requires the 
subject to commit him or herself to ideals which are 
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valued and which in turn will be carried out. Only with 
college experience and leaving home is the late 
adolescent capable of anticipating commitment to valued 
ideals. Kohlberg believes such experiences as 
separation from parents are necessary for advancement 
beyond stage 4 for only through such transitions does a 
person encounter experiences that are not of his or her 
making and which require choices for which the adoles-
cent must take responsibility. Movement to principled 
thinking (stage 5) necessitates a combination of life 
experiences, active and on-going questioning about life 
choices, commitment to personal decisions, and 
corresponding moral reflection. 
In summary, personal experiences of choice 
involving questioning and commitment, in some sort 
of integration with stimulation of cognitive-moral 
reflection, seem required for movement from 
conventional to principled (Stage 5) thought. It 
is probably for this reason that principled thought 
is not attained in adolescence. (p. 493) 
Nonetheless, Kohlberg has reemphasized in his own 
theory the importance of truly principled morality 
(stage 6). Although no longer maintaining the empirical 
verifiability of stage 6, Kohlberg now views that the 
theoretical possibility of a principled morality evinced 
in stage 6 thinking has considerable import. Further, 
Kohlberg now sets forth a role for substages (termed 
"Substage B" for each of the stages). Individuals who 
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demonstrate reasoning at Substage B levels tend to be 
more autonomous and responsible in their thinking and 
are more inclined to view the importance of justice 
operations such as equality and recipricity. For 
example, Kohlberg reasons that individuals who score at 
substage B for stage 5 are able to intuit part of the 
principles of justice set forth in stage 6, yet they are 
unable to articulate the central role accorded the 
justice principle as the criterion for stage 6 
reasoning. 
The present position of stage 6 thinking, moreover, 
appears to provide two features for his theory. First, 
justice has come to operate as a functional component 
inasmuch as it offers a conceptual understanding for his 
theory. Thus, Kohlberg (1984) argues that "a terminal 
stage, with the principle of justice as its organizing 
principle, helps us to define the area of human activity 
under study" (p. 271). Secondly, he appears to view 
stage 6, in the current sketch of his theory, as an 
"ideal end point" for the development of the more 
limited understandings of justice articulated at lower 
stages. It should be noted, however, recent scoring 
revisions demonstrate only minimal support even for 
stage 5 thinking. Thus, Rest (1983) noted that "stage 5 
even in minor traces is a rarity" (p. 583) and that, 
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in general, movement from one stage to another is an 
exceedingly slow process wherein most change occurs 
among only a few stages (usually from 2 to 4}. 
Yet, Kohlberg now hypothesizes the utility of a 
stage 7. Kohlberg views a stage 7 orientation as a 
"soft'' hypothetical stage. Thinking at this stage is 
concerned with life issues and questions which go beyond 
the "hard'' philosophic reflections characteristic of the 
first six stages (e.g., Why be moral?, Why is there 
evil?). In entertaining the idea of a stage 7, Kohlberg 
acknowledges the limitations of his theory to account 
for all meaningful life questions. In this respect, 
Kohlberg appears sensitive to challenges to his own 
thinking. "Generally speaking, a Stage 7 response to 
ethical and religious problems is based on constructing 
a sense of identity or unity with being, with 
life, or with God 11 (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 249}. He 
associates stage 7 thinking with more theistically based 
orientations; for example, he includes such thinkers as 
James Fowler in this latter category. 
In sum, even though there is absent an empirically 
verifiable sixth stage, Kohlberg argues for its 
inclusion as an ideal end-point in an individual's 
on-going moral development. Nonetheless, Kohlberg 
(1981, 1984} has so identified the justice principle 
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with morality that its absence in fact and the paucity 
of post-conventional scores leaves open the question of 
what is moral as well as the question of who can be 
moral. Kohlberg (1984) has stated 
Morality as justice best renders our view of 
morality as universal. It restricts morality to a 
central minimal core, striving for universal 
agreement in the face of more relativist 
conceptions of the good. (p. 306) 
Although this view of morality is understandable 
given Kohlberg's emphasis on hard stage structures, 
it is also problematic in that it rules out an 
individual's full obtainment of morality. 
2. The contextual relevancy of Kohlberg's view of 
morality and the resulting inadequacy of the cognitive-
developmental view for addressing moral situations in 
everyday life. 
A second difficulty with Kohlberg's 
conceptualization of morality concerns the application 
of the justice principle to everyday life situations. 
Surprisingly, even though the concept of justice is the 
central focus for Kohlberg's moral system, the exact 
meaning which Kohlberg accords the justice principle is 
unclear. He has defined justice as "equality" (p. 38); 
a moral principle, that is, "a mode of choosing" which 
all people will adopt in all situations (p. 39); the 
resolution of competing claims (p. 143); the "core of 
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morality" (p. 295); "the agreement, contract, and 
impartiality of the law" (p. 300); and as an abstract 
formal principle containing characteristics termed by 
philosophical discourse as universality, inclusivity, 
consistency, and objectivity. 
Regardless of the justice definition one adopts, 
the justice principle, when applied to Kohlberg's 
dilemmas, negotiates the conflicting rights and claims 
of individuals. Morality for Kohlberg is justice. And 
the highest form of morality is contained in justice 
reasoning characteristic of stage six. However, from the 
standpoint of the nature of morality, interpreting 
morality as the resolution of rights and claims 
represents a circumscribed perspective of morality's 
meaning (Staub, 1978). Furthermore, the emphasis on 
rights and duties underscores what many have believed to 
be the strong ideological bias in Kohlberg's system 
(Haan, 1982; Hogan, 1975; Kagan, 1984; Shweder, 1982). 
Thus, as Gibbs and Schnell (1985) conclude "Kohlbergian 
theory as currently constituted would indeed seem to be 
compromised by philosophical individualism with its 
ethnocentric and elitist ramifications and would appear 
to be in need of revision" (p. 1075). Moreover, the 
dilemmas Kohlberg utilizes to develop a stage morality 
delimit moral context. In other words, individuals as 
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moral agents frequently encounter what they would term 
moral situations not reducible to a conflict of 
competing claims. Eisenberg (1977) has addresed this 
very point regarding the rule oriented focus of 
Kohlberg's dilemmas. Her development of prosocial moral 
reasoning categories attempts to widen the narrow 
conflicting rights focus associated with Kohlberg's 
hypothetical dilemmas. Even so, her emphasis on 
hypothetical dilemmas weds her to the reasoning focus of 
Kohlberg rather than a context for morality situated in 
everyday life events. Relatedly, Lemming (1978) found 
that when given everyday situational dilemmas, 
adolescents tended to reason at stages lower than 
corresponding stages associated with Kohlberg's 
hypothetical dilemmas. Recent investigations by 
Kohlberg (Higgens, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg, 
1985) have attempted to be more sensitive to the 
practical dimensions of moral dilemmas. Advocating the 
concept of a democratic or just community, Kohlberg and 
his associates have shown that the moral atmosphere of 
the school fosters positive behaviors. 
To summarize, notwithstanding Kohlberg's 
acknowledgement of a more practical side to morality, it 
is likely that Kohlberg's preference for defining 
morality in terms of justice necessarily narrows 
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morality's meaning. Likewise, hypothetical dilemmas 
neither provide ·an emphasis for other dimensions of 
morality (e.g., personal everyday behaviors) nor do they 
accurately reflect numerous situations that individuals 
encounter in everyday life events. 
3 . ~ tension between an ethics of justice and an 
ethics of care: The cognitive versus affective debate. 
Essentially, the question associated over the 
debate between an ethics of justice versus an ethics of 
care focuses on the following: What is the nature of 
morality? As noted above, for Kohlberg, the essence of 
what is moral is found in the justice principle which is 
applied impartially and universally to competing claims 
or interests; in addition, this view of morality or what 
Kohlberg terms "the moral point of view" is discovered 
through rational discourse. 
On the other hand, Gilligan (1982) focuses on an 
ethics of care and proposes a significant refocusing of 
morality's meaning. Gilligan's work results from three 
studies undertaken by her and her associates. The first 
study contained interviews of college sophomores and a 
follow-up study five years after graduation. The second 
study focused on women's experience of abortion and the 
reasoning utilized in making such a decision. A cross 
sectional study of 8 men and 8 women at 9 different ages 
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was the focus of the third study; in addition, 2 men and 
2 women were the subject of a more intense interview 
process. 
The results of these studies lead Gilligan to claim 
there exists a dominance of the care orientation in 
women whereas men opt for a more rule-oriented morality. 
Borrowing upon recent revisions in psychoanalytic 
thinking, Gilligan weaves together a feminine view of 
morality which values connectedness, places emphasis on 
interpersonal relationships, and adopts a caring stance 
towards the needs of others. By contrast, she notes 
that the male view of morality is oriented towards 
separation, sensitivity towards rights and duties, and 
the just resolution of competing interests. Gilligan 
has noted 
The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly 
in interviews with women is an injunction to 
care, a responsibility to discern and 
alleviate the "real and recognizable trouble" 
of this world. For men, the moral imperative 
appears rather as an injunction to respect the 
rights of others and thus to protect from 
interference the rights to life and 
self-fulfillment. (p. 100) 
In addition to her claims of male-female moral 
orientations, Gilligan charges that developmental 
theorists (e.g., Kohlberg) have unfairly advocated a 
male oriented view of morality which, in effect, has 
undervalued the female moral orientation that prizes 
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care and connectedness. In this respect, the female 
orientation has been unfairly viewed as simply a 
deviation of the male oriented justice view of morality. 
In reality, what is needed, says Gilligan, is a blending 
of these two perspectives (''voices") in each person 
thereby transforming morality in a way that neither 
perspective could envision separately. 
Colby and Damon (1983) have noted "this book 
[Gilligan's] has created an unusual excitement within 
and beyond the field of psychology, no doubt because it 
is full of exciting ideas" (p. 473). Yet a close 
scrutiny raises questions, state these two critics, as 
to the adequacy of Gilligan's claims. Colby and Damon 
note that studies documenting sex differences are mixed. 
There is some evidence which suggests male-female 
difference regarding some aspects of social behavior and 
occupational choice. However, other areas of 
development, specifically cognitive maturation and 
aspects of personal behaviors, show no differences. 
Colby and Damon remark that "the available research 
data, therefore, do not reveal a clear picture of global 
dichotomy between the life orientation of men and women" 
(p. 476). They cautiously add, however, that ambiguous 
conclusions regarding sex-differences do not necessarily 
undercut Gilligan's assertions. In a related vein, 
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Nunner-Winkler (1984) reports limited research findings 
which point to strikingly similar moral reasoning 
patterns between males and females thus questioning 
Gilligan's claim concerning sex differences in moral 
orientation. 
Kohlberg (1984) has provided the greatest challenge 
to Gilligan's thesis of differing moral orientations in 
males and females. He readily acknowledges that his 
moral judgement theory was originally based on empirical 
findings utilizing only male subjects. He accedes to 
Gilligan's contention that there exists an ethics of 
care orientation, and maintains such a perspective 
"usefully enlarges the moral domain" (p. 360). What he 
does challenge is Gilligan's claim that there exists sex 
differences when Kohlberg's scoring format is utilized. 
Although Gilligan (1982) does not report a summary of 
quantitative data, another report by Gilligan and her 
colleagues (cited by Kohlberg, 1984) offers findings 
on male-female responses to Kohlberg's justice dilemmas. 
Gilligan claims the data support the conclusion that a 
bias against the female moral orientation exists in 
Kohlberg 1 s moral theory. Kohlberg (1984) responds 11 we 
totally disagree with this conclusion and that it is 
unwarranted, given their own findings" (p. 342). 
Kohlberg goes on to critique Gilligan's assertions and 
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points out the following shortcomings in her 
conclusions: lack of test-retest reliability, 
utilization of a scoring format at variance with 
Kohlberg's own measure and which he claims sacrifices 
the conceptual integrity of the individual's moral 
developmental stage, and psychologically (clinically) 
insignificant differences between males and females. 
Although Kohlberg admits that the charge of sex bias 
might be germane in regard to his original stage scoring 
formulated in his 1958 dissertation, he strongly refutes 
the assertion that the currently revised scoring format 
fosters a sex bias. Kohlberg proceeds to review a 
substantial body of literature which focus on 
male-female moral reasoning differences. He finds that 
where dissimilarity exists, it can be attributed to 
educational and vocational differences. Further, his 
longitudinal study of kibbutz males and females report 
"no significant mean sex-differences•• (p. 348). He 
concludes: "studies comparing the sexes in justice 
reasoning stage either report no sex differences or 
report sex differences attributable to higher education 
and role-taking opportunity differences related to work" 
(p. 348). Colby and Damon (1983) offer essentially the 
same critique when, after reviewing the available 
literature they conclude: "while her [Gilligan's] 
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t ayal of general sex linked life orientations in por r 
intuitively appealing, the research evidence at this 
point does not support such a generalized distinction 11 
(p. 479). Kohlberg resolves the tension of an ethic of 
justice versus an ethics of care by interweaving these 
two perspective into his own justice orientation. 
Kohlberg maintains that principled morality is concerned 
with the rights and duties of every person whereas a 
care orientation stresses the bondedness and connected-
ness one maintains with the entire community; in effect, 
both orientations champion mutual care and respect 
towards life. In sum, Kohlberg credits Gilligan with 
enlarging "the moral domain beyond our focus on justice 
reasoning" (p. 358). Nonetheless, he disallows her 
claim that there exist two moral orientations and 
prefers to view the justice orientations as conceptually 
adequate to accommodate an ethics of care. 
Moreover, a close reading of Kohlberg's recent 
reformulation shows that Kohlberg is attempting to 
acknowledge the importance of a care ethics, yet 
preserve the priority he assigns to the justice 
orientation. Accordingly, although Kohlberg argues that 
justice and care share a similar focus with respect to 
responsible concern towards humanity, a closer 
examination of the origin of justice in Kohlberg's 
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theory reveals a distinctive bias towards a cognitive 
emphasis of morality thereby favoring the justice 
orientation. That is, the cognitive emphasis associated 
with moral judgment reasoning, in effect, subordinates 
the more affect-laden response of care and benevolence 
to the cognitive view of justice. 
In earlier writings (Kohlberg, 1981) emphasized the 
need for "role-taking" to develop moral judgment. Yet, 
present throughout his writing there exist an 
appreciation and concern for the welfare of others which 
he views as inherent in the cognitive-developmental 
approach. Thus he writes that moral judgments entail "a 
concern for welfare consequences'' (p. 143) and that "the 
psychological unity of empathy and justice in moral role 
taking is also apparent at the very start of the moral 
enterprise" (p. 143). Furthermore, 
And 
Psychologically, both welfare concerns (role 
taking, empathy) and justice concerns, are 
present at the birth of morality and at every 
succeeding stage and take on more 
differentiated, integrated, and universalized forms 
at each step of development. (p. 175) 
The centrality of role taking for moral 
judgment is based on sympathy for others, as 
well as in the notion that the moral judge 
must adopt the perspective of the 11 impartial 
spectator" or the "generalized other." (p. 
141) 
In essence, Kohlberg views the sympathetic, 
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affect-laden empathic dimension as originating at the 
earliest stages of moral development. Still, he 
consistently views the cognitive dimension of 
role-taking as the means for advancing moral judgment 
and little mention is made of a more sympathetic arousal 
to the plight of others (e.g., empathy) as a means for 
fostering stage advancement. 
In light of the foregoing, it is instructive to 
note that not all role-taking leads to beneficial 
results. For example, Pritchard (1981) maintains 
that role-taking might serve to reinforce one's 
"resentment" towards those who are more adequately 
endowed; that is, experiencing an awareness 
(role-taking) of another who is better off might arouse 
an internal condition of jealousy towards the other 
rather than serve as a catalyst for advancing moral 
judgment. In addition, Kohlberg does not address the 
issue of empathic overarousal. Thus, if one is more 
empathically aroused towards the plight of others, then 
such empathic arousal might well supersede any cognitive 
role taking experience thereby giving greater support to 
an affective dimension for morality. 
In addition, many theorists have questioned whether 
morality can be so easily identified with a cognitive 
orientation. For example, Haan et al. (1985) argue that 
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emotions are integral to any moral understanding. 
Whereas Kohlberg would view a moral problems in terms of 
the moral agent's dispassionate rise above the 
co~~radictions and emotional turmoil engendered by the 
moral problem, Haan et al. (1985) would see emotion as 
an integral component in the obtainment of a moral 
solution. 
Emotions accompany and enrich understandings, 
and they convey far more authentic information 
about a person's position in a dispute than 
any well-articulated thoughts. In ordinary 
circumstances, emotions instruct and energize 
action. In situations of great moral costs, 
emotions can overwhelm and disorganize 
cognitive evaluations. (p. 147) 
Relatedly, it is likely that a person's investment 
in a meaningful everyday moral encounter is likely to 
elicit ego-defensiveness. In other words, everyday life 
situations which present moral difficulties for an 
individual are likely to evoke a variety of affective 
responses which are proportional to the situational 
meanings such encounters hold for the individual; in 
contrast, Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas are far 
removed from ego concerns and thereby enlist little ego 
involvement (Haan 1977; Haan, et al., 1985). 
Consequently, as Villenave-Cremer and Eckensberger 
(1985) assert 
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Whether a subject is able to apply his or her 
moral competence to a real-life context seems 
not only to be a structural problem but rather 
a problem of affectively dealing with personal 
needs and self-interests in a situation. (p. 
176) . 
Interestingly, the researchers entertain the notion that 
the prevalent and consistent finding that adults score 
at a conventional level might suggest, that individuals 
are more inclined, from an emotional standpoint, to 
adopt a societal perspective rather than to confront the 
emotional strain of justifying a position of individual 
rights which represents the more advanced stage 5 
thinking. 
Consequently, inasmuch as Kohlberg (1984) 
identifies morality as the justice principle, little 
emphasis is given to the role of affect. In the latest 
revision of his theory (Kohlberg, 1984), the stark 
primacy of cognition can still be viewed. 
Just as the strength of the emotional 
component is irrelevant to the theoretical 
importance of cognitive structure for understanding 
the development of scientific judgment, so also is 
the quantitative role of affect relatively 
irrelevant for understanding the structure and 
development of justice reasoning. (p. 292) 
Kohlberg views emotions as 11 part" of moral 
development yet "they do not tell us anything directly 
about the specifically moral development of the subject" 
(p. 293). All in all, Kohlberg's position endorses the 
primacy of cognition over affect. As a consequence; an 
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ethics grounded in affective responding (e.g., empathic 
arousal} and the consequent behaviors (prosocial 
responses) is accorded ancillary status. 
Given the foregoing tenets of Kohlberg's theory, an 
ethics of care orientation must look elsewhere for its 
foundation. Relegating emotion to a secondary status in 
moral development, however, is clearly at variance with 
the historical traditions of many religiously oriented 
ethical approaches. The accentuated nature of a 
cognitive approach to morality, as exemplified in 
Kohlberg's theory, undermines the prosocial dispositions 
accorded more normatively based traditions. Not 
surprisingly, critics of Kohlberg (e.g., Ellrod, 1980) 
have underscored this point. Heretofore, religious 
educators (e.g., Moran, 1984) as well as theologians 
(e.g., Conn, 1983; O'Connell, 1978; Spohn, 1984) 
have maintained that emotion exercises a critical role 
in human moral experience. Similarly, in psychological 
circles, the role of emotion has received support not 
only from researchers advocating empathy and 
prosociality as a basis for morality (e.g., Hoffman) but 
also from other theorists who view emotion as the 
foundation for morality (e.g., Kagan, 1984). 
4. The inability of the justice orientation to sustain 
a value content for moral decisions. 
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A fourth criticism leveled against Kohlberg's moral 
theory is the absence of a value content for moral 
development. As noted previously, Kohlberg's moral 
theory arose from the disillusionment emanating from the 
"bag of virtues" approach to morality. In the sixties 
Kohlberg (1981) disassociated his own theory from a 
content-laden approach which advocates distinct values 
and normatively based ethical guidelines. "In my view a 
culturally universal definition of morality can be 
arrived at if morality is thought of as the form of 
moral judgments instead of the content of specific moral 
beliefs" (p. 300). 
Although Kohlberg continues to advocate a content 
free view of moral development, he has modified somewhat 
his original statement regarding the value-free nature 
of moral development. After working in several 
experimental educational settings, Kohlberg, in 1975, 
altered his absolute prohibition of value content and 
admitted the necessity of some content acquisition by 
students. 
I realize now that the psychologist's 
abstractions of moral "cognition" (judgment and 
reasoning) from moral action, and the 
abstraction of structure in moral cognition and 
judgment from content are necessary 
abstractions for certain psychological research 
purposes. It is not a sufficient guide to the 
moral educator who deals with the moral concrete in 
a school world in which value content as well as 
structure, behavior as well as reasoning must be 
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dealt with. In this context, the educator must be 
a socializer teaching value content and behavior, 
and not only a Socratic or Rogerian 
process-facilitator of development. 
Kohlberg goes on to state that 
I no longer hold these negative views of 
indoctrinative moral education and I believe 
that the concepts guiding moral education must 
be partly "indoctrinative." This is true, by 
necessity, in a world in which children engage 
in stealing, cheating, and aggression and in a 
context wherein one cannot wait until children 
reach the fifth stage to deal directly with 
moral behavior. (1975, p. 14) 
still, such normative criteria bear resemblance to the 
"bag of virtues" approach which he has disclaimed. More 
importantly, however, Kohlberg appears to see the need 
to set forth some culturally universal behaviors which 
are requisite for nascent moral development. 
In order to accommodate normative values and 
behaviors, Kohlberg has discussed the ethics of 
benevolence. In contrast to the justice principle which 
is defined by its focus on equality, equity, and 
fairness, the principle of benevolence is associated 
with 11 Christian ethical teaching" or "agape" and the 
religiously held notions such as "charity," 
"brotherhood," and "community." Further, he admits that 
"the principle or care or responsible love has not been 
adequately addressed in our work" (p. 227). 
Nonetheless, even though he makes this admission, he 
still places questions of care under the mantle of 
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cognition. Kohlberg contends that the justice ethic, 
which embraces the 11 concepts 11 of reciprocity and 
contract, is capable of handling the situational 
realities (e.g., relationship and personal conflicts, 
prosocial responses) raised by an ethic of benevolence. 
Yet he also contends that another meaning of moral, 
which he terms "special" obligations and relationships, 
is also capable of resolving difficulties arising out of 
particular relationships. Although Kohlberg 
acknowledges, in effect, two uses of the word 11 moral 11 --
one embracing the justice ethic and the attributes of 
impartiality, universalizability, and consensual 
dialogue in contradistinction to a second approach 
defined in terms of caring and altruistic responses 
accorded special relationships and obligations to family 
and friends--he points out that the latter is relative 
and culturally determined. Moreover, Kohlberg maintains 
that an ethic of care is best viewed as a "personal" 
sense of the word moral whereas the justice orientation 
is moral because of its impartiality and universal 
application. Kohlberg contends that these two meaning 
of moral are best viewed as contrasting dimensions of 
morality. Yet he clearly favors the "moral" labeling of 
justice because the two dimensions do not share equally 
in ugenerality" and "validity." 
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The cognitive-developmental approach advocated by 
Kohlberg leaves unanswered several questions. First,
the principle of justice is unable to account for
situations where the issue is not the violation of
rights but the question of fulfilling values associated
with prosocial responding. Many human situations are 
typified by instances of prosocial dilemmas wherein 
specific individuals decided the allocation of resources 
or the expenditures of personal energies for 
altruistically based ends. A justice orientation fails 
to appreciate other rationales for behavior such as 
those based on a theistic value system (e.g., Gelpi, 
1978) as suggested by Bergin (1980). Furthermore, 
Kohlberg's identification of principled reasoning with 
morality unfairly abrogates the religious dimension of 
human experience. Moran (1984) argues that separating 
morality and religion obscures what is commonplace for 
most peoples' lives; for a large segment of people, the 
separation of morality and religion is not acceptable. 
In a similar vein, Hauerwas (1981) has noted that the 
concept of 11 moral development" has been unduly circum­
scribed by Kohlberg's justice interpretation. Moral 
development, according to Hauerwas, includes a level of 
growth not based on an advancement of stages, but is 
more aptly characterized as a continuous and deepening 
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commitment to values associated with an ethics of care 
orientation. To summarize, notwithstanding the 
principled perspective of morality advocated by 
Kohlberg, for many theorists there exists a content-
laden dimension of morality that receives little 
attention in Kohlberg's theory. Kohlberg does accept 
some indoctrinative features for morality. Nonetheless, 
the mantle of the justice orientation is unable to 
accommodate the presence of prosocial behaviors which 
are commonly accepted by a theistic value system. 
Consequently, what is needed is a consideration of 
morality that allows for the incorporation of a 
religious dimension which is absent in Kohlberg's 
theory. 
5. Kohlberg's emphasis on moral reasoning rather than 
moral behavior. 
The final criticism of Kohlberg stems from the 
absence of behavior as an essential component for 
morality's meaning. Kohlberg adheres to a formalistic 
principled morality which undercuts the historically 
significant role that ethics have accorded behavior 
when defining morality. As Staub (1978) has pointed 
out, morality is usually centered on personal actions 
which conform to either internalized moral norms 
Which one has adopted or to socio-cultural norms 
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accepted by the individual. Thus, morality seems to 
entail both valued personal beliefs as well as behaviors 
which conform or deviate from the norms of society 
(Rest, 1983). 
In contrast to this more conventionally held 
definition of morality, Kohlberg situates morality in a 
formalized abstraction termed the justice principle. 
Moran (1983) summarizes Kohlberg's position in this 
regard by stating that "Kohlberg wishes to leave behind 
the social (person in interaction) for a philosophical 
ideal" (p. 71). 
As noted previously, Kohlberg (1984) defines moral 
reasoning as the awareness and resolution of moral 
conflicts which lead to the development of a stage 
sequential theory of moral development. Kohlberg (1975) 
has stated that although moral reasoning is only one 
factor in determining an individual's moral behavior, it 
11 is the single most important or influential factor yet 
discovered in moral behavior" (p. 672). For this reason 
Kohlberg has advocated a moral reasoning approach to 
moral education for public school. Practical 
applications of Kohlberg's approach (Kohlberg, 1980; 
Kohlberg & Wasserman, 1980) based on student and staff 
responses have reported a greater level of fairness and 
sense of community among school members. In addition, 
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Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) has shown that 
advancement in moral reasoning stages leads not only to 
increasing acceptance of moral principles (which answer 
the question what is moral) but also increased judgments 
of responsibility (which lead one to accept the 
responsibility to carry out the moral action). These 
results are in line with earlier review of moral 
judgment which show positive correlations with behavior 
(e.g., Blasi, 1980) 
This movement of Kohlberg's thinking towards 
behavior undercuts the charge by Moran that Kohlberg is 
uninterested in moral behavior and that he is willing to 
sacrifice the person's behavior for the ideals present 
in philosophical discourse. Still, the priority in 
Kohlberg's thinking remains the reasoning component 
which enables individuals to resolve conflicting claims 
and duties. 
Kohlberg's increasing willingness to consider 
behavioral linkages to moral reasoning stages in all 
likelihood should allow for some rapprochement with 
educators who favor focusing on behaviors and 
content-laden approaches (values and virtues). 
Nonetheless, Kohlberg's disavowal of the "bag of 
virtues" approach confirms his disinclination to view 
moral development in terms of approaches he terms 
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"indoctrinative." 
On the other hand, recent reanalysis of the 
original Hartshorne and May data shed new light on the 
behavioral aspects of values and suggests that 
Kohlberg's dismissal of this classic study is 
inappropriate. Rushton (1980, 1981) reanalyzed the 
Hartshorne and May data and has found the original 
conclusion of situational specificity to be more one of 
long standing error. Basically, Hartshorne and May 
compared scores on individual tests rather than combined 
test scores. Individual test comparisons led to an 
inflated error variance which is reduced in test battery 
comparisons. For example, Hartshorne and May compared 
single situation tests of altruism separately rather 
than combining them into a single battery for comparison 
with other batteries. Rushton points out that a single 
situation is equivalent to one item on a paper and 
pencil test battery. Combining these single items into 
batteries led to battery correlations in the .50 to .60 
range. Furthermore, teacher rating correlated .80 with 
these battery scores. These reanalyzed findings led 
Rushton (1980) to conclude that although situations do 
influence behavior, there does exist a consistent moral 
self and that "the evidence is very solid that there are 
quite stable and consistent patterns of individual 
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differences across situations" (1980, p. 64). Based on 
these findings, Rushton goes on to describe what he 
terms the altruistic personality. Such people are 
more motivated to engage in a1truistic acts. 
He or she has internalized higher and more 
universal standards of justice, social 
responsibility, and modes of moral reasoning, 
judgment, and knowledge, and/or he or she is 
more empathic to the feelings and suffering of 
others and able to see the world from their 
emotional and motivational perspective. 
On the basis of such motivations, this person 
is likely to value, and to engage in, a great 
variety of altruistic behaviors--from giving 
to people more needy than themselves, to 
comforting others, to rescuing others from 
aversive situations. Altruists also behave 
consistently more honestly, persistently, and 
with greater self-control than do 
nonaltruists. (p. 84) 
Thus, according to Rushton, individuals can 
subscribe to a distinctive value system and reflect this 
value system through behaviors that are consistent 
across a variety of situations. 
Rushton's reevaluation of the original Hartshorne 
and May data gives considerable weight to a conception 
of morality associated with commonly agreed upon 
prosocia1 values. More recently, Small, Zeldin, and 
Savin-Williams (1983) note that behavioral observations 
of adolescent males showed a consistent altruistic 
trait across time and a variety of situations. 
Moreover, religious values and beliefs have been 
shown to be excellent predictors of behavior. For 
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example, Strommen, Breke, Underwager, and Johnson (1972) 
discovered that religious values were frequently better 
predictors of people's attitudes and behaviors than 
commonly used variables as age, occupation, level of 
education, or financial status. Strommen (1984) reports 
three national studies covering three random samples 
totaling over 27,000 secondary school students. In 
these studies Strommen states that the single, best 
indicator of high school students rejection of alcohol 
and drug usage is the value they place in religious 
faith. Relatedly, Benson and William (1982) in an 
empirical analysis of a random sampling of members in 
the 96th Congress, found that religious beliefs and 
values predicted voting behavior patterns to a degree 
commensurate with party affiliation. The value stances 
of lawmakers could account for up to 40% of the variance 
on some issues. Further, when the elected official's 
values stance was combined with party, up to 70% of the 
variability in voting records could be explained. 
Strommen (1984) maintains 
In several of our major studies we were able 
to probe people's religious beliefs and values 
as well as their psychological, sociological, 
and demographic dimensions. In each case, 
these studies have shown that religious 
variables rank high as predictors of behavior. 
(p. 153) 
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In sum, Kohlberg's resolute resistance and unyield-
ing criticism of a "bag of virtues'' approach to morality 
are open to serious questioning. Research has documented 
in many cases the significant role that values can 
exercise in fostering a distinctive set of behaviors. 
A summa;:y 
In sum, Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental 
view of moral development has provided developmental 
psychology and education with a rich reservoir of 
empirical data. Nevertheless, sufficient questions 
regarding Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view exist 
to warrant consideration of other approaches. More 
specifically, the questions related to the purpose and 
function of a sixth stage, the applicability of a 
justice ethic in everyday life, the subordination of an 
ethics of care to an ethics of justice as well as the 
diminution accorded the affective domain of morality, 
the refusal to consider a value content dimension 
to morality, and the question of a behavioral dimension 
for morality render Kohlberg's approach to morality as 
questionable when the focus is on a morality for 
everyday life. By contrast, viewing morality from a 
foundational perspective of empathic development leads 
to an understanding of morality sufficiently at variance 
with Kohlberg's perspective to warrant detailed 
investigation. This latter approach to morality, 
likewise, is consonant with a morality focused on 
everyday life events. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF EMPATHY
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory remains 
the dominant perspective from which to view a psychology
of morality. Nonetheless, the limitations of Kohlberg's 
perspective as well as the complexity of the nature of 
morality have engendered both variations of Kohlberg's 
theory as well as competitors. Among the variations to 
Kohlberg's cognitive developmental view are transactive 
induction processes (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983); the 
distributive justice paradigm (Damon, 1975; Enright, 
Enright, & Lapsey, 1981); the retributive justice 
orientation (Lapsey & Quintana, 1985); and prosocial 
moral reasoning (Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, 1982). 
More significant differences exist when the 
question moves fro� cognitive-developmental approaches 
to the issue of the origin of morality. Kohlberg has 
argued for a ontogenetic understanding of the justice 
principle as a basis for morality. Other researchers 
have maintained that it is possible to look for an 
affective source for morality (Kagan, 1984; Rest, 1983). 




T~J!~~.1:!.il}S of El!l2_a t_l}y 
The idea that empathy is essential for morality has 
a rich heritage in Western thought. 11 For at least 300 
years philosophers in the Anglo-American (or 
utilitarian) tradition of ethics have assumed that man 
has an innate social sensitivity which plays an 
important role in moral development" (Hogan, 1973, p. 
222). Historically, philosophers such as David Hume and 
Adam Smith as well as social scientists such as George 
Herbert Mead have accorded a significant role for 
empathy in their own theories (Hoffman, 1981b, Hogan, 
1973). 
The origin of empathy is derived from the German 
word Einfuhlung which is most aptly translated as 
"feeling into" (Gill, 1982). The word Einfuhlung was 
introduced into psychological literature by Lipps in his 
discussions of aesthetic perception. Originally, Lipps 
viewed the person as projecting him or herself into an 
object; as a consequence, the perceiver developed a far 
deeper appreciative understanding of the object at hand. 
Later, Lipps widened his definition to include people as 
the objects of empathic focus. The notion of empathic 
understanding arose from the observer's reaction to the 
observed person's behavior. In effect, the perceiver 
provided cues which served as signals for 
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his or her newly found understanding of the other 
person. In 1910 Tichner translated the word Einfuhlung 
as "empathy" (Goldstein & Michaels, 1985). 
At the beginning of this century empathy was first 
used to describe an aesthetic experience which arose 
while viewing a piece of art. By mid-century, however, 
clinical uses of empathy became prominent. For example, 
Rogers (1957) has suggested that empathy was best viewed 
as a necessary ingredient for successful therapeutic 
interaction between therapist and client. Recently, 
therapy studies have deviated from Roger's 
phenomenological definition of empathy and have 
considered empathy more as a "process" of responding to 
the client's experience rather than as the vicariously 
aroused state of the therapist (Hackney, 1978). 
Surprisingly, although empathy is a richly nuanced term 
having great import for human relationships and social 
well-being, Clark (1980) has criticized the dearth of 
theoretical and empirical studies regarding empathy ir. 
social science literature. 
A problem arises in empathy research because there 
exist numerous definitions. Hackney (1978) has noted 
there are at least 21 empathy definitions in the 
therapeutic literature alone. This plethora of 
definitions notwithstanding, two salient characteris_tics 
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often appear in empathy discussions. These 
characteristics are: (a} an awareness of another's 
situation (cognitive component} and (bl an arousal to 
another's plight and distress (affective component). 
Studies cited herein focus on these two 
characteristics. Several instruments for measuring 
empathy (e.g., Hogan, 1969; Mehrabian, 1972) have 
interspersed both cognitive and affective dimensions 
within the measure. According to Davis (1980), however, 
t~e limitation of the aforementioned instruments are 
their reliance on a single empathy score thereby 
bringing affective and cognitive components of empathy 
into a unidimensional framework. Utilizing factor 
analysis, Davis has developed the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI) which is capable of delineating 
affective (concern) and cognitive (perspective taking) 
components. In addition, Davis was able to identify two 
other dimensions--a fantasy dimension and a distress 
dimension. Within this study, Hoffman 1 s definition of 
empathy (which is stated below) is utilized. 
11:!.e Human Ca12aci ty_for Al.truism 
Martin Hoffman has proposed the most integrated and 
sophisticated theory of empathic development. 
Accounting for physiological, affective, and cognitive 
development, Hoffman (1981, 1982, 1983) has posited an 
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affective basis for morality directly challenging the 
view of morality set forth by cognitive-developmental 
theory. 
Empathy 1 s importance is best viewed when 
considering its role in the development of altruism 
(Hoffman, 1975, 1981a). At this point it is important 
to clarify the two most commonly used words in 
psychological literature that are associated with caring 
for others-- "prosocial" and 11 altruism" (although other 
words such as "positive behavior" are frequently found). 
The psychological literature usually delineates these 
two terms in the following way. 11 Prosocial 11 is used 
when the behavioral act benefits another, although the 
person might receive some reward for his or her action. 
On the other hand, "altruism" is used for those acts 
which are done selflessly and for which one derives no 
benefit to speak of. In fact, one might actually suffer 
(self-sacrifice) when engaging in the altruistic act or 
encounter some personal risk when engaging in the act. 
There is, of course, a "fine" line between these two 
terms and the research literature reflects this thinking 
(e.g., Staub, 1978). Hoffman does not directly address 
this distinction. He utilizes altruism as defined above 
and focuses on the concern (as demonstrated by affective 
arousal) that the empathizer 
has for the other. 
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For the sake of variety, prosocial 
is used interchangeably with altruism, and both terms 
will reflect Hoffman's understanding which focuses on a 
selfless care towards the other. 
Anthropological evidence indicates that prehistoric 
individuals encountered an adverse and hostile 
environment. As a consequence, social cooperation would 
maximize survival. However, since the unit of 
reproduction is the individual rather than the group, 
some anthropologists have argued for an egoistic view of 
the human person. According to Hoffman, evolution has 
provided two motives which enable the human species to 
survive. On the one hand, there exists an egoistic 
motive which motivates the person to engage in actions 
for self-protection or the enhancement of one's own 
condition. On the other hand, there exists an 
independent altruistic motive which promotes the other 1 s 
welfare 11 without conscious regard for one's own self-
interestlt {1981a, p. 124). Hoffman envisions empathy as 
the source of this care for others. 
Accordingly, both an egoistic motive and an altruistic 
motive are necessary as both motive systems allow for 
an optimal level of human adaptability and, therefore, 
human survival. 
62 
The tension between an egoistic and altruistic 
basis for human nature can be resolved, says Hoffman, if 
evidence can be found for some prosociality which also 
enhances individual fitness. Hoffman finds support for 
such thinking in Trivers 1 view of reciprocal altruism. 
Essentially, Trivers uses a "rescue model" to 
demonstrate that natural selection must favor altruism. 
even between non-related individuals. The inclusion of 
non-related individuals is at variance with other 
theories such as kin selection which argue for an 
"inclusive fitness" which means an organism's tendency 
not only to favor offspring but also the fitness of 
other relatives who share the same genes {Hoffman 
maintains that this latter view of kin selection also 
favors a biological disposition towards altruism). In 
short, Trivers' model asserts that if there are two 
individuals (called X and Y) and Xis in serious need, 
the model assumes that the cost to Y is less than the 
gain for X and that there exists a high likelihood that 
roles will be reversed in the future. As Hoffman 
( 198 la) notes, "it is, in other words, in the 
individual's long-term selfish interest to take the 
relatively low risks associated with helping others in 
danger" (p. 124). That is, ultimately it is to the 
benefit of each individual if everyone responds 
prosocially. 
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An objection to this evidence for biological 
altruism comes in the form of gene benefit; in other 
words, the person's genes ultimately prosper because of 
such role reversals. Hoffman asserts that such a view 
would render the whole notion of altruism useless 
because all behavior would be reduced to selfishness. 
In addition, Hoffman points out that this debate is the 
result of differing levels of conceptualization. That 
is, one must look not at individual genes but at the 
total organism who encounters the challenges and 
adversities of the environment. Citing Gould (1977), 
Hoffman notes "selection simply cannot see genes and 
pick among them directly .... Selection views bodies. It 
favors some because they are stronger, better insulated, 
etc." (p. 24). Or, as Hoffman (1981) states, "it is the 
total organism or body that confronts the persistent 
ecological pressures and is directly involved in the 
struggle for existence" (p. 123). He thus concludes 
that a minimum level of prosociality is necessary in 
order to insure human survival. This being the case, he 
asks the question as to the origin of this altruistic 
response. He finds that the human mechanism for this 
response is rooted is the human experience of 
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empathy. Over time, empathic interactions fostered the 
social bonding n~cessary for community survival. 
The validity of an independent altruistic motive, 
says Hoffman, comes from research which documents 
individual's spontaneously helping others, particularly 
when they are the only persons available to aid the 
distressed person. Furthermore, if the basis of 
altruistic responding resides in egoism, then one would 
expect individuals in need of social approval to help 
more than others who feel satisfied with their level of 
social approval. In fact, the research supports the 
opposite conclusion; that is, individuals who are 
satisfied with their own social approval are most likely 
to engage in altruistic acts. A likely reason for this 
phenomenon is that individuals who are dissatisfied with 
their social standing are most likely to be "needy" 
emotionally. Therefore, they adopt ego defensive 
strategies and utilize their psychic energies to deal 
with feelings of inadequacy. Consequently, they are 
less likely to be attentive to the needs of others 
having focused their psychic energies on their own 
troubled emotional states. 
Finally there exists biological evidence to support 
the idea of an altruistic motive. Citing studies by 
MacLean which focus on the limbic system's effect on 
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expressive and feeling states, Hoffman (1975) notes that 
part of the limbic system appears to be related to 
prosociality and the development of social bondedness 
with others. MacLean reports that one area of the 
limbic system is associated with emotions which foster 
self-preservation. On the other hand, MacLean maintains 
another area of the limbic system is predisposed to 
sociability. Citing MacLean (1962), Hoffman (1975) 
notes "in the complex organization of the 
phylogenetically old and new structures under 
consideration we presumably have a neural ladder for 
ascending from the most primitive sexual feeling to the 
highest level of altruistic sentiments" (p. 300). In 
addition, the biological study of the brain appears to 
sustain the biological possibility for altruism. 
MacLean has shown a neural connection exists among the 
primitive limbic cortex, the hypothalamus (which 
integrates somatic experiences and feeling states) and 
the prefrontal cortex (which fosters insight and an 
awareness of others' needs). Says Hoffman (1975) 
In other words, the brain structures required 
for affective involvement with objects in the 
external world, including people, were 
apparently present early in man's evolution. 
The more recent addition of newer brain 
structures along with the acquisition of 
connective neural circuits have made it 
possible for such affect to be experienced in 
conjunction with a cognitive, increasingly 
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sophisticated social awareness or insight into 
others--and all of this appears to be independent 
of the neural base for egoistic, self-preserving 
behavior. In brief, the neural basis for a 
primitive empathy was apparently present early in 
man ' s evolution . ( p. 61 0) 
Clark (1980), likewise, has argued that altruism 
necessitates advanced neurocortical development and 
adequate limbic system functioning. 
Taken together, Hoffman believes that the varying 
pieces of evidence lend support to an altruistic motive 
in human social exchanges. Given that this is the case, 
Hoffman inquires as to what is the mediator or mechanism 
which fosters altruistic behavior. Hoffman maintains 
that empathy is the most likely mediator for an 
altruistic response. 
The_Components and Modes __ o( Empath_y 
Hoffman (1979, 1980, 1981b, 1982) has elaborately 
detailed the nature and development of empathy. 
According to Hoffman (1982), empathy is a vicarious 
affective response to another's situation. Unlike other 
definitions of empathy which stress the emotional 
arousal of the individual, Hoffman's definition focuses 
on the appropriateness of one's response to another's 
experience rather than on one's internal feeling state. 
This "appropriateness" is derived from the cognitive 
component of empathy which allows for an accurate 
interpretation of another's state. Furthermore, in 
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addition to affective arousal, empathy appears closely 
linked to a naturally induced state to respond 
altruistically to another's distress. 
Hoffman (1981b, 1982) maintains there exists six 
modes of empathic arousal. From a developmental 
perspective, these modes appear in the following order. 
ctive Newborn Developmental studies 
demonstrate that even three day old infants utter 
reactive cries upon hearing the cries of other infants. 
Although it is impossible to state whether such 
reactions are learned or innate, it has been shown that 
infants respond to the distressed cry of other infants. 
"This reactive cry must therefore be considered as a 
possible early precursor of empathy, though not a full 
empathic response because it lacks any awareness of what 
is happening" (1981b, p. 45). In other words, Hoffman 
observes that, developmentally, the newborn lacks the 
ability to comprehend the actual situation of the other. 
~l~ssical Conditioning. Soon after the experience 
of the reactive cry, the infant can view the distress of 
another at the same time that he or she is experiencing 
distress. Conditioning results from the fact that 
"distress cues from others become conditioned stimuli 
that evoke feelings of distress in the self" (p. 45). 
Hoffman offers as an example the tenseness of a mother 
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who, upon holding her child, conditions an anxious state 
in the child. At a later time, the mother's facial or 
verbal cues which accompany her distress (conditioned 
stimuli) engender distress in the child even in the 
absence of physical contact. 
Direct_Association. A more general type of 
conditioning exists through an association. This third 
mode of empathic arousal is contingent upon the past 
experience of the empathizer. In other words, the 
distress cues of another evoke in the child his or her 
past experiences of distress which in turn induce an 
empathic response. 
The feelings of distress that accompanied those 
past experiences are then evoked by distress cues 
from the victim that call up any of them. It is 
thus a far more general mechanism than 
conditioning, one which may provide the basis for a 
variety of distress experiences with which children 
and adults as well may empathize. (p. 46) 
In this mode of empathic arousal a person 
imitates the facial and posture of another person. This 
imitation in turn leads to "inner kinesthetic cues" 
which aid the observer in understanding the other and 
allow for the feeling of similar emotions. Heretofore, 
this mode of empathy has been passed over because of its 
instinctual overtones; however, Hoffman maintains it is 
a plausible empathic experience. 
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A more advanced mode of 
empathic arousal is associated with symbolization. In 
this mode a person becomes aware of another's distress 
through symbols (e.g., reading a letter). Thus, 
language mediates between the empathizing observer and 
the distress of the victim. 
;sg_le-taki~. Empathic experiences associated with 
the previous five modes requires only minimum cognitive 
effort. Role-taking, on the other hand, the most 
developmentally advanced of the empathic modes, requires 
an individual to imagine how he or she would feel in the 
other's situation. This imaging of the other's 
situation leads one to "experience some of what the 
other person is feeling" (p. 47). 
Hoffman does not view these six modes as equally 
utilized in everyday life situations; rather, reactive 
crying terminates with maturation whereas role-taking is 
infrequently utilized. The four intermediate modes are 
used intermittently throughout the life span and require 
a variety of situational cues for their activation. 
Hoffman (1980) maintains that empathy has two 
components: cognitive and affective. In addition, 
there exists what might be termed a motivational 
component derived from empathic affect. This three-
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fold delineation is crucial inasmuch as most definitions 
of empathy (Clark, 1980; Goldstein & Michaels, 1985) 
underscore cognitive and affective dimensions yet fail 
to focus on subsequent behaviors which reduce the plight 
of the distressed person. 
'[he_ D~yE!JQP"1'!.E!_~!_Q_L_gl}!12_~ thY 
Hoffman (1979, 1980, 1981b, 1982) maintains that 
the cognitive transformation of empathy transpires 
developmentally. Hoffman's theory sets forth four 
developmental levels of empathic distress. 
Global_Empath,y. Essentially, before the year one, 
the child lacks the capacity to differentiate the self 
from others. Thus the child, upon viewing the distress 
of the other, is unable to construe the distressed 
person's plight as separate from his or her own and, 
therefore, he or she acts accordingly. This empathic 
response is termed global because the child fails to 
differentiate between the discomfort of others and his 
or her own distress; thus, distress is experienced as a 
diffuse and generalized state encompassing both the 
distressed person as well as the infant. 
nRgocentric __ EJllPathY.'._'. Having obtained "person 
Permanence," the child is capable of differentiating the 
self from others thereby understanding that the distress 
of the other is not one's own. At this stage a child is 
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most likely to respond to the other's distress by 
sharing an object or engaging in a behavior which 
relieves the child's own distress. Thus Hoffman cites 
as an example the 13 month old child who, upon seeing 
the distress of the adult, offer the adult his favorite 
doll. Hoffman places quotations on the word egocentric 
to point out this reference is not entirely accurate; 
that is, he does not view the child's behavior as 
selfish. Insofar as egocentrism is present, the child 
does confuse actions which offer relief to the other 
with actions which mitigate the child's own distress. 
Nonetheless, both the affective tone of the child's 
utterances and his or her facial cues as well as the 
behavior itself points to a developmentally 
appropriate altruistic response. 
E~athy_for_Another's_Feelings. Although at first 
rudimentary, the inception of role-taking allows the 2 
or 3 year old child to begin to appreciate the others's 
feelings and interpretations of events as separate from 
his or hew own. At the same time, the child's language 
development allows for an inner awareness and 
sensitivity to the feelings of others. Finally, with 
development, the child becomes increasingly 
sophisticated at differentiating the feeling of others 
and empathizing simultaneously with several feelings. 
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Although not directly addressing the question of 
empathy, recent developmental research demonstrates that 
very young children show a remarkable level of 
prosociality, thus lending support to Hoffman 1 s 
contention of an altruistic dimension to human nature 
(Bridgeman, 1983; Hay & Rheingold, 1983; 
Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1982). These 
findings run contrary to earlier theoretical 
speculations (e.g., Freud} which frame an egocentric 
focus for the child. Apparently earlier interpretations 
of child development eschewed the prosocial nature of 
children and adopted instead a non-social egocentrism 
(Hay & Rheingold, 1983). In fact, some theorists (e.g., 
Bridgeman, 1983} conclude that prosociality is possible 
even in 2 year old children. Given these developmental 
features of childhood, Hoffman would view the child 
capable of moral acts {if prosociality is accepted as 
the basis for morality). In fact, given the possibility 
of prosociality even among young children, it can be 
concluded that empathy theorists would argue that even 
very young children are capable of a moral response. 
True to the nature of developmental thinking, empathy 
theorists would ultimately maintain that although the 
young child is incapable of sophisticated moral 
explanations of his or her action, the fact that he or 
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she responds at whatever level of empathy is 
developmentally appropriate points to a moral response. 
Em~athy_for_Anothers General Pl!g_ht. By the later 
childhood years, a young person or early adolescent is 
capable of understanding that other people possess 
independent life histories, that immediate feelings are 
oftentimes transitory, and that the other person has 
feelings beyond a particular situation. Thus, at this 
level, a child can imagine the situation of the other 
beyond the situation at hand (e.g., the child realizes 
that an economically deprived peer might be joyful over 
receiving a birthday gift, yet that this child is still 
disadvantaged). This final level elicits a more 
sophisticated response from the observer which balances 
immediate reactions to the other's plight with a fuller 
understanding of the other's existential situation. 
Hoffman (1981b) concludes: 
To summarize, empathy is the coalescence of 
vicariously aroused affect and a mental 
representation of the other, at whatever level 
the observer is capable. Individuals who 
progress through the four stages become 
capable of a high level of empathic distress 
(p. 50). 
Although not considered a level, Hoffman maintains 
that a more advanced understanding of "Empathy for 
Another's Plight" allows the older child or adolescent 
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to empathize with entire classes of people (e.g., the 
poor, the oppressed, a racial or political group). This 
wider domain for empathizing results from the 
abstractive and hypothetical abilities engendered by 
formal operational thinking (e.g., Elkind, 1975). 
!J!!..12~!:_hy__As a_Mot i ve ~_f_or Al truism 
Empathic distress has so far been viewed as having 
both a cognitive and an affective component. The 
interplay of these two components is discerned when 
Hoffman (1981b) notes that the affective and cognitive 
components are ''derived from the observer's cognitive 
sense of the other" (p. 51). Equally important, this 
enhanced cognitive capacity, in addition to fostering 
empathic distress, fosters in the observer a feeling of 
sympathetic distress (or what is generally termed 
compassion). The end result of the observer's awareness 
of the other and sympathetic distress is an inclination 
to respond prosocially. 
In addition to the cognitive and affective 
components of empathic distress and the concurrently 
felt state of sympathetic distress, Hoffman asserts that 
guilt exercises a special role in influencing the 
child's prosocial nature. In order to understand the 
child's guilt experience, the relationship of empathy 
and socialization requires brief discussion. 
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Hoffman notes that parental socialization is a 
primary influence on children's empathic reactions. 
Hoffman (1980) has summarized research on parental 
discipline into three broad categories: power 
assertion, love withdrawal, and induction. Power 
asserting techniques are utilized when the parent 
attempts to influence the child through their physical 
strength or control over the child's possessions. 
Examples of this approach include physical force and 
control over choices (e.g., refusing to grant permis-
sions). Love withdrawal takes place when the message in 
the parental technique is separation or the threat of 
abandonment. Examples of this technique include 
isolating the child, threatening to leave the child and 
refusing to speak to the child. Whereas these first two 
approaches have a highly punitive quality, induction 
techniques provide the child with reasoning or focus on 
internal processes which the child might already be 
utilizing. Examples of this technique include pointing 
out to the child the consequences of his or her actions 
on others or appealing to the child's pride, ability to 
master situations, or concern for others. "These 
techniques rely less on fear and more on the children's 
connecting their cognitive content with his own 
resources for comprehending the requirements of the 
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situation and controlling his behavior accordingly" (p. 
322}, 
In short, inductive techniques allow the child to 
focus on and to attend to the hurt they have caused 
others thereby activating empathic arousal to the 
distressed person's plight. In reality, Hoffman asserts 
that delineation of parental discipline techniques into 
one of the three categories above is often not possible; 
in other words, discipline often shows aspects of all 
three approaches. For example, the punitive nature of 
power assertion may be necessary in order to gain the 
child's attention. Nonetheless, the presence of an 
inductive dimension in the discipline triggers empathic 
arousal and allows the child to focus on the 
consequences of his or her behavior. 
Hoffman (1970) has demonstrated that older children 
socialized to induction parenting techniques (being made 
aware of the consequences of one's actions) are more 
inclined to behave prosocially than children socialized 
through methods of love withdrawal and assertion of 
power techniques. More recently, Zahn-Waxler, 
Radke-Yarrow, and King (1979) have shown this same 
result for younger children. Utilizing such inductive 
techniques fosters the child's awareness of the 
consequences of his or her actions (e.g., hurting the 
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other). Most likely, this experience, says Hoffman, 
causes a guilt reaction and leads to helping behaviors. 
In all likelihood, a cognitive component is integral to 
the guilt response. Cognitive transformation enables 
the child to develop more sophisticated guilt 
responses. That is, cognitive maturation allows the 
child to view how his or her actions might qe the source 
of another's injury. Thus, even younger children can 
feel guilty over the observed physical hurt that they 
cause the other. However, a more developmentally 
advanced form of cognition is necessary to attribute 
self-blame to one's own actions or feel guilt over the 
anticipation of hurting the other. Furthermore, 
"another important cognitive dimension of guilt is the 
awareness that one has choice and control over one's 
behavior!! (1982, p. 299). Although the evidence on 
choice is minimal, a plausible explanation, says 
Hoffman, is the child's realization of his or her 
omnipotence. In turn, this omnipotence gives way to a 
sense of helplessness and eventually to an understanding 
that he or she has the ability to control (to various 
degrees depending on the situation) most of his or her 
actions. 
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It seems plausible tentatively to assume that there 
is an early developmental progression from a sense 
of omnipotence, to a sense of helplessness, and 
finally to an awareness of having some but not 
total control over one 1 s actions. (1982, p. 300) 
Another cognitive dimension of guilt arises when 
the child comes to understand the moral norms of 
society, specifically the norm against harming another. 
The child, socialized to this norm, will experience 
guilt when he or she engages in or contemplates actions 
discrepant from the norm. 
A more developmentally advanced form of guilt which 
often occurs in adolescence is existential guilt 
(Hoffman, 1980). This guilt response is classically 
portrayed by the late adolescent (college freshman) who 
enters college and is exposed to information and 
philosophical ideas which are at variance with and call 
into question his or her middle class or upper class 
background. As a consequence, the student experiences a 
sense of guilt; that is, the late adolescent comes to 
believe that his or her privileged position is 
accountable for the distress and plight of others. 
Having been made aware of others' impoverishment and 
distress, the late adolescent is capable of 
empathizing with these disadvantaged while 
simultaneously feeling guilty over his or her privileged 
state thus leading to an existential crisis. 
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In sum, the attribution of guilt necessitates a 
distinction of self from others, an awareness of one's 
actions towards the other, and understanding of one's 
own choices and responsibilities. 
Paradoxically, Hoffman notes that guilt, albeit 
really the result of non-prosocial action, in turn leads 
one to act prosocially. Further, the separateness 
between empathic distress (observing the hurt of the 
other) and guilt (perpetrator of an action injurious to 
the other) necessitates close scrutiny. 
The line between empathic distress and guilt thus 
becomes very fine, and being an innocent bystander 
is a matter of degree. To the degree that one 
realizes that one could have acted to help but did 
not, one many never feel totally innocent. This is 
another way of saying that empathy and guilt may be 
the quintessential social motives, because they may 
transform another's pain into one's own discomfort 
and make one feel partly responsible for the 
other's plight whether or not one has actually done 
anything to cause it. (1981, p. 59) 
El]J2._athy_:_ Altruistic or ~oistic? 
Hoffman (1975, 1977, 1981a, 1981b) appears 
particularly sensitive to the charge that relieving 
empathic distress through prosocial responding is 
actually more in line with egoistic than altruistic 
motivation (e.g., Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969). 
A review of Hoffman's writings shows that he flatly 
rejects this idea. A summary of these findings follows. 
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For one, even though prosocial behavior might 
reduce empathic distress, the aim of the prosocial 
action is the aid of the distressed person. Hoffman 
maintains that critics fail to distinguish between the 
consequence and the aim of an action. Second, when 
individuals, including young children, are queried about 
their aid of distressed others (e.g., 
Eisenberg-Berg, & Neal, 1979; Latane & Rodin, 1969), 
they answer in terms of the other's plight rather than 
their own distress. Third, although some theorists 
(e.g., Bandura, 1977) suggest that individuals engage in 
prosocial acts for self-reward, Hoffman argues that it 
is neither likely that the misery of others would 
engender self-reward nor that satisfying self-reward 
would be dependent upon helping someone is distress. 
This is the cas~ because "there is nothing intrinsically 
prosocial about self-reward, as there is about empathy" 
(1981a, p. 134); furthermore, self-reward is too 
contingent upon cultural factors and too variable to 
serve as an evolutionary criteria for an altruistic 
human nature. Fourth, sympathetic distress is aroused 
by hurt experienced by the other rather than distress 
arising from one's own personal experience. Fifth, 
gratification for helping the other depends on the 
alleviation of the other's plight, rather than focusing 
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on one's own welfare. And lastly, all motives have the 
potential for satisfying the person; as this is the 
case, such satisfaction cannot be used to define a 
distinctive class of motives {e.g., altruistic or 
egoistic motives). Furthermore, such an inclusive 
interpretation renders as useless the very idea of 
altruism. However, one must question the logic of this 
last argument. That is, if all motives are 
self-satisfying, then forming an independent group of 
motives which are non-self-satisfying is questionable. 
Hoffman does appear to be walking a thin tight rope in 
his attempt to establish an independent altruistic 
motive. On the one hand, he appears to accept the 
satisfaction which goes with all human actions. On the 
other hand, he wishes to establish the viable nature of 
an altruistic response. In sum, Hoffman appears to 
recognize the satisfaction that prosocial actions have 
for the person, yet he maintains that empathy serves as 
a distinctly prosocial action which supports the view of 
an altruistic human nature. Thus, 
it is more appropriate to designate empathic 
distress as an altruistic motive {perhaps, with a 
quasi-egoistic component) than to group it with 
such obviously self-serving motives as material 
gain, social approval, and competitive success. 
(1981a, p. 134). 
~l!U2_athic Overarousal 
If empathy is integral to the formation of 
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altruism, then a legitimate question becomes the degree 
of one's empathic arousal. Thus, can one conclude that 
the more empathy one experiences, the more altruistic 
one becomes? 
Hoffman does not believe the relationship of 
empathy and prosociality is monotonic. Too little 
arousal to the distress of another lessens sympathetic 
distress. Equally important, however, empathic 
overarousal impedes prosocial responding. Thus, 
Stotland, Mathews, Sherman, Hanson, and Richardson 
(1979) demonstrated that health care professionals 
(nurses), even though they desired to help, found it 
difficult to remain the same room as terminally ill 
patients. More recently, (Shelton, 1985; Shelton & 
McAdams, in press) reported that whereas 
perspective taking and empathic concern were 
significantly related to a self-report prosocial 
measure, empathic distress (overarousal to distress) was 
unrelated to prosociality. Interestingly, Hoffman 
(1981a) surmises that the lack of relationship between 
empathic overarousal and helping most likely aided 
evolutionary survival; that is, overarousal is often 
associated with severe if not hopeless situations which 
enable the observer, therefore, to conserve energies and 
interventions for more hopeful helping situations. 
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Evidence Supportina Empathy as a Basis for Altruism 
A large amount of empirical evidence has been 
gathered to support Hoffman's view that empathy is a 
basis for altruistic action. The five major texts on 
positive social behavior published in the last decade 
(Bridgeman, 1983a; Eisenberg, 1982a; Rushton & 
Sorrentino, 1981; Staub, 1978, 1979) devote 
considerable space to empathy as the affective mechanism 
(component) responsible for ~rosncjal behavior. Based 
on extant research, Staub (1978), in a comprehensive 
review of positive social behavior, has stated that 
although 11 it is difficult to demonstrate convincingly 
the mediating influence of empathy on helping" (p. 146), 
a cumulative review of the research does "suggest that 
empathy is a likely determinant of helping" (p. 148}. 
Rushton {1980, 1981) has maintained that empathy is a 
critical ingredient in the formation of the 11 altruistic 
personality" and has cited numerous studies to 
substantiate this claim. Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen 
(1978) have reported that empathy is positively related 
to helping behavior in adolescents. Buckley, Sjegel, 
and Ness (1979) found that children who were altruistic 
scored significantly higher on empathy measures than 
their peers while Ornum, Foley, Burns, DeWolfe, and 
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Kennedy (1981) reported this same relationship held true 
for college students. 
At the same time, although researchers generally 
conclude that empathy is a vital component for prosocial 
responding, the relationship between empathy and 
prosocial behavior is complex. Thus, inconsistencies 
are found in empathic experiencing in children whereas a 
more uniform picture emerges for adults. Most likely 
differences among children are due to developmental 
stages because children are less likely to cognize 
accurately or lack the awareness required for 
implementing prosocial behaviors. 
Furthermore, empathy alone is not sufficient to 
account for prosocial responding. Although numerous 
researchers have linked empathic development and 
prosocial responding, no theorist has maintained that 
empathy alone is sufficient to bring about prosocial 
behaviors. In this regard, Eisenberg (1982b) has noted 
that the adolescent can justify his or her personal 
behaviors (or lack thereof) by a diverse array of 
reasons ranging from hedonistic desires to internalized 
moral principles and that "in real life, situations that 
call for prosocial actions vary across many dimensions" 
(p. 241}. And Hoffman (1982) has stated that ''although 
one's empathic proclivities may make one more receptive 
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to certain moral values, empathy alone cannot explain 
how people formulate complex moral ideologies and apply 
them in situations" (p. 310). 
In addition, situational variables appear to occupy 
a role in the activation of an empathic response; 
consequently, even empathic arousal is not likely to be 
triggered in all situations (Feshbach, 1982). From 
another perspective, researchers must carefully 
scrutinize the intensity of the affective component of 
empathy as well as mood states accompanying the arousal 
of empathy (e.g., Cialdini, Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982; 
Eisenberg, 1982). 
As the above discussion suggests, the question for 
researchers is not whether empathic arousal is linked to 
prosociality but under what conditions is empathy most 
likely to induce a prosocial response. 
Sex Differences in Empath_y 
If empathy is posited as integral for morality, 
then a salient issue must be the question of possible 
gender differences. Clearly, the presence of sex 
differences poses ethical and philosophical problems for 
an empathically based morality; in short, such 
inequality relegates the disadvantaged sex to a 
condition of moral inferiority. 
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Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), in an extensive review 
of the literature on empathy, have reported no 
significant differences exist between the empathic 
experiences of males and females. Hoffman (1977) has 
labeled this conclusion "premature" (p. 713). Examining 
closely the specific studies reviewed by Maccoby and 
Jacklin, Hoffman has stated that only six of their 
studies can be classified as true measures of vicarious 
affective arousal to another's experience (Hoffman's 
definition of empathy). In all six of these studies, 
says Hoffman, females obtained greater levels of empathy 
than males. Hoffman has noted that combining other 
studies which recognized another's distress "masked!! the 
true differences that do exist between males and 
females. 
Hoffman's (1977) own review of the literature has 
led him to conclude that differences between males and 
females do exist. He has stated "what is most striking 
about the empathy finding ... is the fact that in every 
case, regardless of the age of the subjects or the 
measures used, the females obtained higher scores than 
did the males" (p. 715). In an examination of 16 recent 
articles, Hoffman has found that in all 16 studies 
females reported higher empathy scores than males. The 
random chance of such a uniform confirmation on 16 
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independent samples, says Hoffman, isl in 64,000. He 
has concluded that 
although the magnitude of the difference may not 
have been great, the finding overall clearly 
provide a stronger case for the proposition that 
females are more empathic through the life cycle 
than that no sex differences exist." (p. 715). 
Feshbach 1 s (1982) extensive analysis of empathy 
differences in children has supported Hoffman 1 s 
conclusion. She adds, however, that in children 
numerous and complex factors account for male and female 
differences. 
Scales to measure empathy have also supported 
differences between males and females. Mehrabian and 
Epstein's (1972) scale for empathy measurement 
differentiated at a significant level between males and 
females. These findings were supported by Davis' (1980) 
multidimensional approach to empathy wherein among all 
four dimensions (empathic concern, 
perspective-taking, personal distress, and fantasy) 
females scored significantly higher than males (2 < 
. 001) . 
Further, it is noteworthy that an analysis of 
Davis' findings supports Hoffman's argument for empathic 
differences. Hoffman (1977) has stated that although 
there is clear evidence for differences between males 
and females regarding the level of affective arousal 
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(measured by the empathic concern subscale), no such 
consistency can be found with more cognitively oriented 
measures, such as perspective-taking. Davis (1980) has 
noted that his own research results show that although 
perspective-taking is highly significant, male and 
female differences are lowest for this subscale thus 
lending support to Hoffman's conclusion that 
perspective-taking is a less discriminant measure of 
male-female differences. 
Besides the cognitive dimension (perspective-taking 
subscale) and affective dimension (empathic concern 
subscale), Davis' multi-dimensional approach identifies 
two other subscales--personal distress and fantasy. 
The personal distress subscale measures extreme 
emotional arousal to another's distress. In other 
words, this scale appears to be a more extreme dimension 
of affective arousal to another's plight. This 
dimension is important because Hoffman (1981, 1982) has 
noted that affective overarousal can attenuate helping 
behavior in individuals who are exposed to another's 
distress. 
Davis' (1980) finding that females experience 
significantly more distress at another's plight could 
result from several factors. First, the affective 
arousal evinced by women on the empathic concern 
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subscale and supported by Hoffman's (1977) findings 
might carry over to a more extreme response leading to 
affective over-arousal. Second, Hoffman has suggested 
that males are oriented to a more "instrumental" role 
which implies an active mastery of the world and social 
competence. Extending this thinking to the present 
question, if females are less socialized to initiate 
behaviors to relieve the distress of another, then it is 
plausible that their affective arousal to another might 
well lead to personal distress. 
Davis' fantasy subscale measures an individual's 
tendency to imaginatively take the role of another. 
Several items on this subscale were taken from an 
earlier scale developed by Stotland et al. ( 1978). 
Unfortunately, Stotland et al. reported no findings from 
their data regarding sex differences for their scale. 
Staub (1978) has reported that a difficulty with fantasy 
research that relates to empathy and helping behaviors 
is the question of external validity; in other words, 
real life situations are often inherently more complex 
than the "imagine" conditions developed in experimental 
settings. Hoffman (1977) has suggested that females are 
more apt to imagine themselves as another. This 
predisposition is the result of affective arousal, 
socialization experiences, and an inner sense of self 
which seeks interaction with others. 
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Staub (1978) gives 
indirect support to this conclusion; he has noted that 
females are more inclined to attend to the feelings of 
others and place greater value on being considerate of 
others. Gilligan (1982), moreover, has argued that 
females place greater emphasis than males on the values 
of care and intimacy. 
In addition, the statements on Davis' fantasy 
subscale have a distinctly empathic focus which 
emphasizes consideration and awareness of others. In 
light of the above, his findings of a high statistical 
significance (2 < .001) between males and females are 
most likely the result of the sensitivity of the measure 
to the value females place on personal 
attentiveness towards others. 
More recently, Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) have 
undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the extant 
literature in order to ascertain whether there does 
indeed exist sex differences in empathy. The 
researchers note that a variety of constructs have been 
utilized to measure empathic responses (e.g., infant 
crying, self-reports, observer ratings). Utilizing 
meta-analytic techniques, they report the following 
findings: (a) Females exhibit more reflexive crying 
than males, yet methodological considerations 
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limit what can be concluded about sex differences. (b) 
When picture/stOry measures of empathy were reported 
females had a slight advantage, but this finding is 
unclear due to the fact in all cases where females 
scored significantly higher than males a female 
experimenter was employed while, conversely, in all 
studies where males scored higher a male experimenter 
was used. (c) In studies where self-report measures 
were utilized after viewing simulated emotional 
situations, the "limited data" led Eisenberg and Lennon 
to conclude there exists a "tendency" for females to 
respond more empathically, yet this concJusion is 
compromised, say the researchers, by the 
inconsistency noted when subjects are rated on other 
measures (e.g., facial cues) which render any conclusion 
suspect. (d) When physiological response measures were 
employed the researchers concluded that "there is little 
evidence of a sex difference in physiological response 
to another's emotional distress. (e) The use of 
facial, vocal, and gestural features do not produce sex 
differences. In studies where children's reactions to 
another 1 s distress were unobtrusively observed, no sex 
differences were reported. ( f) Self-report measures of 
empathy (e.g., the Mehrabian empathy measure) show 
extremely high significance findings favoring females. 
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Eisenberg and Lennon report that for adults some levels 
of significance were beyond 2 < .000000001. 
The researchers state 
Indeed, according to the meta-analysis computed for 
these studies, the finding of a sex difference 
favoring females is Z = 18.35, 2 < .0001, with a 
mean effect size of .99. According to the 
fail-safe statistic, 2,534 studies with a finding 
of no sex differences would be needed to reduce the 
Z to below significance at the .05 level. (p. 116) 
All in all, Eisenberg and Lennon conclude that 
gender differences regarding empathy are a function of 
the methodology employed. Use of self-report measures 
most consistently show sex differences, but such 
self-presentations are most likely to be explained by 
influences such as cultural stereotypes and societal 
expectations. Thus the overwhelming conclusion that can 
be drawn from self-report measures is that there exists 
a clear difference between the capacity of males and 
females for empathy. However, interpretations of this 
finding must be made cautiously. In sum, Eisenberg and 
Lennon state that any conclusions drawn from the extant 
empirical research must be "circumscribed and tentative" 
(p. 126). They conclude that "indeed, at the present, 
all that can be concluded with confidence is that many 
important issues concerning sex differences in emotional 
empathy are, as yet, unresolved" (p. 126). 
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In sum, taken together, studies show that the 
relationship of empathy and prosociality is accepted by 
researchers. However, the multidimensional nature of 
empathy as well as the methodological issues involved 
render suspect any conclusive statement as to the 
presence of sex differences. 
Limitations of an Empathic Morality 
Although Hoffman {1984) maintains that empathy 
allows for a moral orientation fundamentally distinct 
from Kohlberg's justice orientation, he does not believe 
that empathy resolves all moral issues and problems. 
Below are areas where an empathy based morality is 
problematic. 
Empathic Overarousal. There appears to be an optimal 
level wherein empathic arousal induces sympathetic 
distress. On the one hand, too little arousal lessens 
the likelihood of a prosocial response. On the ot~~r 
hand, too great arousal may encourage an egoistic 
concern for one's own welfare thereby weakening the 
likelihood of a prosocial response. 
Qth~.J1£~~Lt~sues. A second limitation for an empathy 
based morality is the nature of the moral problem. An 
empathic morality is most likely to be utilized in 
situations calling for actions of benevolence or agape. 
Moral issues focusing on limited resources and 
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conflictual rights are less likely to be resolved within 
the domain of an empathic morality. For example, an 
employer might be sympathetic with the plight of an 
unemployed. However, how many unemployed workers are 
hired and the wage they are paid is contingent upon 
other factors (e.g., the financial situation of the 
company, the financial obligations owed current 
employees). Furthermore, empathic arousal might lead 
the empathizer to accept uncritically the 
distressed person's point of view or to lose sight of 
long term solutions. In effect, empathic arousal is 
vulnerable to a "situational immediacy" wherein the 
moral concern at issue is unduly influenced and 
potentially subordinate to the immediate emotional 
turmoil experienced by the empathizer. 
The Lack of Directional Focus. Hogan (1973), although 
endorsing the critical importance of empathy in 
morality, notes that empathic experiences "can produce 
an equivocating jellyfish as well as a compassionate 
person with a broad moral perspective" (p. 224). In the 
case of an empathy based morality, there exists no 
guiding principle which allows the empathizer to 
evaluate his empathic inclinations or direct his 
emotional arousal. Thus, the individual can become 
overly biased in favor of the distressed person or the 
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"equivocating jellyfish'' and paralyzed with inaction and 
equivocation. 
LEin.~L C Ol]_l]_en t 
In sum, examination of Kohlberg and Hoffman's 
accounts of morality show merits and limitations. 
Recently, Gibbs and Schnell (1985) have set forth the 
need to consider both perspectives when discussing 
questions of morality. More specifically, they 
underscore the use of affect and cognition in both 
Kohlberg's moral development approach and in what they 
term Hoffman's socialization approach. Still, such 
consideration does not erase the priority each theorist 
proposes. Nonetheless, there most likely exists a good 
measure of truth to their urging to consider both 
approaches. 
It is probably that both cognitive and 
affective sources of motivation are usually 
required for the accomplishment of good and 
fair behavior in the face of narrowly egoistic 
impulses. An action that is fair or that 
rectifies an injustice is especially likely to 
be completed if its cognitive motivation is 
enhanced by empathy or empathy-based guilt. 
CHAPTER IV 
TOWARDS AN EVERYDAY MORALITY 
The issue of morality has received increasing 
interest in the public arena. Social philosopher 
Michael Novak has remarked that "the nation's return to 
this discussion [morality] is one of the decisive events 
of the last twenty years" (McBee, 1985). A 1984 Gallup 
poll suggests that the overwhelming majority of American 
parents support the discussion of morality within the 
American school system (Solorzano, 1985). Higher 
education has also attempted to respond to this renewed 
interest. Currently, in any given year, America's 
institutions of higher learning offer ll,OOO courses in 
areas of applied ethics over a wide variety of 
disciplines (McBee, 1985). 
The renewed interest in morality arises in part from 
recent disclosures of questionable moral practices. 
Recently national attention has focused on corruption of 
major officials in government (e.g, Chicago, New York); 
in business (e.g., E. F. Hutton): and in education 
(cheating scandals at Stanford ·University, the 
University of Southern California, sports scandal at 
Tulane University). Furthermore, according to a 
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national Roper poll survey, one of four Americans admits 
cheating on his or her income tax returns. Resultant 
lost revenue to the federal government is estimated at 
well over 135 billion dollars. In addition, in the 
private sector it is estimated that employers lose 160 
billion dollars annually from individuals who misuse 
work time (Hassett, 1981; McBee, 1985). 
In light of the above, the question of honesty, the 
nature of helpfulness, and a basic orientation that 
limits egoistic concerns and the desire for personal 
aggrandizement are issues of significance for American 
society. In essence, the positive behaviors studied in 
the now classic Hartshorne and May research are 
questions of increasing relevance. 
The Definition of Eve~y_d~ Moral_i!_y in the Context of 
Conte~ora~y_ American Culture 
The definition of morality provided herein is one 
attempt to answer Haan's challenge to psychology to 
rethink the meaning of morality and to conceptualize a 
morality appropriate for "everyday" life. Based on the 
research cited thus far, three points are crucial. 
First, Hoffman's research on empathy pinpoints the 
universality of and the capacity for an awareness and 
Vicarious experience of another's needs. Second, the 
unanimity accorded the significance of prosocial 
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behaviors for both relational and social functioning as 
well as the necessity for a behavioral dimension 
highlights the need to incorporate prosocial behavior as 
an integral factor in any definition of morality. 
Third, the fact that moral agents must strive to find 
meaning and value as they encounter a complex array of 
realities and situations necessitates a multi-visioned 
approach to morality that is sensitive to the personal, 
interpersonal, and social dimensions of huma~ 
experience. 
Everyday morality is defined herein as, simply 
stated, behaviors that aid others in the context of 
daily human social exchanges. In effect, morality is 
viewed as distinctly prosocial behaviors which occur 
within a person's daily life. 
This view of morality is similar to Damon's (1975) 
view of positive justice which is concerned with 
problems associated with prosocial responding. In his 
own research (Damon, 1975, 1980), Damon has shown a 
sequential development of childhood views regarding 
positive justice. It is only with adolescence, however, 
that integration of moral principles and the self is 
accomplished (Damon, 1984). 
In addition to this general definition of everyday 
morality, it is also asserted that this morality can 
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best be understood within the context of three 
d:imens:ions (or as discussed herein--three "visions"). 
These visions are: the personal, the interpersonal, and 
the social. Given the definition of morality described 
above, personal morality is defined as an anonymous {on 
the part of the agent) prosocial response or a response 
that benefits a person(s) unknown to the moral agent. 
The classical image of this type of person is the Good 
Samaritan. Interpersonal morality is defined as a pro-
social response directed towards a person known by the 
moral agent. Social morality is defined as behavior 
which fosters the eradication of social :injustice or 
attempts to aid those who suffer from this :injustice 
(e.g., discr:iminat:ion, :inequality). The argument for 
three discrete visions of morality offers a maximally 
useful strategy for understanding the "specificity 
versus generality" controversy regarding moral behavior. 
As noted previously, Rushton's reanalysis of the 
Hartshorne and May data led him to argue for an 
"altruistic personaJ:ity" or what he termed a general 
moral orientation predisposed towards altruistic 
behavior. Yet, no theorist contends that one's behavior 
is ~!~~-~ moral. It is unlikely, moreover, that an 
individual's actions are uniformly moral across all 
situations particularly when the individual's actions 
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are occasioned by a vast array of interpersonal complex-
ities, situational cues, and diverse if not contra-
dictory informational data. As a consequence, viewing 
morality from one of these three visions provides 
insight into prosocial responding. Use of personal, 
interpersonal, and social dimensions provides a way for 
understanding how personhood is constituted. For 
example, one scholastic definition of person is "a 
separate being subsisting in an intellectual nature" 
(distinctum subsistens in natura intellectuali). Within 
this context, a human person was viewed as someone 
unique. Framed in contemporary terms, philosophical 
psychology views this uniqueness as shown in the form of 
purposive behavior. That is, the human person, from the 
nature of consciousness can intend to aid others and 
help those in distress. The human person has, in other 
words, a conscious sense of self-definition ("I am a 
caring person") which provides a psychic context 
permitting one to aid others (for a discussion of the 
philosophical perspective and its relation to psychology 
see Howard, 1985; Howard & Conway, 1986; Manicas & 
Secord, 1983). A second way of viewing the human 
person is relational or, as designated herein, inter-
personal; a person is defined in-relation-to others. 
The dialogal understanding of person has found emphasis 
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in the writing of contemporary theologians who under-
stand the person as relational. That is, an individual 
does not exist in isolation from the community. He or 
she develops sustaining and nurturing relationships 
which are fundamental for psychological health (e.g., 
Erikson, 1963; Heath, 1965). Finally, a third view of 
personhood has received significant attention in current 
writings which focus on the social dimension of 
humanity. Contemporary writing in Marxism and recent 
theological writings have explored this understanding 
(e.g., political theology, liberation theology). Thus, 
the individual is not simply defined in terms of 
personal relationships to others in society; rather, 
there is a societal need for some honoring of the 
"common good'' that requires commitment from all of 
society's members. 
A wide variety of writings provide a conceptual 
understandings to the three-fold delineation of everyday 
morality. The following brief discussion is meant to be 
illustrative, not exhaustive, of these writings. A 
considerable body of literature has viewed the 
individual's moral self as inherently linked to the 
capacity to make private moral decisions based on 
personally meaningful value systems (e.g., Conn, 1981; 
Nelson, 1973). These values systems stand as a monitor 
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of the "quality" of one's relationships with others. 
This quality is ~xemplified by one's conduct and the 
meeting of obligations within relationships. Albeit 
discussions on the moral self are sometimes 
controverted, there exists general consensus that a 
privately held and internalized value system is an 
essential factor for healthy and growthful human 
experiencing. For example, Rokeach and Regan (1980) 
have argued that successful therapeutic outcomes can be 
facilitated by focusing on the client's 
contradictory behaviors which create "a state of 
self-dissatisfaction"; in other words, the client's 
realization of the failure to live up to a private moral 
ideal creates an ensuing dissatisfaction which in turn 
fosters changes in behaviors thus making "them all more 
integrated with the person's self-conception as a 
basically moral and competent person 11 (p. 580). 
Professional organizations (e.g., the American 
Psychological Association, 1981) recognize the impor-
tance of a private value system; this professional body 
explicitly mentions 11 conscience 11 as an important ethical 
guide for the psychologist to consider when conducting 
research. Finally, research on the mature personality 
supports the importance of a private moral self. Heath 
(1965, 1980) has stated that an autonomous and stable 
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value system is integral to healthy and mature function-
ing. After reviewing several developmental and 
personality theorists, Blocher (1974) has pointed out 
that commitment to personal values is an essential 
component of the "effective personality." In sum, the 
thread that weaves consistently through these writings 
is the relationship of self to personal values. Some of 
these personal values no doubt influence one's conduct 
or behavior towards others. In terms of the present 
discussion of morality, the individual responds 
prosocially to the distress and needs of others. The 
thrust of this vision of morality is the popularly 
understood image of the Good Samaritan; aiding one 
unknown to the person. 
The argument for an interpersonal morality needs 
little introduction. Historically, ethical guidelines 
(e.g., the Ten Commandments) insist upon the intrinsic 
unity of ethical ideals and interpersonal behaviors. 
The capacity to engage in meaningful human relationships 
is integral to mature conceptions of the person in 
developmental literature (e.g., Erikson, 1963}. 
Finally, two recent critiques of academic psychology 
have raised the possibility for an interpersonal 
morality that is prosocial in nature. Bergin (1980) has 
challenged what he terms the clinical-humanistic bias of 
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contemporary psychotherapeutic theorizing and argues 
that consideration must be given to a value system that 
allows for commitment and self-giving in relationships. 
More recently, Wallach and Wallach {1983) have viewed 
psychology in general and psychotherapy in particular, 
as dominated by an egoistic frame of reference; they 
offer as an alternative a psychological view of the 
human person which is interpersonally oriented. 
Unlike personal and interpersonal morality, the 
viewing of a social morality is a more recent 
phenomenon. Groome (1980) has fashioned an approach to 
religious education which takes on a distinctly social 
character whereas Hauerwas {1981) has argued for a 
social ethic that is sensitive to the social needs of 
society; he situates this ethic in the context of 
symbolic and story forms of social theorizing. Finally, 
psychology is not immune from the challenge to consider 
a social morality. Current questioning of 
psychotherapeutic practices and social values reflects 
the need for mental health professionals to address the 
concerns of social morality. For example, Eldridge 
{1983} has argued that professionals can integrate 
social actions strategies into their professional 
practices. Butcher {1983} has reviewed the literature 
concerning the mental health practitioner as a change 
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agent (one who actively attempts to influence and change 
social structures) and argues that change agentry is a 
necessary and inevitable role for the mental health 
professional in today's complex society. Perhaps the 
most enlightening statement on the role of psychology 
and social morality comes from Bandura (1974) who has 
stated "if psychologists are to have a significant 
impact on common problems of life, they must apply their 
corrective measures to detrimental societal practices 
rather than limit themselves to treating the casualties 
of these practices" (p. 86). 
Using the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS), Shelton 
(Shelton, 1985; Shelton & McAdams, in press) presented 
evidence which showed construct validity among research 
findings and this three-fold understanding of everyday 
morality. This instrument is a paper and pencil measure 
used to assess a secondary school adolescent's response 
to the three fold dimensions of morality discussed 
above. The instrument provides the adolescent with the 
opportunity to respond to a series of daily life 
situations in terms of the likelihood of engaging in a 
prosocial response. All three samples (combined 
male-female, male, female) obtained their highest mean 
on the interpersonal score. This finding is expected 
inasmuch as interpersonal morality is defined as 
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prosocial behavior which benefits someone the moral 
agent knows. Characteristically, individuals are most 
apt to behave favorably towards those individuals who 
are friends or personal acquaintances (e.g., Staub, 
1978). Conversely, the greatest variance in scores 
occurs with the social morality subscore. This type of 
morality is the most complicated in terms of issues and 
most potentially divisive as the result of political and 
social ideologies which can be interjected as a 
rationale for deciding what is an appropriate behavior. 
As expected, both males and females scored lowest on 
this dimension of morality. Furthermore, two other 
findings are of interest. First, interpersonal morality 
correlates most strongly ( .45) with perspective-taking 
(an empathy subscale of the IRI measure developed by 
Davis). This is a persuasive finding because one would 
be most apt to be sensitive towards those one knows. 
Second, the morality subscale measures (personal, 
interpersonal, and social) are positively correlated 
least frequently with the distress empathy subscale 
measure. This finding is supported by Hoffman 1 s 
assertion that empathic overarousal (distress) inhibits 
prosocial responding. Furthermore, a regression 
analysis failed to find distress as a predictive 
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variable for everyday morality. Most likely, distress
Jeads one to focus inwardly in psychically defensive
ways thereby lessening the ability to recognize or
respond to the needs of others.
Several reasons exist as to why an understanding of 
everyday morality as defined above is significant for 
theorists and researchers. First, an everyday morality 
that is defined as prosocial responding appears 
compatible with individual's actual understanding of 
morality. For example, Colangelo and Dettmann (1985) 
asked a sample of over 300 elementary school students to 
write a story depicting what they viewed to be a moral 
problem. Unlike Kohlberg's dilemmas which commonly 
understood moral problems in terms of public welfare 
concerns, the overwhelming majority of students 
described personal and practical concerns with almost 
half describing relationship issues (peers and family). 
"The characteristics of the problems generated by these 
students, however, differ considerably from Kohlberg's 
hypothetical dilemmas" (p. 270). Yussen (1977) found a 
similar tendency among adolescents. 
A second reason for social science investigation of 
an everyday morality arises from widening public 
interest in positive behaviors. As noted previously, a 
large majority of Americans favor school interventions 
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which delineate moral standards. More recently, U.S. 
secretary of Education. William Bennett has endorsed 
character education as a goal for public education. A 
sign of this upsurge of interest is seen in the shifting 
focus accompanying the teaching of values. In the 
l960's the demands for tolerance and appreciation of 
diverse lifestyles led educators to adopt value 
neutrality regarding questions of morality. Currently, 
a growing emphasis in school districts is encouraging 
the teaching of nonsectarian values such as compassion 
and honesty {Solorzano, 1985). 
Moreover, an issue of r2_~~daJ_us published in the 
early nineteen eighties which focuses on American 
elementary and secondary education :eatures articles 
highlighting the necessity of positive social behaviors 
among students. Sociologist Gerald Grant {1981), 
commenting on the character of the American school, 
notes that the emphasis placed heretofore in value 
neutrality has led to a crisis in American education. 
"The crisis of authority in the American school is that 
in many places we no longer have any agreement on what 
that provisional morality ought to be" (p. 146). By 
Provisional morality Grant means a socialization to 
"some set of standards, beliefs, and values about what 
it means to be a human being" (p. 146) which can be 
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reevaluated by the child when he or she reaches 
adulthood. The point to be made, though, is Grant's 
belief that the educational system is unable to reach 
consensus on what such a morality might be. As a 
consequence, schools have for too long avoided moral 
content and fostered a value neutrality. As a solution, 
Grant advocates a re-commitment to a provisional 
morality which distinctly champions positive behaviors 
associated with the everyday morality described herein. 
He argues that a provisional morality must "express some 
of the conscious beliefs of a democratic pluralist 
society" (p. 147}. Characteristics of such a morality 
include 
the minimal order required for dialogue, the 
willingness to listen to one another, respect 
for truth, the rejection of racism (or 
openness to participation in the dialogue), as 
well as those transcendent values that shore 
up the whole society--a sense of altruism and 
service to others and respect for personal 
effort and hard work. Without such an 
agreement, one does not have a public, but a 
kind of radical, relativism; not pluralism but 
mere coexistence. (p. 148} 
In a similar vein, Jerome Kagan (1981) has 
maintained that the American school exercises critical 
function for the American community. He argues that a 
responsibility of the school is to develop a "dimension 
of character" among students. He notes the 
characteristics critical for such character dimension. 
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Thus I borrow from both the moral absolutists 
as well as the utilitarians in suggesting the 
dimensions of character to be celebrated at 
least until the balance is restored. Kindnes-
s, restraint on aggression, honesty, and a 
reasonable blend of pride and humility stand 
at the top of my list for several reasons. 
First, the community currently needs more 
citizens to practice these standards, and many 
youth are dissatisfied with the callous acts 
of privacy, cheating, lying, and, on rare 
occasions, destruction of a peer's notes they 
are forced to in order to survive in a system 
that can award special merit to only a few. 
But my observations of children persuade me 
that kindess and control of aggression have a 
natural priority in development. Three-year--
olds spontaneously offer toys to peers in 
distress and are reluctant to strike another, 
unless the latter intrudes or threatens. (p. 
163) 
In a related event, two recent books published by 
psychologists underscore the renewed emphasis on 
positive behaviors in academic circles. Psychologists 
Lickona (1985) and Schulman and Mekler (1985), in books 
expressly written for parents, maintain that it is an 
important enterprise for parents to encourage moral 
behavior in their children. While eschewing a morality 
based on religious beliefs, the overriding theme of both 
works is that morality which is defined in terms of 
prosocial values (compassion, care, kindness, respect, 
helpfulness} and behaviors is a legitimate enterprise to 
be taught to children and adolescents. 
'th.~_Ag_y~nt~Qf an Everyday Morality in Light of 
0!.~~ent Moral Discussion 
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Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) has characterized the 
current state of moral thinking as one of moral 
disarray. He notes that the contemporary state of 
morality is one "of grave disorder." According to 
MacIntyre, culture lacks a consensual understanding of 
morality and thereby provides no uniform rationale for 
deciding moral disputes. "For what analysis of A's and 
B's position reveals once again is that we have all too 
many disparate and rival moral concepts" (p. 235). In 
essence, the idea of a moral community has been lost and 
opposing views of justice (to take an example) vie for 
dominance, each with his or her own adherents. 
This fragmenting of community, which MacIntyre 
discusses in terms of moral philosophy, is taken up by 
Bellah (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 
1985) and reframed in light of sociological insight. 
Commenting upon the ethical quandary which exists today, 
Bellah notes 
Now if selves are defined by their prefer-
ences, but those preferences are arbitrary, then 
each self constitutes its own moral universe, and 
there is finally no way to reconcile conflicting 
claims about what is good in itself .... In the 
absence of any objectifiable criteria of right and 
wrong, good or evil, the self and its feelings 
become our only moral guide. What kind of world 
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is inhabited by this self, perpetually in progress, 
yet without any fixed moral end? (p. 76) 
Historically, says Bellah, the dominant ethos in 
American culture has been the focus on "individualism". 
In short, individualism in both its utilitarian (the 
personal maximization of goods) and expressive (the 
primacy of self-actualized feelings) forms has sundered 
the individual from his or her historically felt 
rootings in community. Consequently, Americans remain 
deeply ambivalent about their individualism. 
The inner tensions of American individualism 
add up to a classic case of ambivalence. We 
strongly assert the value of our self-reliance 
and autonomy. We deeply feel the emptiness 
of a life without sustaining social commit-
ments. Yet we are hesitant to articulate our sense 
that we need one another as much as we need to 
stand alone, for fear that if we did we would lose 
independence al together. (pp. 150-151} 
The philosophical quandary and social strains 
emanating from disparate moral positions and the 
dominance of selfhood in American culture will not be 
resolved within these pages. Yet, the definition of 
everyday morality set forth herein offers the potential 
for a unifying vision among diverse and disparate moral 
views. 
In other words, empathic experiences which induce 
prosocial behavior provide a consensual basis for 
morality as well as the bridging theme among diverse 
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moral beliefs and autonomous human behaviors. That is, 
although individuals reason to conflictual moral views 
and subsequently engage in contradictory if not opposing 
behaviors, all individuals are endowed with an empathic 
sense (Hoffman, 1975, 1977) and a commonly agreed upon 
consensus is that a minimal level of prosocial behavior 
is requisite for personal and societal functioning 
(Rushton, 1980). Thus, an everyday morality that is 
empathy based offers the opportunity for personal 
understanding and consensus as well as opportunities for 
social discourse. 
Bellah's discussion of how Americans understand and 
express their prosocial behaviors provides insight into 
how empathy might provide increased moral understanding. 
American life is best characterized as "a society in 
which the individual can only rarely and with difficulty 
understand himself and his activities as interrelated in 
morally meaningful ways with those of other, different 
Americans" (p. 50). As such, individualism is ''the 
dominant ideology of American life" (p. 302). A 
consequence of individualism's dominating presence is 
the relegation at times of even prosocial behaviors into 
some form of enlightened self-interest. That is, the 
ethos of individualism encourages one to respond to the 
another's needs if and only if, all things considered, 
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such actions benefit oneself. Equally important, 
explanations for such behaviors, as pointed out by Smith 
(1986), are often expressed in "cost benefit" terms; 
this phenomenon results from the paucity of an adequate 
moral language. Because empathy (as defined by Hoffman} 
entails cognitive and affective dimensions which in turn 
induce a behavioral response, it is reasonably likely 
that prosocial behaviors engendered by empathic arousal 
provide an optimum forum both for encouraging social 
interaction and allowing for self-insight into the 
motives for one's actions. All in all, given proper 
social reinforcement and environmental supports, 
empathic expressions would provide a useful antidote to 
the impoverished understandings of prosocial 
inclinations which Bellah maintains are commonly 
expressed in American life. 
Foundation for An Everyday Morality 
It is maintained herein that empathy is a founda-
tion for everyday morality. As previously noted, the 
argument that empathy is a basis for prosocial behaviors 
has been suggested by numerous psychologists (Batson and 
Coke, 1981; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Hoffman, 
1980; Rushton, 1980, 1981; Staub, 1978). In order to 
ascertain the relationship of everyday morality and 
empathy Shelton (Shelton, 1985; Shelton & McAdams, in 
115 
press) developed the Visions of Morality Scale (VMS). 
Briefly stated, this scale described 45 everyday life 
situations in which secondary school adolescents 
responded in a Likert scale format as to their likeli-
hood for engaging in a specific prosocial response. The 
criterion used for constructing the 45 situations was 
the following: The author had observed each situation 
occurring among adolescents he had either taught or 
counseled, or he had been informed about the incident 
through personal contact with an adolescent who had 
experienced the situation. The opportunity for this 
contact with adolescents occurred while the author was 
an instructor and counselor at a college preparatory 
school in Denver, Colorado during the late seventies. 
Utilizing one or the other of these criteria insured the 
construction of prosocial situations which are commonly 
experienced by adolescents in everyday life. In a 
preliminary study, the VMS successfully discriminated (£ 
< .001) between students engaged in voluntary school and 
community service projects and a control group of 
students. 
Overall, a highly significant relationship emerged 
between the total empathy score and the total morality 
VMS score {.42, £ < .001). Although a cautionary note 
is warranted given the correlational nature of the data, 
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the highly significant correlation combined with the 
large body of supportive psychological literature lends 
reasonable support to the conclusion that empathy is 
integral for prosociality. In addition, a multiple 
regression analysis found perspective-taking (the 
cognitive component of empathy) and empathic concern 
(the affective component of empathy) to be significant 
predictors of an everyday moral orientation. Moreover, 
research supports the efficacy of paper and pencil 
measures in predicting prosocial behaviors (Eisenberg-
Berg & Mussen, 1978; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Rushton, 
1981). Finally, a broad range of studies have linked 
empathy as a motivational force for fostering positive 
behaviors (e.g., Goldstein & Michaels, 1985). 
The use of empathy rather than justice (Kohlberg} 
as a foundation for morality provides an alternative 
view of morality advocated by some philosophers (e.g., 
Puka, 1985). These critics, essentially, have posed the 
question of how morality can be conceptualized with 
reference to values such as compassion and love. 
Moreover, moralities based on justice or prosociality 
have both strengths and weaknesses. 
It is important that we assess the merits and 
demerits of a love or altruism rationale 
against those of justice structure. Just as 
altruism may have difficulty resolving 
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conflicts of interest, justice may have difficulty 
(if it has anything to say at all) prescribing 
ideals of character and community. (A mixed or 
complex conception of love or altruism could deal 
with both issues). Where love may sometimes be 
nondiscriminating regarding who gets what or 
whether anyone gets the goods, justice may be 
unacceptably indifferent as to what goods people 
should pursue. (Puka, 1985, p. 197) 
Furthermore, an empathy based morality finds support in 
the psychological view of morality proposed by Kagan 
(1984). According to Kagan, the potential for a set of 
feeling states "is a nonrelative platform upon which a 
set of universal, or principled, moral standards can be 
built" (p. 123). Kagan offers the example of 
considering whether to hurt someone to illustrate his 
point. Rationalists (e.g., Rawls) would object to 
harming another and base such refusals on Kant's ethical 
imperative or the principle of the priority of human 
life. Notwithstanding these rationalist objections, 
Kagan maintains that individuals refrain from such 
behaviors primarily because of their emotional reac-
tions; it is their need for standards which leads 
individuals to develop rational justifications. 
Optimally, the strongest moral convictions are likely to 
be those that arouse one's emotions as well as satisfy 
rational argumentations. 
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Perhaps each of us is persuaded of the moral 
rightness of an idea by two different, 
incommensurate processes. One is based on 
feelings; the other, on logical consistency with a 
few deep premises. When a standard derives its 
strength from either foundation, we find it 
difficult to be disloyal to its directives. When 
it enjoys the support of both, as it does for 
torture and unprovoked murder, its binding force is 
maximal. (p. 124). 
In other words, some human acts are so morally repugnant 
that they shock basic moral sensitivities and invite a 
deeply felt emotional response. When in addition such 
actions are devoid of any rational explanation (e.g., 
mass murder of a family) they induce the strongest 
objections; that is, they are viewed as violations of 
one's deepest moral convictions. 
Paralleling this emotional reaction is the child's 
development of standards. Kagan observes that empathy 
provides one of several sources for standards; that is, 
the child's feelings of discomfort, by age two, allows 
for the inferences that another child who undergoes the 
same experience will feel in a similar way. This 
inference based on one's own distress implies the 
violation of some standard. In sum, the capacity for 
certain emotions and the corresponding needs for 
standards emerge as the foundational soil for the 
rooting of moral reasoning and ethical understandings. 
Influences on an Everyday_M~~~li!_y 
Everyday morality is not uniform across all 
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situations. Notwithstanding the presence of a general 
moral orientation (e.g., Rushton, 1980), a variety of 
factors influence an individual's inclination to respond 
prosocially. In short, even though a general moral 
orientation may be a valid construct, specific develop-
mental, situational, and social variables must be viewed 
in order that everyday morality is not simply an 
abstract understanding of morality but rather a morality 
situated in the context of everyday life events. The 
following is a concise survey of salient factors which 
affect prosocial tendencies. 
~x 
Behaviors which benefit others have generally been 
defined in the literature as generosity (giving material 
aid to another person), being helpful (aiding another 
when he or she needs help), and bystander rescue 
(intervening when another individual is in an emergency 
situation) (Staub, 1978). Underwood and Moore (1982) 
have noted that the results of studies regarding sex 
differences are mixed. In terms of generosity and 
helpfulness, the consistent finding is that females 
demonstrate more positive behavior than males. The 
researchers state that there does exist a sex 
difference, albeit small, in the prosocial responses of 
males and females; yet, this sex difference does not. 
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always occur. For example, there does exist evidence to 
suggest that in some emergency situations, males are 
more likely to intervene and aid the distressed person 
than are females. Staub (1978) has suggested that 
perhaps the male-female differences exist because males 
are more concerned with equity and keeping their 
personal freedom; these tendencies, consequently, might 
lead them to be less helpful than females. Thus an 
individual in need might elicit a negative reaction from 
the male who values independence and is dependent upon a 
high level of status. Staub notes, however, that 
interpretations of male-female differences regarding 
prosocial acts are complex due to the limitations of the 
experimental studies and the numerous and at times 
contradictory interpretations which can be given the 
research findings. In addition, Staub (1978) has 
questioned Maccoby and Jacklin's (1974) conclusion that 
there exists no differences in the helping behaviors of 
males and females. This lack of differences, says 
Staub, might be due to the types of studies they 
examined. For example, in their discussion of rescue 
studies, the researchers failed to note male tendencies 
towards competence which might have led them to 
intervene as much as females. Staub (1978) has noted 
that 
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under certain circumstances females may be more 
helpful than males, because they are competent in a 
particular area, because being helpful is more 
socially appropriate for them, or because certain 
characteristics they acquired (or tend to possess 
by heredity) make them more likely to be helpful. 
(p. 254) 
From another perspective, the values prized by 
females might support a greater tendency for females to 
act prosocially. Rokeach (Rokeach 1973, Rokeach and 
Regan, 1980) has suggested that values represent ideal 
end states which serve as evaluative standards for 
personal actions. Bearing this in mind, Feather (1980), 
in a discussion of adolescent sex differences in value 
orientation, noted that females are socialized to place 
more emphasis on "communal" values and concerns which 
favor caring behaviors whereas males are more likely to 
adopt values which sustain independence and competit~ve 
strivings. Relatedly, Shelton (Shelton, 1985, Shelton & 
McAdams, in press) has found that female adolescents 
consistently favored an everyday morality across 
personal, interpersonal, and social dimensions when 
compared with their male counterparts. 
Q_r_oup Size 
A consistent body of research has documented the 
presence of others as having an effect on prosociality. 
Latane, Nida and Wilson (1981) note 
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There is little doubt that an individual's 
likelihood of giving help decreases as the number 
of other bystanders also witnessing an emergency 
increases. The evidence for this group size effect 
is vast, remarkably consistent, and is comprised of 
studies involving a wide variety of experimenters, 
experimental situations, and participant 
populations. (p. 309) 
A limitation of group size studies is their 
emphasis on emergency situations which, for the most 
part, are not characteristic of everyday prosocial 
responding. Everyday situations rarely require the 
urgent response that is characteristic of emergency 
situations. Still, these bystander rescue studies offer 
a necessary understanding to prosocial research, and, 
relatedly, everyday morality which in turn must be 
considered. Latane, Nida, and Wilson (1981) reviewed 56 
published and unpublished studies in which subjects 
prosocial responses were measured. The independent 
variable in these studies was the subject alone or in 
the presence of others (or the subject knew others were 
observing the same situation). In sum, 75% of people 
tested alone helped, but fewer than 53% of those tested 
with others helped. In 48 of the 56 ~+~~;cs subjects 
exposed to group conditions helped less. The chances of 
such findings over this range of studies occurring by 
chance is one in 51 million. Speculations as to why 
individuals respond prosocially when alone include 
adherence to internal norms of responsibility, guilt, 
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and empathic arousal. On the other hand, three factors 
might explain the reduction in inclination to initiate 
helping while in the presence of others. First, 
audience inhibition refers to how individuals might be 
embarrassed if they deviate from their normal public 
behavior. Thus an individual might believe that he or 
she could become embarrassed through misinterpreting the 
emergency or intervening in a way that others consider 
foolish. Social influence is a second factor. Individ-
uals look to others as measures for appropriateness 
concerning their own behaviors; consequently, the 
disinclination of other to offer aid most likely 
influences one's decision to offer help. Finally, 
diffusion of responsibility offer a reason for refusing 
to aid others. If alone, the burden of responsibility 
is solely one's own. However, in a group, responsibili 
ty is shared thereby lessening one's own feeling of 
personal responsibility. 
As noted above, group size investigations must be 
interpreted cautiously for confirmation of any thesis on 
everyday morality due to the ''emergency" nature of the 
situational variable. Nonetheless, in terms of everyday 
morality, it is likely that group influences are likely 




A variety of studies haye investigated the role of 
emotions in helping. In general, positive mood states 
foster positive social behaviors; in this regard, 
experimental findings are relatively straightforward. 
on the other hand, negative mood states are more 
complex. Thus, guilt appears to induce prosociality 
whereas sadness and failure, to a great extent, appear 
to inhibit prosocial responding. Numerous explanations 
are offered for this finding. One of the most 
persuasive explanations appears to be the shift of 
attentional focus from the distressed person to oneself 
thus lessening concern for the other {Rosenhan, 
Salovey, Karylowski, & Hargis, 1981). Cialdini, 
Kenrick, and Baumann {1982) shed light on the influence 
of negative mood states. These researchers offer a 
negative relief state model to explore the relationship 
of prosocial responding and mood. According to these 
researchers, a prosocial act becomes a source of 
self-gratification thus serving the function of reducing 
one's negative mood state. All in all, these research-
ers view prosocial responses in light of negative mood 
states as serving an instrumental function; that is, 
they are directed to altering one's mood. On the other 
hand, helping behaviors carried out when experiencing 
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positive mood states are viewed as "by products" of the 
positive mood; iri other words, these states encourage 
one to like others, be optimistic about future events, 
and focus on positive memories. Thus, positive mood 
states serve as a foundation upon which prosocial 
response naturally thrive and often occur. 
socialization Factors 
A variety of socialization factors have been linked 
to prosociality. Among these are: modeling, 
attribution, exhortation, reinforcement, punishment, and 
verbal instruction (Goldstein & Michaels, 1985; Grusec, 
1981, 1982; Staub, 1978, 1979). Staub (1981) has 
attempted to apply these factors in working with school 
age children. According to Staub, effective 
socialization to prosociality focuses on the 
significance of reinforcement whereas Hoffman (1979) 
advocates the use of gradual insight which comes with 
inductive techniques. More recently, psychologists have 
attempted to translate these ideas into practical 
applications for parents (e.g., Schulman & Mekler, 
1985). It follows that exposure to these factors, over 
time, encourages the development of prosocial responses. 
Conversely, limited experience with the above factors 
most likely makes one less receptive or at least limited 




The amount of factors affecting one's inclination 
to respond prosocially are immense. In addition to 
factors cited above, a variety of researchers 
(Bridgeman, 1983a; Eisenberg, 1982a; Rushton & 
Sorrentino, 1981; Staub, 1978, 1979) have provided 
evidence for a multitude of variables that are linked to 
prosocial responding. Among these factors are: 
decision-making skills, one's level of perceptual 
awareness, cognitive factors, internal mediators such as 
devaluation of others and just world conceptions, 
situational factors, and feelings of personal 
competency. 
To summarize, an empathically based everyday 
morality is most likely influenced by numerous factors 
operating within a multitude of relationships and 
situations. Consequently, although the everyday 
morality described herein is in some sense an abstract 
concept, focus and attention to influences provides 
recognition as to the complexity of morality as it is 
experienced in daily life. 
Norma Haan's Interactional Morality 
Norma Haan has set forth an interactional view of 
morality which offers similarities to the empathy based 
everyday morality described herein. The following is a 
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brief discussion of Haan's understanding of morality. 
Haan (1982) has disputed the disjunction between social 
science inquiry and the study of morality. In essence, 
says Haan, the function of social science (she focuses 
on psychology in particular) is an impartial explanation 
of facts. However, if social science attempts to be 
value free then it inexorably fails for such a view of 
science is no longer tenable (Haan, 1982; Haan et al., 
1985; Manicas and Secord, 1983}. On the other hand, 
social science is "scientific" when it examines facts 
impartially. 
To answer the question I initially posed, 
moral research cannot be "scientific" if this 
means being value neutral, but it can be 
"scientific" in the sense of impartially 
submitting all formulations to the full 
reality of people's moral consensuses and 
interactions in everyday life. (pp. 1103-
1104) 
Haan criticizes Kohlberg's theory because it 
proposes an understanding of morality that is unencumbe-
red by the situational realities individuals must 
confront in everyday life. 
In everyday life, the dialectic between self 
and other interests seldom leads to perfect 
solutions but instead to compromises, to 
discoveries of mutual interests, to choices of 
the lesser of two evils, or to ways to rectify 
temporary inequalities by future action. In 
contrast, traditional theories define moral 
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situations as adversarial and hold out the promise 
of perfect solution: One party is wrong while the 
other is right. These solutions strain relation-
ships. (p. 1103) 
Haan has described her view of morality as "every-
day morality" (because it is focused on morality as it 
is commonly experienced in everyday life) and "practical 
morality" (because it is a morality that people actually 
use) before settling on the term "interactional moral-
ity", Haan favors what Packer (1985) has termed the 
hermeneutic approach to psychology. As conceived by 
Packer, this approach studies what people actually do in 
their everyday lives. Moreover, it is questionable 
whether human can be studied simply as properties 
subject to causal interpretations as in the physical 
sciences. Manicas and Secord (1983) maintain that the 
problem of consciousness--the intentions, meanings, and 
understandings humans give to everyday life 
encounters--place limitations on or call for expansion 
of the scientific approach. Instead, these researchers 
argue that attention must be given to ideals and 
purposes which motivate people in their everyday lives. 
Haan (1982), in turn, appears to accept this view. 
To elucidate the contingently enacted moral 
forms of everyday life is surely a task for 
social scientists; however, enacted moralities 
cannot be understood if separated from their 
cherished forms. Therefore the kinds of 
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analyses typically performed by philosophers are an 
essential part of the empirical search. Naively 
empirical studies cannot reveal morality's nature 
because morality is flavored by cherished meanings. 
(p. 1103) 
According to Haan, the social scientist's study of 
morality should assure several goals: First, any study 
of morality by scientists already assumes the adoption 
of a value which she terms "the moral ground"; that is, 
every morality must adhere to some essential ingredient 
as the core experience of morality (e.g., for Kohlberg 
this moral ground is ''justice" whereas for Haan it is 
11 equality"--one 1 s moral concerns are taken seriously and 
treated in a respectful manner by others). Second, 
social scientists must move beyond the empirical fallacy 
(that the entire truth is contained within measurable 
facts) ucherished moral ideas have the power to move 
history, so it is clear that social scientists need to 
take more than observable morality into their accounts" 
(p. 48). Third, special emphasis must be placed on the 
need to take into account moral action. Fourth, 
although important, the study of action must be comple­
mented by what might be. There appears to be, in other 
words, a call by Haan for social scientists to examine 
the significance of moral imagination--ideals which are 
inspirational for peoples' lives (e.g., Martin Luther 
King's speech "I Have a Dream''}. Fifth social scientists 
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must be willing to embrace their peers in other 
disciplines; in effect the study of morality must be 
transdisciplinary. All too often, says Haan, psychology 
has narrowly focused on the individual while eschewing 
the influences of sociopolitical contexts within which 
moral actions transpire. 
Haan openly admits that her thinking is "controver-
sial" since it fails to follow traditional understand-
ings of morality. In pointing out her challenge to 
psychology and other social science disciplines, she 
pinpoints six ''irreverent" theses germane to her 
thinking. Because these irreverencies concerning the 
nature of interactional morality help to portray her 
thinking, they are presented below. 
1. It [interactional morality] is irreverent 
toward moral philosophy in reasoning that fresh, 
clarifying insights may come out of attempts to 
understand the moral psychology of ordinary people. 
2. It is irreverent toward research psychology by 
arguing that valuing cannot be denied so the 
cherished morality of people and researchers should 
be openly brought into account. 
3. It is irreverent to the academy in general in 
contending that vested boundaries among the 
disciplines of social sciences and philosophy 
hinder our coming to understand the moral basis of 
life. 
4. It warns citizens not to accept too easily 
psychologists' and sociologists' "scientifically 
based" claims about morality, as truth without 
dross. 
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5. It is irreverent toward old beliefs that the 
educationally, politically, and economically 
advantaged are morally superior and that the 
disadvantaged's complaints are merely envy and 
therefore without moral merit. 
6. It is irreverent toward the theory and work of 
the pioneer psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg, who 
stirred philosophy when he added the idea of 
development to classical moral theory, but who 
stopped short, in our view, of apprehending the 
promises and emendations that lie in practical 
inquiry. (p. 4) 
In her study of morality Haan has attempted to 
bring together both the cognitive-developmental view of 
Kohlberg (which emphasizes reasoning} and social 
learning accounts of morality (which stress the 
importance of societal and environmental influences). By 
focusing on everyday life contexts, Haan contends that 
her own interactional view of morality blends these two 
approaches together. Given this blending of the two 
approaches she maintains that 
in this formulation, morality is action. 
People with moral dilemmas are actors involved 
in real or imagined dialogues and negotiate 
moral claims so that balanced, equalized 
relations with others can be achieved or 
reestablished. In other words, when people 
make moral choices, they interact with others 
and within a given situation. (p. 38} 
Haan asserts that eight conclusions can be drawn 
from an interactional approach to morality. 
conclusions are listed below. 
These eight 
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l. Moral decisions are created and jointly 
achieved in actual or imagined dialogues instead of 
being drawn by single persons from principles or 
learned generalizations. 
2. The reasoning involved is practical, not 
formally logical. 
3. General self-interest is always a legitimate 
part of dialogue, although a particular 
self-interest may or may not be found legitimate in 
particular dialogues. 
4. Moral decisions are not always expected to be 
perfect, absolute solutions; they are often 
compromises or choice between the lesser of two 
evils. 
5. Young children are not seen as moral 
primitives; they engage in moral dialogues at a 
very early age and make self-chosen decisions. 
6. Moral skills, but not moral concern, develops 
gradually rather than by stages. 
7. All aspects of people's functioning, including 
thought, emotions, and motivations, are brought 
into play during the dialogue and influence 
eventual decisions. 
8. The adequacy of moral actions can vary, 
depending on the contents or dilemmas and demands 
and stress of immediate social contexts. {p. 39) 
An implicit assumption in Haan's theory is the 
centrality of equality in the moral dialogue. That is, 
Haan states that, above all, individuals place priority 
in their need to have their moral concerns heard and 
considered by others. "The cherished value is that 
participants' claims--interests in terms of facts, 
needs, and contributions--are considered, understood, 
and weighed" { p . 4 O ) . 
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There are several similarities between interaction-
al morality as described by Haan and an everyday 
morality. First, both moralities give recognition to 
the role of affect. However, for interactiona1 morality 
affect is viewed more as an adaptive and coping device 
that influences moral action whereas for everyday 
morality affect represents the foundation on which 
morality is constituted {although as already noted 
empathic distress lessens the probability of moral 
action). Second, interactional morality has as its 
moral ground, equality; on the other hand, everyday 
morality views the moral ground as prosocial action. 
Third, both mcralities leave open the possibility for 
examining the role of values and their impact on moral 
action. Likewise, both emphasize action--what the 
individual does. In addition, both moralities are 
sensitive to the context of everyday life events in 
which moral actions transpire. For interactional 
morality this involves some type of consensual dialogue 
and negotiation whereas for everyday morality such 
context is centered on the possibility of responding 
prosocially in daily life. Finally, both moralities are 
addressed to educators. Haan et al. (1985) has noted 
that interactional morality is addressed "with profes-
sional social scientists in mind, but the primary 
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concern is to address educators and parents" (p. 9). 
Everyday morality, on the other hand, is an attempt to 
conceptualize a morality that is sensitive to educa-
tional concerns, and, in particular to the current 
interest in awakening students to the need to exhibit 
prosocial behaviors (see Solorzano, 1985). 
CHAPTER V 
TOWARDS A MORALITY OF THE HEART 
At this point it is helpful to recapitulate the 
conceptual perspectives that this study incorporates. 
Kohlberg 1 s approach to morality is deemed inadequate 
when attempts are made to address everyday morality 
(prosocial behavior in daily life). If Kohlberg's 
approach is not acceptable, then what approach can 
adequately address the concerns of a morality centered 
on prosociality? We have concluded that Hoffman's 
perspective of an empathy based morality is a viable way 
to conceptualize a prosocial morality. Still, utilizing 
empathy presents a far too general construct which 
inadequately addresses the multifaceted nature of 
morality. This complex!ty of morality is nicely 
delineated by Rest 1 s use of four components. When 
applied to everyday morality, Rest's model allows for 
distinctive constructs which together form what is 
termed in this chapter a morality of the heart. It is a 
morality of the heart which allows for an understanding 
of the adolescent's everyday morality. 
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In this chapter, Rest's component process model 
will be examined and his understanding of morality will 
be explored in order to set forth what he terms a "fully 
developed morality." After a discussion of Rests' 
approach we move to a conceptual framework which allows 
for a discussion of everyday morality. In this regard, 
the "heart" will be used as a metaphor to capture the 
adolescent moral experience. More specifically, the 
metaphor will be extended to apply to each of the 
components that Rest sets forth. Thus, the metaphorical 
framework will include four dimensions: the sensitive 
heart, the valuing heart, the discerning heart, and the 
committed heart. 
The Rest Model 
Rest (1983, 1984, 1985; Carroll & Rest, 1982) has 
provided a framework for viewing morality which attempts 
to capture all relevant dimensions. According to Rest, 
psychological criteria for defining morality have 
included: norms, behavior, reasoning, and internal 
mechanisms (e.g., guilt). Psychologists have tended to 
view morality solely from one of these perspectives. 
Yet each of these criteria at some point fail to addres~ 
the complexity of morality. Thus, Rest (1983) maintains 
that "we need to attempt a fuller, more complicated, 
more integrated picture of morality and to envision how 
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the part processes are organized" (p. 558}. Rest {1985} 
notes that "the four components are not presented as 
four virtues that make up an ideal person; rather they 
are the major units of analysis in tracing how a 
particular course of action was produced in the context 
of a particular situation" (p. 14). For moral behavior 
to occur, all four components must function adequately. 
Rest believes that popular moral theories (e.g., 
Kohlberg's) address issues germane only to one or two of 
these components, but that no research focuses 
sufficiently on all components. For example, Rest views 
Kohlberg 1 s cognitive-developmental approach as situated 
within the framework of Component II. "In short, it 
[Rest's model) claims that to a large extent, the major 
theoretical approaches have bypassed one another in 
attending to different aspects of the phenomenon of 
morality" (Rest, 1984, p. 25). 
Component I is best termed the sensitivity 
component. More specifically, this component focuses on 
the ability to recognize- to be aware that there exists 
a situation calling forth some level of moral response. 
A variety of factors exist that have the potential to 
obfuscate the sensitivity component. Among these 
factors are ambiguity of the event, the interpretation 
of the situation, and emotional arousal to the situation 
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(for an extensive treatment of these factors see Staub, 
1978). According to Rest, to respond morally one must 
first recognize that a moral response is required. Rest 
notes Hoffman's discussion of empathy as a primary 
candidate to be studied as a Component I process. He 
argues that empathy is a significant factor in 
recognizing the moral element in situations. At the same 
time, he elucidates three reservations concerning 
empathy's role. First, empathy is limited to select 
situations; thus, under many circumstances, empathy is 
not the most adequate rendering of morality {Rest cites 
the biblical story of Solomon where his wisdom was more 
aptly translated as fairness). Second, over-empathizing 
with another might unduly sway one in a prejudicial way; 
for example, a judge who over-empathizes with a 
contestant might unfairly favor that contestant. Thi~d, 
some situations require a wider social context such as 
institutional involvement whereas empathic responding is 
most likely associated with one on one personal 
encounters .. To illustrate, one might be upset over 
individuals who are placed in a state institution; 
however, given the number of indigent individuals or the 
realities of state budgetary restraints, the state's 
course of action might be the most appropriate response. 
Rest (1983) notes 
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Any paradigm of morality that neglects the 
societal-historical context of human 
interaction is likely to underestimate 
institutional and programmatic ways of meeting 
human needs and one's duties and rights within a 
set of ongoing social arrangements. Sometimes a 
person charged with the responsibility for a social 
organization must act in opposition to his empathy 
for specific people. (p. 561) 
On the other hand, Rest's reservations do not 
disclaim the significance of empathy. Situations 
calling for fairness do not preclude a viable role for 
empathy (cf. Gibbs & Schnell, 1985). Further, to 
over-empathize is a question as to the extent of one's 
empathic response rather than a question of empathy's 
merits. Even Hoffman has addressed this concern in his 
cautionary note regarding empathic overarousal (too 
great an empathic response to the other diminishes the 
altruistic response). Finally, although institutional 
contexts might alter the role of empathy even these 
wider social contexts require basic empathic components 
(e.g., perspective-taking). For example, Shelton (1985) 
found a significant relationship between empathy and 
social morality which suggests some consideration can 
be given to empathy even when addressing complex social 
system concerns. I~ addition, essential empathic 
responses (empathic concern) might well act as an 
inhibiting agent to impersonal decision making which is 
commonplace in social-bureaucratic structures. 
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whereas Component I focuses on the realization that a 
moral concern exists, Component II centers on the ideal 
one envisions as central to the moral concern at hand. 
In other words, that there is a moral concern now 
becomes: "What am I now to do in light of this 
concern?'' "Component II involves determining what 
course of action would best fulfill a moral ideal, what 
9-~gl}_t to be done in the situation" (Rest, 1983, p. 561). 
Rest explores how psychologists have dealt with 
this ideal. One tradition, says Rest, focuses on social 
norms such as equity and social responsibility. In 
contrast to this line of research, a more popular way to 
conceptualize morality is the justice principle set 
forth in Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental view. Much 
of Rest's own research has been within this tradition 
(e.g., his research with the DIT--Defining Issues Test). 
Thus, it is understandable that Rest discusses Component 
II primarily in terms of Kohlberg's research. As a 
consequence, in the Kohlbergian tradition, a 
psychologist concentrates on the moral reasoning 
responses that articulate the responder's understanding 
of justice. As noted previously, although Kohlberg 
would deem his understanding of morality as satisfying 
all four components, Rest views the Kohlberg 
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paradigm as falling under Component II. Rest gives 
little attention to other approaches which might 
incorporate other dimensions (e.g., values). 
Even though one might know what one ought to do, 
one still must choose to do it; this choice is the 
essence of Component III. Damon (1977) demonstrated 
that children's moral ideals (what they said was just 
and fair} could be discrepant from their actual behavior 
(self-interest led them to give a disproportionate share 
of candy to themselves). Damon's findings, says Rest, 
point out the need to investigate what leads one to 
actually choose to behave morally. 
Rest (1983, 1984) notes that a variety of moral 
motivational theories exist {the choices one makes to 
behave morally). These include biological, social, and 
psychological elements. Rest states that research gives 
only limited support to any theory of moral motivation 
and that 11 an enormous amount of work" needs to be done 
on this component of morality. No one would deny that 
the complexity of morality necessitates on-going 
research. At the same time, it is questionable whether 
Rest's statement as to little support for these research 
traditions is sustainable. For example, the 
cognitive-developmental view of Kohlberg {Chapter II) 
and the empathy perspective of Hoffman {Chapter 
III) have generated a large body of studies and a 
significant amount of research support. 
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Rest devotes the least attention among the four 
components to Component IV. The most likely reason for 
this is the psychological nature of Component IV and the 
fact that this component is least likely to be 
associated with morality. In other words, Component I 
focuses on recognizing a moral situation and 
Component II addresses what ideals are relevant. In 
turn, Component III views the moral choices which must 
be made. All three of these components address relevant 
moral concerns--recognition, ideals, and choices. In 
contrast, Component IV is defined as the executing 
component--to carrying out one's moral action. An apt 
image for this component is some sort of executing 
mechanism residing within the person which fosters the 
carrying out of one's moral choice. As such, this 
component has the "potential" for being sterile; 
embracing a cold, calculating efficiency (thus a 
sociopath could score very high on Component IV). 
Although Rest admits this possibility if Component IV is 
viewed in isolation from the other components, he favors 
viewing this component in terms of some type of "inner 
strength." 
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Rest (1983) quotes St. Paul's famous statement "the 
good that I would, I do not; but the evjl which I would 
not, that I do" (Romans 7: 19) to point out the pitfalls 
associated with executing moral actions. The 
resolution to carry through on one's moral intentions is 
essentjal; simply stated, moral choices are not 
adequate, one must also follow through on one's moral 
ideals. His emphasis on a fourth component blends with 
his understanding of morality (Rest, 1983) which 
stresses "that behavior can be called moral only on the 
basis of knowing both the observable behavior and the 
processes giving rise to the behavior" (p. 569). 
Finally, Rest notes that this component has received 
little attention in logical research. 
One significant limitation of Rest 1 s component 
process approach is the lack of a developmental focus. 
For example, there is no attempt to integrate his 
components with the "adolescent experience". 
Accordingly, the adequacy of various theoretical moral 
approaches in terms of the adolescent experience need 
consideration. In this way, pertinent factors which in-
fluence the adequacy of Rest's four components can be 
addressed. 
In order to understand the adolescent experience, 
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attention will be given to short accounts of two 
dominant focuses .for adolescent morality--the 
psychoanalytic and cognitive developmental views. 
The psychoanalytic interpretation of adolescent 
morality has been set forth by several writers (Elos, 
1962, 1967, 1973; A. Freud, 1958; Settlage, 1973; Wolf, 
Gedo, & Terman, 1972). According to this tradition, the 
superego emerges as the "heir to the oedipus complex." 
The child's object attachment to the parent must yield 
to the social and interpersonal realities which now 
surro~n~ him.1her. To allay fear of parental displeasure 
and punishment and to control the massive repression 
needed to contain libidinal urges, there emerges the 
superego. During the latency period the consolidation 
of ego and superego psychic structures transpires. 
Thus, 
the superego can be traced from early ir.fancy 
through its many precursory stages until it 
assumes the definitive structure of a psychic 
institution at the decline of the oedipal 
phase. Its origin, or better, its formation, 
is due to the settlement or the Pyrrhic 
victory which brings the oedipal struggle to a 
close. (Blos, 1962, p. 184) 
However, with puberty, sexual urges again gain 
ascendancy and the adolescent must now defend against 
the re-emerging oedipal struggle. As Anna Freud (1958) 
notes in her comment upon this adolescent phase of life 
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Threatened with anxiety by the drive develop-
ment, the ego, as it has been formed in 
childhood, enters into a struggle for survival 
in which all the available methods of defense 
are brought into play and strained to the 
utmost. The results, that is the personality 
changes which are achieved, vary. Normally, 
the organization of ego and superego alter 
sufficiently to accommodate the new, mature 
forms of sexuality. (p. 124). 
Ideally, the adaptive functioning of the ego in 
adolescence coincides with a flexible superego thereby 
allowing for a gradual disengagement from parental ties 
and a growing attachment (cathexis) to others. Blos 
(1957) notes that the resolution of adolescent 
intrapsychic conflicts generates character formation 
which is typified by increasing self-esteem, a growi~g 
sense of one's ego identity, and the management of 
emotional turmoil. 
Blos (1962) states that the ego ideal takes on a 
significant role during the adolescent period. 
According to Blos (1962), the ego ideal is formed 
separately from the superego. Unlike the superego whose 
structure is set with the ebbing of the oedipal phase, 
the ego ideal is consolidated only with the advent of 
early adolescence. In essence, the ego ideal 
attains its definite organization only 
belatedly at the decline of the homosexual 
stage of early adolescence. The psychic 
institution of the ego ideal continues to 
integrate during adolescence an ever variable 
content; its structure, however, remains 
constant and permanent. (p.184) 
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In effect, the ego ideal provides the adolescent 
the opportunity to develop object attachment to others. 
Moreover, the decathecting of libidinal ties signals the 
potentjal for narcissism as well as object attachment 
beyond earlier parental attachments. Blos {1967) notes 
11 the love of the jnfant's parents is, partjally at 
least, replaced by the love of self or its potential 
perfection'' (p. 252). Unfortunately, as Anna Freud 
(1936) has pointed out, the disengagement from parental 
object attachments can foster such narcissism. 
The adolescent is in danger of withdrawing his 
object libido from those around him and 
concentrating it upon himself; just as he has 
regressed within the ego, so he may regress in 
his libidinal life from object love to 
narcissism. (p. 121) 
The significance of the ego ideal lies in its 
capacity to effectuate the movement from narcissistic 
centering to outer-directed object attachments thereby 
fostering growing psychic stability through an 
increasing incorporation of significant others and 
cultural norms. In sum, the ego ideal eases the process 
of parental object disengagement and provides a bridge 
for channeling libidinal energies towards 
developmentally appropriate objects. 
More specifically, growing exposure to diverse 
attitudes and values leads the adolescent to become, 
through object attachment, "what he/she would like tu 
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be", Blos (1962) views the ego ideal as an agency for 
solidifying interpersonal attractions. Moreover, the 
shedding of parental attachments leads to a growing 
shift in psychic energy resulting in increasing bonding 
to others and the development of social roles. 
The libidinal model of "I love what I would 
like to be" establishes narcissistic complete-
ness; this was described above in terms of the 
homosexual phase of early adolescence. The 
heir of this phase is the ego ideal in its 
final organization. Thus, the ego ideal 
advances to the status of an ego institution 
by the transformation of homosexual object libido 
into ego libido, and in the concomitant state of 
sexual completeness to be found in heterosexual 
polarity . ( p . 18 5 ) 
The psychoanalytic account of adolescent morality 
has been criticized for its lack of empirical research 
as well as its inability to explain how the superego can 
so readily incorporate numerous attitudes and values. 
More importantly, however, the question remains how the 
ego necessarily responds in a moral (prosocial) sense 
when, in fact, the ego is inclined to immoral as well as 
moral ends. That is, what human experien~e orients the 
adolescent to behave morally (Hoffman, 1980)? 
The dominant theoretical mode for viewing 
adolescent morality has been Kohlberg's cognitive 
developmental approach. Because Kohlberg's 
understanding of morality has been described in detail 
in Chapter II, only brief mention will be given here. 
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However, time will be spent examining its applicability 
to the secondary school experience. In regards to the 
adolescent's moral reasoning, the thinking of Kohlberg 
on this subject can best be characterized by the word 
"retrenchment." The alteration in Kohlberg's thinking 
on adolescent morality is best viewed by examining 
Kohlberg's (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971) now classic (anc 
now acknowledged idyllic) article which portrayed the 
adolescent's moral experience--"The Adolescent as 
Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a 
Postconventional World." Kohlberg relates the 
adolescent 1 s struggle to find meaning within a society 
whose norms and values are increasingly held suspect, as 
the germinal period for postconventional thinking. 
The postconventional level is first evident in 
adolescence and is characterized by a major 
thrust towards autonomous moral principles 
which have validity and application apart from 
authority of the groups of persons who held 
them and apart from the individual's 
identification with those persons or groups. (pp. 
1066-67) . 
Kohlberg recognized that the acquisition of formal 
operational thinking created a fertile field for the 
transition to truly principled thinking. A key to this 
transition is the adolescent's experience of relativism 
Which allows for the questioning of society's norms and 
values while still uncommitted to moral principles. 
Moreover, Kohlberg viewed the adolescent questioning and 
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rejection of conventional understandings of justice as 
allied with the growing mass social movements which 
critically challenged American cultural norms (e.g., 
protest movements of the late sixties). 
In contrast to this optimistic view of moral 
reasoning advancement, Kohlberg, by the late seventies, 
stated that postconventional thinking was only possible 
with the passing of the adolescent years. In his 
article published in 1980, "Educating for a Just 
Society: An Updated and Revised Statement," Kohlberg 
shed his hopeful view of the early seventies. No longer 
viewing adolescence as the harbinger for 
postconventional thought, he saw high schoo: youth as 
wedded to conventional thinking. 
In summary, my 1976 lecture on education for 
justice stressed a retrenchment from my 1968 
Platonic stage 6 to a stage 5 goal and 
conception of justice. The present paper 
reports a further retrenchment to stage 4 
goals as the ends of civic education. It 
discusses my civic educational efforts for the 
last four years at Cambridge high school's 
alternative Cluster School. Our Cluster 
approach is not merely Socratic and 
developmental, it is indoctrinative. Its goal is 
not attainment of the fifth stage but a solid 
attainment of the fourth stage commitment to being 
a good member of a community or a good citizen. 
(pp. 458-459) 
Central to Kohlberg's current thinking is the 
importance of a communal atmosphere where students 
actually experience a sense of justice in peer and 
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teacher student relationships. A community for Kohlberg 
represents a forum for shared decision making, thereby 
allowing students the opportunity to experience justice 
issues first hand. This community also provides 
opportunities for the discussion of conflicting 
arguments as well as exposure to more advanced levels of 
moral reasoning. Kohlberg has reported (Kohlberg, 1984; 
Higgins, Power, and Kohlberg, 1984) success in 
developing the good citizen among secondary school 
students. He now views principled thinking as beyond 
the reach of secondary school youth. For such thinking 
to take place, students are in need of on-going life 
experiences which challenge them to re-examine their own 
beliefs and invest themselves in deepening commitments 
(e.g., leaving home, vocational choices, etc.) 
(Kohlberg, 1984). 
Hoffman has admiration for the empirical rigor 
exemplified in the cognitive-developmental approach. 
Yet, he finds missing in the moral reasoning approach a 
motive force that orients the person to actually pursue 
moral ends. Hoffman (1980) states "Jn short, what seems 
to be missing in the psychoanalytic account, as in the 
cognitive disequilibrium view, is a concept of a mature 
motive force that may underlie moral action" (p. 307). 
It is with an eye towards rectifying the void in these 
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accounts of morality that Hoffman has stressed the human 
experience of empathic arousal. 
~_r:1_9.rali ty_ of the Heart 
Wicker {1985) has argued that psychologists must 
break from their "conceptual ruts" through the use of 
-~ aphors which expand awareness and lead to increased 
understanding of psychological processes. Because there 
exists no adequate psychological understanding of the 
adolescent 1 s everyday moral experience, notwithstanding 
the component processes set forth by Rest, it is helpful 
to offer a metaphor which elucidates a framework for an 
everyday morality. I propose that an apt metaphor for 
such a morality is the "heart." Haan (1982; Haan, et 
al., 1985) has warned psychologists that the 
psychological study of morality must move beyond 
statistical findings. To fail to do this, says Haan, is 
to commit the "empirical fallacy." The empirical 
falla~y is the mistaken assumption that the tot2} 
understanding of a phenomenon is gathered through 
empirical data. On the contrary, morality is a richly 
nuanced construct which has "cherished meaaings." 
Psychologists must be open to unraveling these meaning 
to fully understand the significance of morality for 
peoples' lives. Moreover, the word "heart" 
resonates with the prosociality described within these 
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pages. The heart is a cherished meaning that cannot be 
explained totally by physical or empirical data. 
what Rahner (1974) terms a "primordial word." 
It [heart] cannot be defined, cannot be 
composed of better known words, because its 
meaning is an original unity and totality. 
It is 
For this reason it occurs in all languages and 
belongs to the primitive patrimony of man's 
speech. It is one of the words in which from 
the beginning man has already ascended beyond 
the superficial experience of daily life 
(including that of anatomy and of purely 
physiological sensations of the body), without 
becoming abstract and losing touch with the 
corporeal and tangible. It is one of the 
words in which man, knowing himself, expresses 
the mystery of his existence without solving 
that mystery. When a man says that he has a 
heart, he has told himself one of the crucial 
secrets of his existence. (p. 323) 
Rahner's understanding of heart attempts to link 
the bodily existence of personhocd with the capacity to 
find meaning beyond the isolate self. This 
understanding blends nicely with everyday morality 
which posits a visceral arousal that is focused on the 
other's experience (e.g., the distressed person). In 
effect it is a transcendent experience for it renders, 
through arousal, a bonding to and reaching out beyond 
the self. As Feshbach (1982) notes "in essence, empathy 
is the vicarious sharing of another person's experience" 
and "empathy entails an internal representation in one 
person of a psychological experience taking place in 
another person" (p. 319). Psychiatrist Robert Jay 
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Lifton in The Broken Connection, his provocative study 
of life and death imagery, reflects this bonding 
capacity of empathy when he notes 
the quality of that access to another's 
experience, physical and mental, is also 
specifically human. It is what makes possible 
the intense level of caring that can develop 
with love. That is why human being can 
express and experience love in letters, on 
long-distance telephone, during and after 
prolonged physical separations, while being 
mostly indifferent to others immediately 
around them. (pp. 123-124} 
In order to capture the meaning of the word heart 
for a psychology of morality, it is helpful to view a 
different metaphor which characterizes the 
cognitive-developmental perspective and to explore 
briefly its implications as a way of contrast. What 
metaphor might fit the cognitive-developmental view of 
morality? An apt metaphor might be that of a 
"negotiator". 
Chapter II explored Kohlberg's understanding of the 
"moral point of view" as the justice principle, a 
principle most fully demonstrated through stage six 
moral reasoning. Although Kohlberg gives a variety of 
justice definitions, he consistently views justice as 
capable of negotiating the rights and claims of 
individuals. According to Kohlberg, one must be an 
"impartial spectator", judiciously capable of taking the 
role of every other person. 
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This impartiality is most fully discovered in the 
context of stage six (the morality which Kohlberg labels 
as truly "moral") . Only at this stage can one clearly 
glean and clarify issues and concerns of others as 
legitimate rights which must be respected. Yet, as the 
crjtique of Kohlberg's theory {Chapter II) points out, 
other perspectives on morality call into question the 
view of morality as negotiation. Moral concerns (e.g., 
whether to act prosocially} in everyday life are not 
solely amenable to negotiating rights and claims. Such 
a perspective points to a sterility and dispassionate 
view of life that is far removed from bonded 
relationships with significant others. 
The Heinz example illustrates this point. The 
Heinz of stage six would view the conflicting claims of 
life and property and discern the clear priority of the 
value of human life as the ultimate value and act 
accordingly. However, Kohlberg fails to stress 
adequately what is absolutely central for the human 
being in any actual life context. Heinz is not only a 
citizen, he is a husband. One cannot speak of a spousal 
relationships without thinking of emotional bonding, 
commitment, and cherished meaning. The sterile nature 
of negotiating rights and claims is inadequate for the 
marital bond. In other words, to view morality simply 
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as rights and claims renders Kohlberg's Heinz 
existentially impossible. A spouse's reactions to the 
distress of the other spouse are more than rational 
calculation. Even the legal system, the ultimate source 
of impartiality, admits this fact. For example, a 
spouse cannot be forced to testify against his or her 
partner. Accordingly, the experiences of everyday life 
lead us to look elsewhere for a morality. 
Hans Walter Wolff (1974) has shown in his analysis 
of Old Testament literature that the ''heart" is a richly 
nuanced term. He notes that "the most important word in 
the vocabulary of Old Testament anthropology is 
generally translated 'heart'" (p. 40). Wolff has shown 
that in the Hebrew Old Testament the heart includes 
meanings associated with feelings, wishes and desires, 
reason, and decisions of the will. The decisions of the 
will include not only planning and choosing but the 
actual carrying out of one's actions. He notes it is 
"difficult to distinguish linguistically between 
-perceiving' and 'choosing', between -hearing' and 
·obeying 1 " { p. 51 ) . 
Given the highly nuanced meanings of the word 
"heart", this word can be used to capture the essential 
components of morality set forth by Rest. Consequently, 
in order to incorporate the symbolism of the heart, 
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the four components discussed herein are termed the 
sensitive heart (Component I), the caring heart 
(Component II), the discerning heart (Component III), 
and the committed heart (Component IV). 
In order to explore an adolescent everyday morality 
in terms of the perspective of the heart, each wiJl be 
examined separately. 
"I.he _Sensitive _Hear_t 
A morality of the heart must first be a~tivated. 
What mechanism undergirds this caring response? What 
sensitizes a person to the plight and distress of 
others? Or, from another vantage point, what is the 
constitutive element within human experiencing that 
orients one to be aware of the needs of others? Thus 
the thematic expression of this sections is, simply, 
within what does the sensitive heart consist? 
Because a sensitive heart denotes a recognition and 
awareness of another 1 s experience, it is proposed that 
empathy is ari integraJ feature of the sensitive heart. 
Although a delineation of empathy has already been 
undertake~ in Chapter III, it is important to explore 
how empathy is integral for the sensitive heart 1 s 
functioning. Thus, references wil' be made to both 
Hoffman as well as other researchers' work which points 
to this sensitivity. The sensitivity one has to the 
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need (plight, distress, etc.) of another is for Hoffman 
primarily an affective response. Although Hoffman does 
speak of a cognitive component (1982) and a behavioral 
component for empathy (1980), the primary thrust of 
Hoffman's framework for empathy is the affective 
element. Hoffman's focus on affective arousal appears 
to represent his desire to set forth a "moral motive 
force." As stated a:iove, he finds the psychoanalytic 
and cognitive-developmental view as lacking this moral 
basis. Accordlng to Hoffman, it is this affective 
arousal which engenders the prosocial response 
(behavioral component). 
The primacy of the affective component can be 
viewed in Hoffman's delineation of the inchoative nature 
of empathic arousal. This rudimentary level of empathic 
arousal (termed "global empathy") is essentially a 
response to the distress of another. Only with 
advancing cognitive sophistication, however, does 
self-other differentiation take place thereby allowing 
an accurate perception of the other's situation and the 
possibility of a prosocial response which can alleviate 
the other's plight. This explanation captures the 
meaning Hoffman (1979) gives to one succinct 
relationship between empathy and cognition -"the 
experience of empathy depends on the level at which one 
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cognizes others" (p. 962). 
As can be seen from the previous discussion, 
empathy is a multi-dimensional experience which 
incorporates several components. Within this context, 
the sensitive heart is best viewed as an affective 
experience wherein increasing levels of cognitive 
maturation allow for greater awareness of moral concern 
and increasing likelihood of an appropriate response. 
Although Hoffman has presented the most 
sophisticated explanation of empathy, his approach to 
empathy is not the sole conceptualization. Norma 
Feshbach (1982) has argued that for empathy to occur, 
three components are necessary. First, the capacity to 
perceive accurately the affective state of the other 
persor.. Second, the ability to take the role of another 
(the capability to comprehend a situation in the way the 
distress~d person understands the situation). Third, 
the capacity to respond emotionally must exist; in other 
words, one must be able to experience the feelings of 
another. The first two components are cognitively based 
whereas the third component is affective. Although 
Feshbach's model stresses two cognitive components, her 
discussion of empathy, like Hoffman's, views empathy as 
primarily an affective response. Moreover, Feshbach 
believes "that it is just this vicarious emotional 
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reaction that separates empathy from the general area of 
social cognition ~nd role-taking" (Goldstein & Michaels, 
1985, p. 19). 
To summarize, one aspect of the sensitive heart is 
the emotional arousal engendered by the need or distress 
of the perceived person. Still, for this emotional 
arousal to be activated there is need for a cognitive 
component which represents some perceptual accuracy and 
understanding for the empathizer. It is this two-fold 
perspective which reflects the essence of the sensitive 
heart. 
Goldstein and Michaels (1985) have argued that any 
cognitive component of empathy must be examined closely 
in order to delineate its dimensions. Several 
researchers (e.g., Staub) have noted that the cognitive 
element of empathy is best described as a two-fold 
dimension. The first entails role-taking or what 
Goldstein and Michaels term "perspective taking 
ability." This process allows one to recognize tha":: 
another person is distressed. The second dimension is 
labeled "affective role taking" and focuses on an 
accurate interpretation of another's feelings. Gove and 
Keating (1979), for example, demonstrated that 
children's ability to interpret the feelings of another 
is contingent upon their ability to interpret 
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situational cues; that is, children must first be able 
to construe accurately a situation before they can 
correctly interpret internal psychological processes 
(the other's feelings). Thus, it is ible that one 
may not recognize distress in another if a situation is 
misinterpreted. A more suggestive finding of this 
research is that one may indeed recognize the distress 
of another and could conceivably still misrepresent the 
other's internal psychological state. Utilizing the 
framework of empathic development formulated by Hoffman, 
this growth in cognizing from situational to internal 
psychological states is compatible with his level of 
empathy termed "empathy for another's feelings". This 
level of empathy allows the child to develop, over time, 
an accurate representation of another's plight which 
employs both perceptual accuracy of the situation as 
well as increasing understanding of internal 
psychological processes. 
Underwood and Moore (1982b) have provided an 
exhaustive analysis of the relationship between 
perspe tive-taking and altruism. Their analysis sheds 
light on the dimensions of the sensitive heart and 
support the scrutiny needed when addressing this 
component of everyday morality. 
These researchers delineated a three fold 
understanding of perspective taking. 
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Their expanded 
discussion of perspective-taking includes three forms: 
(a) perceptual ("to predict the literal visual 
perspective of another"); (b) social-cognitive ( to 
identify another person's thoughts, intentions, motives, 
or social behavior); and (c) affective ("to infer 
another's feelings, reactions, or concerns" p. 144) 
These researchers utilized a meta-analytic technique to 
examine perceptual, social-cognitive, and affective 
dimensions of perspective-taking. In regards to 
perceptual perspective taking, meta analysis reveals a 
highly significant relationship between perceptual 
perspective-taking and altruism (Zma=4.63, g <.000005). 
However, the entire list of studies is limited to 
elementary school children and no studies were found 
that examined adolescents' perceptual perspective-taking 
abilities. 
In regards to social perspective taking (which 
includes a range ''from the ability to predict and 
understand other people's thoughts and actions to thP 
ability to communicate with another person in a 
nonegocent r i c fashion," p. 150) , l.JndervWOl~ and Moore 
noted that there existed "a reliable positive relation 
between social-perspective taking and altruism 
( Zma=7. 64, p_ <. 000000001) .• Again, there exist no 
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studies which examine adolescents as subjects; all 
subjects in these studies were children. An examination 
of partial correlations suggested a possible causal 
relationship between social-perspective taking and 
children's altruism whereas for perceptual 
perspective-taking such causality could not be 
established. 
Underwood and Moore defined two kinds of affective 
perspective-taking. One should note that Underwood and 
Moore differentiate this type of perspective-taking 
(affective perspective-taking) from perceptual 
perspective taking that is discussed above. The first 
type of affective perspective-taking is a recognition of 
another's response, the second is actually experiencing 
the other 1 s affective response. Underwood and Moore 
state "we follow convention by referring to this 
vicarious affective aro~sal as empathy and distinguish 
it from affective recognition, which we label affective 
perspective-taking" (p. 159). These researchers found 
only two studies dealing with "affective recognition" 
and significance did result from their analysis 
(Zma=2.25, p=.02). However, the researchers found 
"somewhat less encouraging" results fur empathy and 
altruism. The researchers speculate that reasons for 
weak results between empathy and altruism result both 
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from flawed instruments used to measure empathy as well 
as children's inability to adequately process situations 
and their own empathic arousals (see Hoffman, 1981a for 
a critique of such studies). More importantly, 
Underwood and Moore cite more recent studies using more 
advanced measurement techniques and note highly 
significant results. Further, experimental rather than 
correlational studies tend to support a significant 
relationship between empathy and altruism. All in all, 
based on these findings Underwood and Moore (1982b) 
conclude nwe feel that there is good reasons to believe 
that empathy plays a causal role in its relationship 
with altruisn:" (p. 166). One finding stressed by these 
rese~rchers is that the most solid evidence for relating 
empathy and altruism is with adults. They note, 
specuJatively tha.t it is possibJe "there is a 
relationship between empathy and altruism and that it 
develops over time, so it is not present during 
childhood; it is present only partially or unstably 
during adolescence, and it emerges as a stable positive 
relationship only during adulthood" (p. 164). Eve:1 so, 
the researchers state they are "uneasy" with this 
explanation because of the small number of studies in 
the adolescent and adu]t age group. 
Karniol 1 s (1982) approach to cognitive processes 
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and altruism is instructive for the sensitive heart 
although it differs dramatically from the developmental 
perspectives discussed thus far. For Karniol, an 
information processing approacr i~ adequate to explain 
what is traditionally termed empathy and role-taking. 
She argues that these constructs need to be recast as 
attempts to retrieve and gain access to stored knowledge 
from memory. "Our contention is that the inference of 
need in others does not depend on role-taking activities 
but on information retrjeval processes that are 
initiated by situational stimuli" (p. 256). In other 
words, as a person interprets an event, he or she 
attempts to join currently interpretable data with 
prestored knowledge. To illustrate, the recognition of 
situational cues calls forth a set of "situation relatec. 
scripts"; these scripts contain material relevant to tr:e 
curre~t situation. Thus, 11 understanding is a process by 
which people match what they see and hear to prestored 
groupings of actions that they have already experiencec" 
(p. 257). In order to respond prosocially, the observer 
activates "inducement networks" which allows one tc f.:t 
the distressed person's inferred emotional state wjth 
the given situation. In sum, it is this situational 
retrieval of stored knowledge and the activation of 
inducement networks which allows for the recognition of 
prosocial situations. 
Equally important in examining the role of 
cognition is the presence of the prosocial act. 
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Karniol 
applies information processing to prosocial action in 
the following way. Having recognized the need of 
another, motivation to aid the other arises froffi the 
activation of self-schemas. A self-schema is a 
cognitively based self-generalization which monitors 
information relevant to the self. Thus, if one has a 
self-schema for being a "kind person", then an 
interpreted situation calling forth a helping response 
would allow one to relate the currently perceived need 
situation to one's "self as a kind person" and foster a 
helping response. 
KarnioJ's explanation of the role of cognition is 
subject to criticisrr.. For example, experimentally 
induced emergency situations demonstrate that 
individuals often respond instantaneously to emergencies 
(P.offman, 1977; Staub, 1978) thus offering little time 
for processing and retrieval of scripts. Moreover, a 
more pointed criticism is the issue of self-schemata 
saliency. That is, what actually leads one to activate 
a kindne~:s script rathe~' than a script o: 
non-involvement, etc. What is the motivation that pulls 
for kindness rather than contempt? In short, the 
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question for information processing understandings of 
prosociality resembles the challenge Hoffman levels 
against psychoanalytic and cognitive-developmental 
accounts: What is the motive force that necessitates 
moral action? Neither an ego, a reasoning 
perspective, nor an accessed script necessarily orients 
one to respond prosocially whereas the distress 
accompanying empathic arousal focuses one on the plight 
of others and the ensuing "sympathetic distress" 
channels one's energies to respond prosocially. 
Notwithstanding this criticism of an information 
processing perspective of prosociality, this approach 
does demonstrate the importance of interpreting 
correctly the situation. Moreover, for a sensitive 
hea;t accurate cognitive interpretations are essential. 
These interpretations include both situational 
understanding as well as accurate interpretations of the 
other's affective state. Additionally, the cognitive 
interpretation must parallel affective arousal which is 
at the heart of both Hoffman's and Feshbach's theories 
of empathy. The sensitivity one shows another's needs, 
then, is supplemented by a cognitive component which 
initiates the affective response. In sum, Karniol has 
shown that cognitive factors exercise a crucial role in 
determining awareness of a moral situation (e.g., 
r 167 focusing on situational cues, accurately interpreting
the situation). Equally important, other theorists 
(e.g., Hoffman, Feshbach) have demonstrated the
significant nature of the affective dimension of
empathy. Thus, the sensitive heart must be construed in 
such a way that it is capable of embracing what is 
typically viewed as empathy (e.g., Hoffman's definition) 
as well as cognitive factors which are essential 
indicators for appropriate empathic arousal. Eisenberg 
(]982) succinctly points to the sensitive heart's need 
for both the primacy of affection yet the necessity of 
cognition. 
Just because an individual understands 
another's perspective does not mean that he or 
she will act in a manner consistent with the 
other's needs. The individual must be 
to act in ways consistent with one's 
understanding of the situation. Often the 
core of this motivation is affective. Thus, 
it is important to consider affective motives 
as well as cognitive motives in the 
development of prosocial behaviors (p. 12}. 
The Adolescent's Sensitive Heart 
Research on adolescent empathy and prosociality is 
limited. The general thrust in research does ehow that, 
with increasing age, children do respond more 
prosocially (Green & Schneider, 1974} and that the 
incidence of prosocial responding tends to be greatest 
in the adult years (Underwood & Moore, l982a, 1982b). 
Adolescents appear to respond more prosocially than 
motivated 
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children but with less consistency that adults; 
unfortunately, psychologists have not theorized to any 
great extent on why this might be the case. 
By the adolescent years, empathy has reached its 
most sophisticated expression; that is, the ability to 
embrace social systems perspectives. As noted in the 
Underwood and Moore research, studies focusing on 
empathy and prosociality in adolescence are meager. 
Eisenberg-Berg and Mussen (1978) found that adolescent 
males who engaged in a prosocial act were significantly 
higher in their empathy score than males who did not 
help; on the other hand, this relationship did not hold 
for females. For both sexes empathy was 
significantly related to prosocial moral reasoning. 
Finally, females were more empathic than males (t=6.81, 
E <.001). Although no explanation was given 
for the lack of significance in the empathy score 
between prosocially and non-prosocially oriented 
adolescent females, it is possible that the greater 
homogeneity in scores (less variance) accounted for the 
non-significant biserial correlatio~ between empathy and 
helping behavior. 
As reported in Chapter IV, Shelton & McAdams (in 
press) utilizing the VMS and the IRI noted significant 
relationships between various dimensions of empathy arid 
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everyday morality. An advantage of their research in 
the use of an empathy measure (IRI) that delineates four 
dimensions of empathy. Their findings show that a 
significant relationship exists between prosociality and 
the empathy dimensions of empathic concern and perspec 
tive-taking. 




If, as the research suggests, the adolescent is 
less inclined to behave prosocially (or at least with 
less consistency than adults}, what psychological 
experiences during the adolescent years might account 
for this diminished prosociality? There appears to be 
no differences in the adolescent as opposed to the 
adult's level of empathic development (this is 
consistent with Hoffman's assertion that adolescents are 
capable of experiencing the highest form of empathy). 
However, there are factors within the adolescent 
expe?ience that predispose the adolescent to be less 
sensitive to the needs of others. We now exami~e two 
factors which most likely diminish the adolescent's 
capacity to develop the sensitive heart. 
The first factor centers on the cognitive 
transformations transpiring during this age period. A 
large body of writing has been produced on the subject 
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of adolescent thought processes (Elkind, 1978, 1980; 
Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Keating, 1980; Piaget, 1968). 
A primary focus of these writings is the adolescent's 
experience of egocentrism. Egocentrism in childhood 
refers to the inability of the child to take the 
perspective of another. Research suggests that this 
inability restricts the child's capacity for responding 
prosocially. Thus, Buckley, Siegel, and Ness (1979) 
found in a study of children 3 to 8 that children who 
responded prosocia11y scored significantly higher on 
empathy and perspective-taking measures than those who 
did not respond prosocial1y. This gives support to the 
view that inconsistency and lower scores among children 
in regards to prosocia1 behavior is at least to some 
extent due to their developmental level. Most likely, 
this egocentric response precludes the child from 
recognizing the need of the other. With time, cognitive 
advancement coupled with increasing peer interactions 
allows the child to understand the other's psychologica~ 
processes thereby facilitating relational understandings 
and peer friendship formation. With adolescence 
egocentrism continues, but in a new form. Whereas 
childhood egocentrism is defined by the child's 
inability to take the perspective of another, adolescent 
egocentrism originates in the wedding of adolescent 
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thinking with the adolescent role. Inhelder and Piaget 
(1958) note the quality of the egocentric response. 
Moreover, the adolescent manifestation of 
egocentrism stems directly from the adoption 
of adult roles, since ... the adolescent not 
only tries to adopt his ego to the social 
environment but, just as emphatically, tries 
to adjust the environment to his ego. In 
other words, he begins to think about the 
society in which he is looking for a place, he 
has to think about his own future activity and 
about how he himself might transform this 
society. The result is a relative failure to 
distinguish between his own point of view as 
an individual called upon to organize a life 
program and the point of view of the group which he 
hopes to reform. (p. 343} 
Adolescent egocentrism encompasses a fascination by 
the adolescent in his or her own thought. The realities 
of the world, in effect, yield to the adolescent's own 
idealized theories and understandings. Moreover, the 
adolescent not only adapts the self to adult roles but 
in an egocentric sense wonders how other adults and 
societal views can be subject to his or her own 
ruminations. 
Elkind (1978, 1980), has contributed the most 
elaborate formulation of adolescent egocentrism. 
the most discernible qualities of sucl1 thinking is 
adolescents' preoccupation with their own thought. 
One of 
Correspondingly, "the adolescent fails to differentiate 
between the objects towards which the thoughts of others 
are directed and those which are the focus of his [the 
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adolescent 1 s] own concern" (p. 1029). This 
self focusing nature of adolescent thinking leads him or 
her to believe mistakenly that others are also 
preoccupied with his or her thoughts or behaviors. 
effect, the adolescent "thus constructs an :!:_mag_:!:_~ary 
that is constantly monitoring his or her owc 
behavior'' (1980, p. 354). Unfortunately, or what Conger 
(1977) terms a "minor tragedy", this egocentric stance 
often precludes the adolescent from being aware of 
others. 
Relatedly, Elkind offers a "corollary" to the 
imaginary audience which also originates out of the 
adolescent's egocentrism: the personal fable. Elkind 
(1978, 1980) suggests that the adolescent, because of a~ 
inability to differentiate between his or her own 
thinking and that of others, develops a sense of 
omnipotence or uniqueness. In other words, because 
others focus on "me", "I" must be someone ~~g_i_al. 
Consequently, there is constructed a personal fable. 
Unfortunately, such thinking often engenders foolish and 
ill-fated risks whereby the adolescent erroneously views 
his or herself as the exception, the one who can 
disregard rules with impunity. 
It is likely, too, that the adolescent's cognitive 
advancement is supportive of defensive psychic 
functioning. 
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Blos {1967) speaks of the adolescent's 
egocentrism as vital in warding off instinctual urges. 
Infantile ego states are, furthermore, 
recognizable in the emotional state that is 
akin to merger. Such states are frequently 
experienced, e.g., in relation to abstractions 
such as Truth, Nature, Beauty or in the 
involvement with ideas or ideals of a 
political, philosophical, aesthetic, or religious 
nature. Such ego states of quasi-merger in the 
realm of symbolic representations are sought as 
temporary respite and serve as safeguards against 
total merger with the infantile, internalized 
objects. (p. 167} 
Thus, if one explains defensive psychic functioning in 
psychoanalytic terms, the following is illustrative of 
its function for adolescent maturation. In effect, to 
invest psychically in objects in thought is to create 
forms of safe object attachments which are consciously 
under the adolescent's control. These cognitively based 
attachments offer a refuge from the reawakened infantile 
attachments that seek to threaten the embattled ego. 
To date, there exists no psychological literature 
which examines the inhibiting tendencies of adolescent 
cognj~ive maturation on prosocial behavior. Yet, the 
need to recognize situational cues as well as the 
internal psychological states of oth0r·s renders the 
introspective tendencies of adolescent thinking as a 
likely inhibiting event in the recognition of another's 
distress. Absorbed in his or her own thinking, the 
adolescent is more than likely to fail at consistently 
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attending to situational cues and the other's internal 
state. "It is perhaps one of the minor tragedies of 
adolescent life when these young people actually meet, 
each is likely to be more preoccupied with himself or 
herself than with observing others!! (Conger, 1977, p. 
184) . 
Keating (1980) has remarked that introspection is a 
salient feature for adolescents. "There seems to be a 
great fascination among adolescents for probing their 
own internal states, whether cognitive or emotional'' (p. 
215). Although there are reasons other than cognitive 
advancement for adolescents to explore introspectively 
their own self-understanding, an acknowledged catalyst 
for the intense introspection of adolescence is the need 
for adolescents to expand their own "horizon" and to 
seek a fuller and more adequate self-definition 
(Keating, 1980). 
Thus, it is plausible that the cognitive 
advancement present in the adolescent years provides not 
only greater cognitive discriminations and broadened 
opportunities for insight into others' need states, but 
also the potential to misperceive the needs of others. 
In effect, adolescent cognitive maturation represents a 
double edged sword. On the one hand, it provides the 
necessary abilities requisite for advanced empathic 
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development--a social systems perspective. On the other 
hand, it offers a temporary respite from the outer world 
through retreat into self-examination thereby narrowing 
one's sensitivity towards others and subsequent 
recognition of another's need. 
Relatedly, formal thinking makes provision for thF 
adolescent to think about contrasts and what is 
In other words, formal thinking provides the 
adolescent the opportunity to consider what might be 
opposed to what simply is (Keating, 1980). Conger 
(1977) notes that it is this enhanced ability to imagine 
contrasts and possibility that can account for the 
handicapped adolescent, who in childhood appeared robust 
and happy, to suffer depressive episodes in adolescence. 
In childhood a person is cognitively constrained; he or 
she is not capable of fully understanding the various 
possibilities that "could be" Having come to realize 
that others do enjoy differing opportunities and 
seemingly unlimited possibilities, the handicapped 
adolescent is capable of a more meaningful realizatio~ 
which contrasts his or her own narrowing life options 
with those of peers. 
It is likely that this capacity for thinking about 
alternatives (or possibilities at variance from one's 
current life situation), can lead one to diminished 
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recognition and attention towards others. In 
t 1. C1' 1 -- ~-par ,,.,...1.0._,_ , what an adolescent might like to do might 
well be at variance with what the adolescent is actually 
doing; consequently, the adolescent might lose interest 
in the other 1 s life situation. Evidence for this 
misat~ention is found in Csikszentmihalyi and Larson's 
(1984) use of the experience sampling method (ESM) to 
study the everyday lives of high school age adolescents. 
These researchers utilize the construct of "psychic 
entropy" to describe the lack of attention and focus 
that adolescent experience in their everyday life. More 
specifically, there exist significantly different 
finding between adults and adolescents in terms of 
several measures of cognitive efficiency (concentration, 
ease of concentration) and activation (alert, active;. 
Further, these findings held across age, sex, and social 
class. These researchers speculate that adolescents are 
unable to choose goals that account for their diminished 
attentional focus. The possibility of future goals, 
turn, necessitates a sufficient level of cognitive 
maturation that allows for the continual viewing of 
various options and future possibilities. Thus, these 
researchers state that adolescents 
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appear to be less able or willing to mobilize 
their psychic energy. These data suggest that 
they attend to the world less often and see it 
less clearly, because unless a person can 
concentrate on what is around him, unless he 
can actively focus hjs attention upon things, 
he is but a passive recipient of disordered 
information and stimuli. (p. 87) 
Loneliness and th_~_ Adolescent 
A second phenomenon that acts as an inhibiting 
factor in the adolescent's development of a sensitive 
heart is the vicissitudes and emotional intensities 
which accompany the adolescent experience of loneliness. 
Loneliness can be viewed as an emotional experience 
which accompanies a relational deficit (Brennan, 1982; 
France, McDowell, & Knowles, 1984; Numerof, 1984; Peplau 
& Perlman, 1982). Although loneliness is evident in 
adult life, this experience takes on greater impact 
during the adolescent years due to intrapsychic 
conflicts and the newly experienced intensity of the 
adolescent's affective experience. 
Adolescents may not be more lonely than people 
at other points of transition in their lives, 
but there are common elements to the 
adolescent process that give loneliness at this 
stage a specific quality. Characteristically, 
loneliness during adolescence is stamped with 
issues of mourning one's own identity as a child 
and giving up certain forms of childhood 
attachments and beliefs. The process of separating 
and maturing is tinged with loneliness. (Ostrov & 
Offer, l978, p. 36). 
A number of features might account for the 
intensity of adolescent loneliness. Brennan (1982) has 
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cited severa: experiences which predispose adolescents 
to the uncomfortable nature of their emotional state. 
Asong these experiences are: cognitive development, 
separation struggles with parents and the need for 
autonomy, interpersonal concerns with peers, and the 
�arginality of adolescents in society. Surprisingly, 
few studies have exarr.ined the nature of loneliness in 
adolescence. 11 Dat� from available studies consistently 
suggest that loneliness is an acutely painful and 
widespread problem among adolescents 11 (p. 271). 
Adolescents appear to find solitude a more lonely 
experience than adults. In their discussion of 
aGolescent solitude, Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1984) 
�cte that the adolescent 1 s emotional state is 
unsettling. "The most extreme characteristic of 
sclitude are feelings of loneliness and detachment'' (p. 
l 8 4) Adolescents, according to these researchers, find 
sc2itude an entropic experience which undermines the 
at�lities to attend to other dimensions of their lives. 
The·; expl,.dn tht.� dy:1c,m.:i c in thie:� vJay.
needs validation and recognition from others in order to 
confirm his or her own existence. When this recogriit.ion 
is not forthcoming (e.g., in the experie�ce of 
solitude) 1 the adolescent draws increasingJy inward anc: 
focuses inordinate arr.aunt of psychic energy on the self. 
".'he ado~e~~cent 
To remain in an ordered state, the self 
requires others to confirm its existence. 
Unless others recognize me and my goals, I 
begin to doubt that there is such a thing as 
"I.ft These doubts demand turning increasing 
amount of attention inward to bolster the 
sagging self, leaving less attention to deal 
with other information. It is thus that the 
experience of loneliness takes hold, 
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increasing emotional entropy in consciousness. (p. 
187) 
There is no evidence in psychological research to 
suggest how loneliness attenuates the adolescent 1 s 
se:i.sitive heart. To date, there is no literature 
available on the effects of loneliness on prosociality. 
However, there is evidence regarding mood states that 
address, at least in a suggestive sense, the 
adolescent's disinclination to be sensitive to others. 
A fairly reliable finding in the literature on 
prosociality is that positive mood states tend to foster 
prosocial responses (Rosenhan, et al., 1981). 
Interpretations of negative mood states are more 
problematic. In general, negative mood states (e.g., 
guilt} appear to foster prosociality. This has been 
explained by a negative relief state model wherein the 
prosocial response appears to lift one's mood. The 
negative mood of "sadness" has appeared, however, to 
have mixed results (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Moore, 
Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; Thompson, Cowan, and 
Rosenhan, 1980). As loneliness to some degree is 
180 
compatible with feelings of sadness (e.g., Ostrov & 
offer, 1974} it is conceivable that the effects of 
loneliness mirror those of sadness. In an attempt to 
explain the mood of sadness on prosocial behavior, 
Cialdini et al. (1982) note that a crucial distinctio~ 
must be made between one's attention to another's 
distress (sadness resulting from viewing the other's 
situation) and one's attention towards one's own 
internal psychological state (sadness emanating from 
one's own self). Thus a review of the Thompson et al., 
(1980} study shows this to be the case. These 
researchers asked a group of college students (late 
adolescents) to imagine an extremely distressing 
event -their best friend was dying of cancer. One group 
was asked to focus on their friend's feelings whereas 
the second group was requested to focus on thejr own 
feelings. When asked to respond prosocially at a later 
date, the former group helped significantly more than 
controls whereae the latter group failed to respond more 
th2n controls. In commenting upon these findings, 
Cialdini, et al., ( 1982) note that ''an inner focus may 
render an individual inattentive or insensitive to the 
gratifying nature of external events, such as the 
opportunity to help others" (p. 348}. 
The inward focus that loneliness fosters and the 
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accompanying negative moods suggests an inhibition in 
the perceptual understanding of another's situation and 
thereby weakens the possibility for empathic concern for 
another's plight. Because the experience of loneliness 
is a more intense experience during the adolescent years 
than at any other stage of life, the attentional focus 
surrounding emotional states renders the adolescent 
particularly vulnerable to a more inward focus thereby 
leaving less sensitivity for the needs of others. 
As loneliness is experienced as a needy state by 
the adolescent, it is useful to explore the possibility 
that s~ch adolescents might actually help others more iD 
order to gain peer approval and, in effect, compensate 
for their felt interpersonal deficit. No studies report 
such findings with adolescents; however, several studies 
have focused on younger children who were emotionally 
needy (e.g., unpopular with peers). These studies 
(Mussen, Harris, Rutherford, & Keasey, 1970; Yarrow, 
Scott, & Waxler, 1973) demonstrate that such children 
2.:- t=' riot more prosoc .i ally inclined than their less 
emotionally needy (and presumably less lonely) peers. 
Indeed, such children tend to provide lower prosocial 
responses. Although it is difficult to interpret why 
this might be so, it is plausible given the need for 
perspective and affective perspective taking as well as 
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accurate interpretation of situational cues that 
individuals who are focused on their own "needs" are 
less inclined to be aware of others' needs. 
Consequently, their capacity to accurately interpret of 
another's situation and their corresponding affective 
distress at another's plight are diminished. 
To conclude, if the sensitive heart of the 
adolescent is to be present, there must exist an 
orientation towards others that contains both cognitive 
understandings and affective concerns. Given the nature 
of the adolescent experience, there exist developmental 
features of this age period which preclude the optimum 
awareness needed for sensitivity to the concerns of 
others. Two likely events which foster this diminished 
focus are cognitive maturation and the emotional impact 
of the experience of loneliness. It would seem likely, 
then, that enhancing the adolescent's sensitive heart 
necessitates addrPssing the consequences of these 
developmental realities. 
The Valuing_ Heart 
Rest (1984) focuses on two "major researcL 
traditions'' for understand!ng the second component--the 
moral ideal. The first tradition incorporates the 
emphasis psychological theorists, in particular social 
psychological theorists, have given to social norms. 
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Among the social norms that Rest notes are legitimate 
modes of inquiry for understanding the moral ideal are 
social responsibility and equity. Although Rest does 
make mention of these approaches, he gives little 
attention to them. His primary emphasis is on the 
cognitive-developmental perspective. In other words, 
for Rest, the moral ideal, from a psychological vantage 
point, appears best explained by one's developing 
structural understanding of morality rather than by the 
internalization of social norms. As noted previously, 
Rest's own research is within this cognitive-develop-
mental tradition. Accordingly, in his explication of 
component two he gives considerable attention to the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT}. 
What is lacking in Rest's second component is 
another approach which we might term a value 
orientation; this approach emphasizes the role of 
values in morality. We have already noted in chapter 
two's critique of Kohlberg that values can be 
significant predictors of behavior. In the discussion 
that follows, we will focus on the valuing heart as the 
repository of values which reflect care and concern 
towards others while providing meaning for the 
recognition and sensitivity that is experienced by the 
sensitive heart. Furthermore, we will focus on the 
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process within which the adolescent orients him or 
herself to choose values. 
Values have received less attention in psychology 
than other cognitive constructs, such as attitudes. 
Historically, psychologists have approached the study of 
values through an examination of one of two 
perspectives: behavioral values or object values. The 
former are "prescriptive guides" or what one 11 ought to 
do" whereas the latter are the values one gives to 
objects (McKinney & Moore, 1982). 
Rokeach (1973) has focused on the behavioral 
approach for he notes it is more conducive to the study 
of social behavior. According to Rokeach, a value is 
"an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or 
end-state of existence is personally or socially 
preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or 
end-state of existence" (p. 5). Rokeach states that 
values contain several elements: (a) they contain 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions; (b) 
they state a preference for one course of action over 
another; (c) there is a degree of "oughtness" to them. 
Thus values allow one to set standards, foster 
decision-making, and sustain long term goals. Rokeach 
(1983) states that a person•s values "are centrally, 
strategically located "deep structures" within one's 
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total belief system" (p. 172). Values are core beliefs
which contribute to one's self-definition. Furthermore, 
they exercise a significant role in terms of one's
self-identity and self-presentation to the world. In 
sum, 
to say that a person has a value is to say 
that he has an enduring prescriptive or 
proscriptive belief that a specific mode of 
behavior or end-state of existence is
preferred to an opposite mode of behavior or 
end-state. This belief transcends attitudes toward 
objects and toward situations; it is a standard 
that guides and determines action, attitudes toward 
objects and situations, ideology, presentations of 
self to others, evaluations, judgments, 
justifications, comparisons of self with others, 
and attempts to influence others. (Rokeach, 1973, 
p. 25)
The Relation of Values and Behavior 
The significance of a psychology of values for 
psychological research stems from the assumption of a 
consistent relationship between values and behaviors. 
"An implicit assumption among those who study cognitive 
concepts, such as beliefs, attitudes, and values is that 
there is some correspondence between behavior and these 
cognitions" (McKinney & Moore, 1982, p. 550). 
Although many researchers have critically 
questioned the use of values as predictors of behavior 
(Kohlberg's use of the term "bag of virtues" is a 
classic example), a considerable body of research 
disputes this premise and maintains that beliefs (values 
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and attitudes) are good predictors of behavior (e.g., 
see reviews by Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Kelman, 1974). 
The question as to whether values can predict 
behaviors is contingent upon the behavioral analysis 
employed. Ajzen & Fishbein (1977) state in order for 
the predictive utility of a cognition to be operative, 
four elements of behavior must be examined: (a) the 
specific action; (b) the target at which the specific 
action is directed; (c) the context in which the action 
is performed; (d) the time when the behavior transpires. 
For predictive accuracy to exist, the measurement should 
correspond to these elements of behavior. Thus, a 
generalized measure of a specific cognition (e.g., the 
value of honesty) would not be expected to predict a 
specific instance of cheating; yet, this same measure is 
predictive in general of honest behavior over time 
across a variety of situations (review and application 
of this approach is given extensive treatment in 
McKinney & Moore, 1982; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). This 
method of analysis, for example, provides insight into 
Rushton 1 s formulation of the "altruistic personality." 
Such an individual possesses a generalized trait of 
prosociality that predisposes him or her to respond 
prosocially. Rushton does not maintain that one would 
necessarily respond prosocially in a specific situation. 
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However, given any number of situations, the predis-
position of the altruistic personality would show forth 
through behaviors which reflect a prosocial response. 
The complexity of the predictive nature of values 
is brought to light in a now classic social 
psychological study that focuses directly on the issue 
of prosociality--Darley and Batson's (1973) experiment 
entitled ''The Good Samaritan." Darely and Batson set up 
an experimental situation reminiscent of the Good 
Samaritan Bible Story 11 what is perhaps the classical 
helping story in the Judeo-Christian tradition" (p. 
101). Forty seminarians who were paid volunteers were 
asked to give a talk on either employment prospects for 
seminarians (a secular topic) or on the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. The subjects were instructed to go to 
another building to present their talk. Half the 
subjects for each type of talk were told they were under 
time pressure and needed to leave immediately whereas 
the other half were under no such time constraint. 
Along the way all subjects encountered a distressed 
person. The independent variables were time and subject 
matter for the talk and the dependent variable was 
helping. Analysis of the data demonstrated that time 
was a significant variable in determining whether one 
would aid the person in distress. Thus, those under ~o 
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time constraints responded significantly more often to 
aiding the distressed person than those under time 
pressure. The type of speech given, however, had no 
effect as to whether one helped. Darely and Batson 
concluded "thinking about the Good Samaritan did not 
increase helping behavior, but being in a hurry 
decreased it" (p. 107). It could be assumed that these 
seminarians held values supporting prosociality. Still, 
situational pressures (e.g., time) inhibited the 
behavioral dimension of their values. However, a 
reanalysis of the Darley and Batson findings (Greenwald, 
1975) has reached a partially different conclusion. 
Greenwald used a Bayesian analysis of the data rather 
than hypotheses testing. A Bayesian analysis is an 
approach to statistical inference based on a subjective 
definition of probability rather than the more commonly 
used relation frequency definition of probably. 
Greenwald concluded that it was highly probable that the 
seminarians who were to speak on the parable of the Good 
Samaritan were much more likely to aid the distressed 
person than those who were speaking on a secular topic. 
Moreover, given this reanalysis, the saliency of one's 
beliefs might well emerge as a significant factor in 
prosociality. 
Three conclusions might be drawn from these 
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findings. First, it appears that a value orientation 
does not necessitate behavior consonant with one's 
values (e.g., the many seminarians who did not help). 
Furthermore, situational realities (e.g., time) can 
influence prosocial responding. Yet, a self-conscious 
saliency concerning one's values can predispose one to 
aid others. All in all, this novel experiment shows the 
complexity of linking values and prosociality. 
The Adolescent Experience of Values 
The adolescent experience has provided a fertile 
ground for value research. Much research has attempted 
to capture the values of adolescents in terms of 
generational change (Jennings & Niemi, 1975); 
ideological thinking (Gallatin, 1980); and the 
prototypic or type of adolescent (Baumrind, 1975). 
As might be expected, Feather (1980) has noted that 
value changes over time among adolescents mirror their 
internal psychological changes. For example, he notes 
that the relative importance of values (using the 
Rokeach Value Survey) shows greater importance given to 
values which are associated with self-autonomy. "There 
were signs that both sexes were increasingly valuing 
achievement, open-mindedness, responsibility, and 
self-respect as they grow older and downgrading modes of 
behavior connoting conformity to convention and 
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authority" (p. 262). Overall, however, value research 
has focused disproportionately on late adolescents 
(college youth) rather than students at the secondary 
school level. 
Furthermore, little research exists concerning the 
relationship of values and prosociality during the 
adolescent years. Although not related specifically to 
prosociality, Rokeach (1985) reports significant 
differences in the value orientations of adolescent 
non-drug users and drug abusers. The former group 
placed greater emphasis on social values such as "world 
at peace 11 and 11 equality 11 whereas the latter group 
favored more personal and hedonic oriented values such 
as "an exciting life 11 , 11 happiness 11 , and 11 pleasure 11 • 
As noted previously, the issue of values and 
prosociality has received little attention in 
psychological research. Staub (1978) has reported 
findings for late adolescents (college undergraduates) 
which indicate that values such as 11 helpfulness 11 and 
"equality" differentiate helpers from non-helpers. 
Moreover, conducting such research is made difficult due 
to the contrasting generality of value instruments and 
the specific nature of prosocial experimental 
conditions. Utilizing the Fishbein model of attitude 
formation, exacting standards of specificity must be 
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employed for target values and behaviors or researchers 
must utilize general instruments measuring general value 
orientations and prosocial responses. At the same time, 
such a paucity of research does not preclude a 
reasonable speculation which considers empathy and 
other-centered values to be linked. 
Exactly what link exists between the sensitive 
heart which is aware of the distress and needs of others 
and the valuing heart which reflects values consonant 
with this awareness of others remains a question. Most 
likely, psychological research has assumed that values 
focus on the "right action" that is a consequence of 
empathic arousal. Within this framework, prosocial 
responses are a direct result of empathic arousal. 
Rest's model of morality would differentiate between 
these two behaviors (the empathic arousal and the value 
orientation) through his unit analysis of discrete 
components. Such a ''clean" differentiation is, however, 
not totally acceptable. Currently, psychological 
research has focused on cognitive interpretations which 
would include value orientations that generate emotional 
reactions. In effect, values not only provide an 
idealized sense for what one "ought to do 11 but most 
likely contribute to arousal. Although their role 
(values) might be ancillary to the role of empathy and 
192 
the corresponding correct interpretation of situational 
realities, a value orientation most likely exercises a 
collateral role in sensitizing one to the distress of 
others. Thus, ••particular values and value 
orientations are likely to form a cognitive network; 
these interrelated cognitions are applied to the 
interpretation of the world" (Staub, 1978, p. 45). For 
example, a value orientation that favors values which 
focus on the concerns and needs of others is likely to 
engender empathic arousal and cognizance of what ought 
to be done to aid others. 
The Ego Ideal as the Source for the Valuing Heart 
If the valuing heart of the adolescent is oriented 
to a compassionate stance as regards to the welfare of 
others, then what psychic experience does the adolescent 
undergo that allows for this caring dimension to 
surface? That is, what psychological phenomenon during 
adolescent maturation can account for the experience of 
the valuing heart? Stated another way, if empathy 
resides as a central component for the sensitive heart, 
then what parallel experience within the adolescent 
fosters the valuing heart? Hoffman (1980) has rightly 
noted that the ego in general can be subject to immoral 
as well as moral ends and thus is an inappropriate 
subject as a source for morality. Yet, within the 
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psychoanalytic framework, there does exist a psychic 
structure, the ego ideal, which takes on great 
prominence and is predisposed to adopt values that 
reflect a prosocial dimension. 
The ego ideal has received sparse attention in 
psychoanalytic literature. In discussions concerning 
any type of moral orientation, attention focuses on the 
superego. As Blos (1962) has noted, "the concept of the 
ego ideal has played of late a rather insignificant role 
in the psychology of adolescence" (p. 184). 
Historically, the ego ideal has often been confused 
with the superego. The apparent reason for this 
confusion is the dual nature Freud gave to development 
of a person's moral orientation. That is, according to 
Freud, there exist two features necessary for the 
psychological development of personal morals: 
idealization and prohibition. Freud introduced the term 
ego ideal in 1914. At this early juncture the term was 
used to refer to an individual's attempt to maintain an 
infantile narcissism. Moreover, the term was kept 
distinct from conscience which monitored behavior and 
was self-punitive. By 1921 Freud's use of the term 
incorporated both a narcissistic element and a 
self-critical sense. Soon thereafter (1923) the term 
11 superego" and "ego ideal" were used synonomously. 
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Finally, in 1932 it appears Freud saw the ego ideal 
residing within the superego and reflecting the person's 
idealized parental introjects (Sandler, Holder, & Meers, 
1963). Thus, Freud's final position on the source of 
intrapsychic morality was the incorporation of the ego 
ideal into the superego construct. 
More recent psychoanalytic accounts have focused on 
delineating the concept of ego ideal from superego and 
pointing out the significance of the ego ideal for the 
adolescent period. Essentially, the ego ideal 
represents an attempt at wish fulfillment or the 
attainment of some desired state. To contrast, the ego 
ideal represents the self's wish to obtain a desired 
state whereas the superego's function resides in 
self-criticism and prohibition (Lample-DeGroot, 1962). 
As Blos (1973) has stated, "the superego is an agency of 
prohibition, while the ego ideal is an agency of 
aspiration" (p. 95). 
The ego ideal's significance in the adolescent's 
years resides in its pivotal role in enabling the 
adolescent to shed reawakened libidinal ties to parents. 
Most psychoanalytic writing, however, has tended to 
focus on the internal psychic restructuring which allows 
the ego ideal to emerge as the natural successor to the 
narcissism of adolescence. That is, with adolescence, 
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the young person is submerged in a growing 
narcissistic presence. This newly discovered narcissism 
is rekindled by reignited oedipal feelings and the 
concomitant disillusionment resulting from parental 
inadequacies. The adolescent, troubled by the waning of 
parental ties, seeks refuge in an omnipotent self, fads 
and cursory interests, or peer group ideals in order to 
assuage a felt inner void. With time, this narcissism 
is shed through a growing adoption of personal values 
which reflects the adolescent's adaptation to the adult 
world. 
If we follow the course which the ego ideal 
follows from infancy to adulthood, we can 
trace a continuous adaptation of its basic 
function to the increasingly complex value system 
as it accrues along developmental lines. Thus, the 
ego ideal gets further and further removed from 
those primitive efforts which aim at narcissistic 
restitution. (Blos, 1973, p. 95) 
This internal focus (e.g, emphasis on cathectic 
shifts and object attachments) has preoccupied 
psychoanalytic writing to the detriment of viewing other 
aspects of the ego ideal which receive only sparse 
comment. More specifically, the focus on internal 
psychological dynamics precludes viewing the 
interpersonal and social nature of the ego ideal. Yet, 
it is this social nature of the ego ideal that reflects 
the value constellation which crystallizes during the 
adolescent period thereby providing a content of values 
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for the valuing heart. 
The ego ideal is bonded with an ethical stance. In 
essence, a mature ego ideal is formed through gradual 
identification with values that lead to an increasing 
sense of autonomy. In the adolescent years what 
transpires in normal development is the shedding of 
idealized parental standards and the adoption of an 
increasingly personalized value system. The final stage 
of ego ideal formation occurs in adolescence and leads 
to the "formation of ethics and ideals as 
attainable goals after disillusionment by the idealized 
parents" (Lample-DeGroot, 1962, p. 99). The ego ideal 
emerges as a source for values whereby the adolescent 
gradually identifies with a personalized value 
orientation that in turn provides a greater adaptive 
capacity for the adult world. In the course of normal 
development, implicit in this value identification is 
the presence of societal norms and the significance 
accorded some minimum level of prosociality. 
The ego ideal represents a unique psychic structure 
for value because of its aspirational drive to become 
something beyond the present. In essence, the ego ideal 
represents a striving for something yet-to-be-realized. 
The ego ideal possesses an aspirational quality which 
seeks to achieve the self's ideals. Blas (1973) hints 
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at this feature when he notes the ego ideal is an 
"agency of aspiration." Like values, the ego ideal to 
promote an "idealized end state". 
The author experienced a situation while a 
secondary school classroom teacher which points out the 
aspirational quality of values. A high school junior, 
Jim, was periodically difficult during class. He 
displayed attention seeking behaviors and showed a 
strong need for adult approval. Jim came from a 
difficult home background. His father was an alcoholic 
and his mother was a dominating figure in his life. One 
day a classmate, John, was disrupting class. As the 
teacher I corrected John and requested he stay and see 
me after class. At the end of the class period John 
came to me quite upset. He accused me of not being 
fair. He stated I allowed Jim to get by with actions 
which I would not allow from him. He pointed out that I 
displayed a more tolerant attitude toward Jim. In 
effect, John was demanding that I be fair in my 
classroom discipline. As the teacher I was well aware 
of this discrepancy (although the disparity was most 
certainly overdramatized by John). I explained to John 
that as the teacher in the class it was important to be 
fair with students. At the same time I explained to Jim 
that as a teacher I also strived to understand my 
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students and desired to know "why" they acted as they 
did in the classroom. I simply asked John to reflect on 
whether he and Jim were the same. Thus, in this 
particular situation, I was attempting to go beyond 
fairness. I was appealing to a valued ideal in John 
which cherished sensitivity and compassion. Based on 
the discussion thus far, John would hopefully empathize 
with Jim's difficult situation at home. His own 
evolving moral identity and the significance of his own 
value system would allow him to view the need for 
sensitive understanding of Jim's situation and to aspire 
to a set of personal behaviors and openness that 
reflected this understanding. 
In effect, the ego ideal can be depicted as 
providing the psychic energy for values. Values in turn 
are the expression of the ego ideal's attempt to 
engender an "idealized end state. 11 In a sense, then, 
the ego ideal represents the psychic substratum for 
values. As noted above, the adolescent's need for such 
ideals is the result of the hiatus resulting from the 
gradual shedding of parental attachments and the 
concomitant need to internalize societal norms. This 
process of focusing on ideals becomes an integral 
feature in adolescent maturation or what Wolf, Gedo, and 
Terman (1972) term the adolescent's "transformation of 
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self"; it is the ego ideal's purpose to function as an 
integral fixture in the growing stabilization of the 
adolescent self which is increasingly removed from 
childhood. 
To be sure, the values with which the adolescent 
identifies need not necessarily reflect a dimension of 
prosociality. Furthermore, ego ideal formation might 
well contribute in its own unique way to pathology 
(Blos, 1979). Still, the very nature of the ego ideal 
is characterized by a decidedly prosocial dimension 
which, in normal development, would reflect a minimum 
level of concern and care for others. This results from 
the nature of the ego ideal as a harbinger for 
adolescent adaptation to adult society and the adoption 
of a cultural ethos. Within such a context, societal 
norms and parental standards are more weighted to a 
decisively prosocial stance. In effect, for normal 
maturation to occur, the adolescent comes to adopt such 
standards as his or her own. Idealized norms in society 
such as compassion and care for others become 
significant ideals that the adolescent can strive to 
achieve. Even though peer group values and norms might 
delimit such idealized values, studies of adolescent 
values in relation to peer group and parental values 
demonstrate remarkable similarity between adolescents 
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and parents regarding significant life decisions and 
general attitudes and values. Disagreements and 
adoption of peer standards center more on stylistic 
concerns and personal behaviors (hair style, use of 
time) rather than on more general value orientations 
which focus on prosociality (Coleman, 1980; Newman, 
1982). 
The Discerning Heart 
If empathic sensitivity and the recognition of 
another's distress are necessary in order to view a 
moral problem, and values point to "what I ought to do," 
given this moral problem, then, following Rest's model, 
the course of action (given that the "moral ground" 
chosen is prosocial behavior) becomes the focus of 
attention. The discerning heart is the adolescent's 
choice to behave prosocially. 
Given that a person is aware of various 
possible courses of action in a situation, 
each leading to a different kind of outcome or 
goal, why then would a person ever choose the 
moral alternative, especially if it involves 
sacrificing some personal interest or enduring 
some hardship? (Rest, 1984, p. 32) 
In other words, why would one choose a particular course 
of action, especially if this course of action leads to 
a level of sacrifice, an experience often encountered in 
situations calling for prosocial response? From the 
vantage point offered here, the question can be 
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addressed as to why prosocial behavior is likely to be 
chosen by the adolescent as the appropriate action. 
For the adolescent, the decision to choose some 
particular value over others, even to act at variance 
with one's self-interest, can be traced to the 
development of a "moral identity." According to Blasi 
(1984), every individual organizes a level of 
"self-related information" that 
determines the order and the hierarchy among 
the characteristics that are included in the 
self, along such metaphorical dimensions as central 
peripheral, deep superficial, important 
unimportant, and so on. It also defines what could 
be called the essential or the core self, namely, 
the set of those aspects without which the 
individual would see himself or herself to be 
radically different; those so central that one 
could not even imagine being deprived of them; 
those whose loss would be considered and felt as 
irreparable. (p. 131) 
Given this definition of moral identity, there 
exists not only a conscious awareness of "what I must 
do" but also the actual choosing of certain actions 
which reflect a basic self-consistency with "who I am". 
That is, there exists consonance between one's personal 
self-definition and action. Without this unity, a sense 
of self-discrepancy develops whereby at the core level 
of self one feels alien to who one truly is. 
This self-consistency allows one to define the self 
as moral ("I am moral because I do what I believe to be 
the moral action"). Further, according to Blasi, there 
develops a responsibility to act consistently in a 
manner that mirrors this self-definition .. 
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There exists a high degree of congruity between 
Blasi's notion of moral identity and the more commonly 
understood view of identity as expressed in the writings 
of Erik Erikson (1956, 1968, 1980). Erikson's 
discussion of identity is elusive. Erikson (1956) 
himself admits that the term has been used 
interchangeably to refer to a variety of meanings for 
identity. Among these meanings are: a conscious sense 
of one's personal identity, a sense of on-going 
character which develops over time, the synthesizing 
aspects of the ego, and a solidarity with the ideals of 
one's own group. Although identity can take on a number 
of meanings, Erikson (1968) favors identity as an aspect 
of self-continuity. More specifically, then, identity 
formation allows one to connect a personal life history 
with the demands of the on-going present while preparing 
for the tasks that await one in the future. More than 
anything, identity produces an inner sense of 
continuity, a cohesiveness of self. Erikson (1956) 
states "the term identity expresses such a mutual 
relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness 
within onself (self-sameness) and a persistent sharing 
of some kind of essential character with others" 
(p. 179). 
He writes elsewhere 
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An optimal sense of identity, on the other 
hand, is experienced merely as a sense of 
psychosocial well-being. Its most obvious 
concomitants are a feeling of being at home in 
one's body, a sense of "knowing where one is 
going, 11 and an inner assuredness of 
anticipated recognition from th~~e who count. 
(1968, p. 165). 
According to Erikson, each stage has a particular 
virtue (he now uses the term "strength" to describe 
these virtues). They represent the successful 
resolution of the task essential for the stage. For 
adolescence, the stage of identity crisis, the positive 
feature corresponding to the successful meeting of 
identity issues is fidelity. "Fidelity is the ability 
to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of the 
inevitable contradictions and confusions of value 
systems" (Erikson, 1980, p. 25). It is, for Erikson, 
the "cornerstone" of identity. This definition of 
identity shows similarity to Blasi 1 s use of the term 
moral identity. Both definitions point out the self's 
capacity for an inner directed consistency in action and 
the desire to direct the self towards ideals in spite of 
uncertainty. McAdams (1985) has presented a life story 
model of identity which addresses the ideals which form 
within the adolescent's life. This story is shaped by 
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an ideological setting (beliefs and values) as well as 
significant characters--idealized "images" of self 
{McAdams terms these imagoes). These imagoes serve as a 
foundation and directional focus for the adolescent's 
evolving self-definition which confronts on-going moral 
concerns and questions. 
McAdams notion of a story as a context for an 
evolving identity is intuitively appealing. In the 
context of the present discussion what is suggested is 
that every life story has the potential for an image of 
self that is caring. Stated another way, a morality of 
the heart brings care to central images of self which 
all men and women come to develop in their life story. 
Thus "Hera'' (utilizing McAdams' typology of Greek 
figures for imagoes), the loyal friend, as well as 
11 Ares 11 , the warrior, are images which are affected by 
this care. In the case of the former overt acts of care 
are most likely forthcoming whereas with the latter 
bonded loyalty and the desire to protect might be apt 
characterizations of a morality of the heart. 
Support for the notion of an adolescent moral 
identity is given by Damon's (1984) study of child and 
adolescent self-understanding. Damon's understanding of 
self coincides with the notion of identity for he 
defines the self as a psychological construct "whose 
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domain is the individual's experience of personal 
identity" (p. 112). More specifically, and in line with 
moral identity, Damon is interested in exploring how 
morality relates to one's self-understanding. Damon 
utilized open ended question (e.g., "What kind of person 
are you?" "What do you want out of life?") and 
discovered gradual, schematic growth in 
self-understanding. This self-understanding in both 
childhood and adolescence incorporates knowledge of 
physical (Level one), active (Level 2), social (Level 
3), and psychological (Level 4) aspects of the self. 
For example, in early childhood, self-understanding is 
associated with aspects of one's physical self 
(self-understanding in terms of physical 
characteristics). During the adolescent years, however, 
there appears the dominance of the social and 
psychological aspects of the self. 
Moral self-statements are one signal of Level 
4 and rarely appear in prior levels. The only 
real exception is some mention of reciprocal 
moral responsibilities sometimes made in the 
context of Level 3 social-relational 
self-statements. But morality does not become a 
dominant characteristic of self until Level 4, and 
Level 4 statements are not found in any frequency 
until middle adolescence. (p. 116) 
Thus, children most often characterize themselves by 
physical and active selves; they are unable to 
articulate moral principles which are typically stated 
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by the psychological self in adolescence. 
According to Damon, the adolescent self shows an 
increasing sensitivity towards the opinions and 
expectations of others as well as the realization that 
others expect certain behaviors from the adolescent. 
The adolescent understands that he or she must now take 
greater responsibility for personal behaviors and that 
this is an assumption that others share. Because 
of the presence of a "social network" in which the 
adolescent becomes actively engaged, he or she becomes 
aware of others' expectations, the needs of others, and 
his or her own role within the social group. 
A second feature of adolescent morality is the 
ideological theme that is often present in adolescent 
thinking. With the advent of formal thinking, the 
adolescent discovers a fascination with ideas which 
provide a framework for reflecting upon and discovering 
ethical beliefs. From the perspective of society, 
ideology offers the initial underpinnings for entrance 
into the adult world. Although the formulation of 
ideology becomes more differentiated and personalized in 
late adolescence (the college years), the power of 
formal thinking allows the high school adolescent to 
examine inchoatively, if only in a rudimentary way, a 
variety of positions on various issues. As a 
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consequence, the adolescent develops numerous 
self-statements (e.g. ,"I am a Democrat," "I believe in 
God") which are seeds sown for further self­
understanding in late adolescence. Damon notes the 
passionate nature of adolescent thinking when he says 
"perhaps at no other time in life, at least for most 
individuals, are such doctrines so extensively 
articulated and so purely held" (p. 119). 
Damon states there are two significant changes in 
adolescent self-understanding which provide a base for 
"conceptual integration with adolescent moral thinking" 
(p. 119). The first shift is the development of a 
sophisticated Level 3 perspective on self--the social 
personality perspective. The adolescent now witnesses 
the self in a social context which he or she soon 
discovers is fraught with moral consequences. Thus, 
"being helpful, generous, open, suspicious all are 
morally relevant characteristics of one's social 
interactional self" (p. 119). The daily interactions of 
the self in interpersonal contexts naturally elicit 
moral questions and concerns which help the adolescent 
sort out personal moral views and ways to act which 
reflect personal beliefs. 
A fuller understanding of the significance of the 
social-interactional self is given by Youniss (1980) in 
208 
his discussion of adolescent friendship formation. 
Borrowing on the work of Sullivan and Piaget, Youniss 
hypothesizes that adolescents come to engage in a 
"relation of cooperation" whereby they come to 
appreciate the thoughts and feelings of others and 
interact with peers in mutually supportive and healthy 
ways. Further, Youniss states "the psychologically 
healthy and morally mature personality" is derived from 
this ''relation of cooperation." Such relations contain 
five characteristics: mutuality (give and take between 
peers which leads to compromise and mutual 
understanding); standards of worth (personal judgments 
based on interpersonal consensus); similarity between 
self and others (awareness of sameness which fosters an 
equality in the relationship); interpersonal sensitivity 
{awareness of the individuality of the self and the 
others and the acceptance of personal limitations); 
relational possibilities (the formulation of a 
self-definition that is derived from being in 
relation-with-others). In short, peers provide the 
adolescent the opportunity for increasing cooperation, 
developing self-insight, and accepting individuality. 
Peer friendships lay the foundation for future adult 
intimacy {Youniss, 1981). 
This focus on interpersonal interactions finds 
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further confirmation in the work of Kegan (1982). His 
constructive-developmental view of human growth situates 
adolescence in the Stage 3 Interpersonal Self. The self 
at this stage is relationships. According to Kegan, the 
adolescent self is embedded within the interpersonal; he 
or she has shed the later childhood construction of the 
self as "need." In effect, the adolescent self no 
longer is its needs; rather, it has needs. Consequent­
ly, the adolescent self can now increasingly reach 
outward to others and come to regulate the self's needs 
through interpersonal interactions. The interpersonal 
consequences of moving the structure of needs from 
subject to object is that the person, in being able to 
coordinate needs, can become mutual, empathic, and 
oriented to reciprocal obligation" (p. 95). According 
to Kegan, with adolescence the self becomes 
interactional, it becomes a shared reality. This 
movement represents a transformation for the adolescent 
is now situated in a self-understanding that must 
recognize the needs of others in order that the self can 
be defined. 
Interestingly, evidence suggests that such 
interpersonal interactions which typify the adolescent 
years are important for the adolescent's development of 
prosocial behavior. Adolescents tend to act more 
210 
prosocially towards their friends than peers; this 
behavior most likely reflects the increase in mutuality 
and equality within the friendship. Further, 
adolescents who respond prosocially towards their 
friends are more likely to respond in a similar fashion 
towards strangers. Although little research exists 
which discusses the relationship of friendship and 
prosocial behavior in either childhood or adolescence, 
it is possible that the experience of friendship and the 
accompanying prosocial responses directed towards 
friends do in turn influence the adolescent's behavior 
towards others (Berndt, 1982). 
A second "developmental shift" in the adolescent 
self involves the increasing understanding of the self 
in psychological terms; this change allows the 
adolescent to define the self in the context of ideas 
and philosophical beliefs. "The system of belief 
[philosophical/ideological thinking] reflects the main 
organizing principle of the adolescent's 
self-conception" (p. 119). Such beliefs have moral 
consequences for they frame for the adolescent a 
distinctive set of attitudes and behavioral norms which 
influence the adolescent's behavior towards others. 
Even though Damon (1984) does not set forth a 
definition of morality, the social interactional 
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perspective of self implies an awareness of and focus on 
the welfare of others; thus, there seems to be 
incorporated into Damon's thinking some level of 
prosocial response. Moreover, Damon's work which 
documents the interpersonal nature of the adolescent 
self ("How I act towards others is who I am") points to 
the interpersonal features of adolescent morality. 
There emerges within this interpersonal focus, a merger 
with the psychological understanding of self. Thus, 
through interactions with peers adolescent come to view 
their own behaviors as either consonant or at variance 
with their own self-understanding which is increasingly 
defined through rudimentary philosophical and ethical 
understandings. Correspondingly, behaviors which vary 
from increasingly proclaimed self-understandings ("I am 
a Christian," "I am honest") engender what Rokeach 
(1981) terms states of "self-dissatisfaction." In 
effect, such states are violations of the ego ideal. 
The above findings drawn from Blasi, Damon, and 
Kegan suggest the possibility of a prosocial inclination 
with adolescence. The identity of the adolescent--an 
organizational system of self-understanding--is 
increasingly framed both in relationship and in terms of 
cognitive understandings of self that include value 
formulations. Because the identity of the 
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adolescent is in part a product of socio-cultural values 
(Erikson, 1968), p·rosociality emerges as a significant 
factor within which the adolescent can frame his or her 
own self-definition. Likewise, acting in ways contrary 
to one's self definition ("It is right to be kind to 
others," "I am loyal to my friends") engenders the 
self-dissatisfaction discussed by Rokeach (failing to 
have one's actions reflect one's values). A more 
adequate expression of this "self-dissatisfaction" is 
Hoffman's notion of "interpersonal guilt" which results 
from empathic distress. Unlike behavioral 
understandings of guilt which reflect fear of 
anticipated punishment, and Freudian guilt which is the 
product of repressed wishes, interpersonal guilt arises 
from feelings of empathic distress and the 
self-attribution of blame associated with the other's 
plight. Feelings of guilt initially arise in young 
children simply because of the awareness of empathic 
distress and the close proximity of this internal state 
to the child's personal actions. Thus, even though the 
young child might not be responsible for the plight of 
the other, he or she might still experience guilt. 
Later, the awareness of their own actions as causing 
another's pain is likely to lead to guilt. Even 
comparisons between one's own situation and that of 
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another can lead one to feel guilt, even though one has 
done nothing directly to hurt the other. Over time, 
empathic distress can elicit guilt even when one is not 
responsible for the plight of the other (the example of 
the Good Samaritan). "The line between empathic 
distress and guilt thus becomes very fine,- and being an 
innocent bystander is a matter of degree" (1984, p. 
289). The adolescent who develops a salient value 
system which is oriented towards prosociality is 
particularly likely to be subject to a sense of guilt. 
To violate one 1 s internal values which are central for 
one's self-definition ( 11 I am loving, 11 "I am 
compassionate 11 ) leads to personal self-dissatisfaction 
which in turn fosters prosocial behaviors. 
The Co~mitted Heart 
Whereas the first three components of Rest's model 
lead one to recognize the need for a prosocial response, 
clarify significant values which orient one to engage in 
a moral action, and lead one to choose the action, the 
actual execution of one's behavior is the domain of 
Component 4. Rest quotes St. Paul's famous passage in 
Romans to show the tenuous nature of moral execution. 
11 The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I 
would not, that I do" (7:19). The intention of the 
person often falls short of action. 
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Executing and implementing a plan of action 
involves figuring out the sequence of concrete 
actions, working around impediments and 
unexpected difficulties, overcoming fatigue 
and frustration, resisting distractions and 
other allurements, and not losing sight of the 
eventual goal. Psychologists sometimes refer 
to these processes as involving "ego strength" 
or "self-regulation skills." (Rest, 1984, 
p.33) 
Evidence suggests that numerous characteristics 
exist that influence the actual carrying out of 
prosocial behaviors. For example, Barrett and Yarrow 
{1977) showed that among children who recognized the 
needs of others, those who were more assertive were 
significantly more likely to engage in prosocial 
behaviors. Rest cites evidence which shows that 
individuals at Kohlberg's Stage four level of moral 
reasoning who scored high on ego development showed less 
dishonest behavior than Stage 4 subjects low in ego 
development. Commenting upon this research, Rest notes 
"presumably those subjects with high ego strength had 
the strength of their convictions; whereas the Stage 4 
subjects with low ego strength had such convictions but 
did not act on them" (p. 33). 
What personal strengths enable one to implement 
one's chosen course of action? A likely candidate for 
fostering the execution of actions is found in maturity 
(see below for a definition). In all likelihood, those 
adolescents who evidence mature behavior are more likely 
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to carry out their intentions and sustain over time 
their behaviors in a consistent fashion. 
Suprisingly, little research has been reported in 
the literature on the maturity of adolescents. What 
evidence that does exist is more focused on late 
adolescents (Heath, 1965, 1980) or is reported in 
conjunction with literature delineating clinical 
concepts of normality and psychopathology (Oldham, 
1978; Offer & Sabshin, 1974). The most sophisticated 
attempt at exploring aspects of maturity for middle 
adolescence is contained in the writing of Greenberger 
and Sorenson (1974). Their model outlines a three 
dimensional focus for maturity. The underlying theme of 
their conceptual schema is the adaptational capacity of 
the adolescent in light of his or her meeting of 
specific developmental tasks. The first dimension is an 
adequate coping capacity and the ability to function in 
a growthful and adaptive way on one's own; this 
dimension is termed individual adequacy. This dimension 
is focused on the adolescent's capacity for self-
autonomy, bringing clarity to his or her identity, and 
on-going commitment to growth in the development of 
personal talents and interests. The second dimension, 
labeled interpersonal adequacy, focuses on the 
individual's ability to relate interpersonally with 
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others. Major focuses of this dimension are the 
development of communication skills, a growing trust of 
others, and the gradual obtainment of roles. Finally, 
there is a social adequacy which is concerned with the 
adolescent's capacity to function in a wider social 
context; this dimension takes into account how the 
adolescent adapts to sociopolitical changes, functions 
within cultural norms, and is capable of identifying 
with and relating in wider social groupings. Aspects of 
this dimension include openness to change in the 
sociopolitical environment, a tolerance for contrasting 
ideas, and growing realization of the need to be a 
functioning member of the community. This three 
dimensional view of maturity is consonant with the 
fourth component of Rest. Moreover, Rests notes that 
"perseverance," resolution, competence, and character" 
are contained within Component IV. Maturity, as defined 
by Greenberger and Sorenson, relates to the adolescent's 
capability to function in a regard to individual, 
interpersonal, and social levels. 
Utilizing this conceptual approach, Greenberger, 
Josselson, Knerr, and Knerr (1975} developed a maturity 
scale to measure the maturity levels of middle 
adolescents (secondary school students}. Josselson, 
Greenberger, and McConochie (1977a, 1977b} report 
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findings for both males and females. These researchers 
contrasted high and low maturers of both sexes. 
Two characteristics appeared in the description of 
low-maturing females. These students desired to possess 
material goods and have fun. The data identified two 
groups of low maturing females. The first group, 
reflecting the popular stereotype, were very active 
socially, attractive, and identified closely with the 
interests and preoccupations of peers. A basic 
self-centeredness and non-reflective manner was evident 
in this group of females. Their behavior was influenced 
more by external restraints than by internal goals. 
Another group of low maturing females were noted for the 
lack of enjoyment they experienced. These females had 
feelings of low self-esteem and inferiority, and they 
desired the care-free life of the first group of 
females. Also, their home lives were often conflictual. 
In both groups there was a tendency to show little 
self-awareness and the need for external controls to 
guide behavior. 
In contrast to the low maturing females, high 
maturing females could be characterized as having 
multidimensional lives noted for their complexity. 
These females were not as absorbed in the present as the 
low maturing females and they presented a picture of 
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forward thinking which was concerned with future 
commitments. There was also evident a significant level 
of reflectivity and awareness of personal actions and 
their consequences. The peer pressures which dominated 
the thinking of low maturers were noticeably absent from 
high maturers. There was a good sense of interpersonal 
relatedness among this group and their relationships 
were characterized by awareness of the other and 
personal sensitivity. Finally, these females valued 
independence and enjoyed focusing on the future and 
influences that affected their lives beyond their 
immediate environments. 
Similar characteristics were found among adolescent 
males. For low maturing males, there was a notable lack 
of self-reflection and awareness. They were more 
subject to external pressures than their high maturing 
peers and they were more preoccupied with the present 
than with the future. Relationships were problematic 
for low maturing boys. Their peer relationships lacked 
depth, and even making friendships was difficult. 
Aggressive impulses were also difficult to control. 
Friendship for these students was valued for what "was 
in it for me." 
High maturing males are more difficult to 
characterize than their low maturing counterparts. They 
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are less subject to peer influences and their lives are 
noted for their diversity with school interests, 
religious practices, and personal hobbies occupying 
their time. There is a strong sense of individuality 
and an optimistic view of the future. They are capable 
of living with self-doubt and can effectively cope with 
personal concerns. They are goal directed and possess 
an adequate level of concentration to accomplish their 
goals. 
For high maturing males and females there is a 
tendency to be more focused on others and less concerned 
with the influences and pressures of peers. Moreover, 
high maturing adolescents are capable of drawing upon 
inner resources thereby allowing them to accomplish 
personal goals and sustain their focus on future 
aspirations and commitments. Most likely, high maturers 
have less need to expend psychic energy on their own 
needs or to be defensive about their lives whereas low 
maturers must expend considerable energies attempting to 
contain inner impulses and to cope with personal 
feelings of inadequacy. 
Moreover, the sense one is left with when viewing 
high maturing adolescents is that of resolute 
individuals capable of carrying out their intentions 
without being encumbered by the developmental exigencies 
220 
which preoccupy the lives of their peers. These 
adolescents successfully master their environment and 
there is displayed a "developmental increase in ego 
control" (Josselson, Greenberger, & McConochie, 1977a, 
p. 46). 
What is proposed here is that adolescents who are 
found to be mature and who at the same time are found to 
experience empathy, other-centered values, and an 
articulated sense of their moral identities are more 
likely to exhibit most consistently a morality of the 
heart. Most likely, such expression reflects the mature 
adolescents' ability to respond appropriately to their 
own value systems while being aware of their 
environments (the needs of distressed others), and the 
parallel capacity to act resolutely on their own values 
without being overly burdened by peer pressures or 
personal shortcomings. 
Rest (1984) correctly notes of all the components 
of morality, this component has a specifically 11 amoral 11 
quality. That is, whereas Component I displays a moral 
sensitivity, Component II moral values, and Component 
III a moral choice, Component IV focuses on the 
execution of action. Thus, a mass murderer or a Nazi 
storm trooper can resolutely carry out an action in the 
same manner as a Good Samaritan. Although this might be 
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case, to frame Component IV in terms of maturity which 
is the development of ego strength as expressed through 
individual, interpersonal, and social adequacies adds a 
moral dimension. This arises from an examination of 
interpersonal and social adequacies. Interpersonal 
adequacy includes an essential trust in others and the 
capacity to relate interpersonally. Likewise, social 
adequacy necessitates a tolerance of others and 
identification with a larger social body. In both 
instances there exists the need for the adolescent to be 
aware of others' needs. 
In this chapter we have examined the adequacy of 
Rest's component process model as it relates to the 
adolescent experience. In addition, specific features 
have been set forth for each component which together 
suggest that a fully developed morality that is germane 
to the adolescent's experience does exist. In sum, it 
is suggested that the empathic adolescent who is aware 
of and can accurately recognize the needs and hurts of 
others, who articulates a compassionate value system 
{adopts values of love, self-sacrifice, etc.), who 
expresses these values as essential features of his or 
her identity in a consistent fashion, and who exhibits 
mature behaviors is most likely to display a high degree 
of everyday morality. 
CHAPTER VI 
ADOLESCENT SOCIAL MORALITY 
Social morality, as noted in Chapter IV, is the 
fostering of prosocial behaviors in order to eradicate 
social injustice as well as aid those suffering from 
this injustice (e.g., discrimination, inequality). This 
morality is related to developmental shifts which 
prepare the child for adulthood. Correspondingly, 
because this morality concerns issues beyond 
interpersonal concerns (personal encounters with 
others), questions of political socialization and 
understandings of social phenomena become significant. 
Recently, there has been increasing interest in 
discussions about the importance of social morality in 
education (e.g., Grant, 1981; Groome, 1980; Kagan, 
1981). This chapter focuses on why the development of 
social morality is truly possible only with the 
beginning of the adolescent years. An examination will 
be made of specific developmental processes which 
influence the growth of social morality during the 
adolescent period as well as psychological perspectives 
on the formation of social morality. Attention will 
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then shift to utilizing a morality of the heart as the 
basis for discussion about the fostering of social 
morality during the adolescent years. 
Adolescent Development and Social Morality 
From a developmental perspective, the capacity for 
a social morality resides in the adolescent's experience 
of formal thinking and the struggle for identity. 
Formal thinking allows the adolescent to comprehend 
complex forms of social stimuli as well as intricate 
understandings of abstractions, e.g., "justice" and 
"peace". Thus, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) have noted 
that "the notions of humanity, social justice ... freedom 
of conscience, civic or intellectual courage ... are 
ideals which profoundly influence the adolescent's 
affective life" (p.349). What is noted by these 
researchers is adolescents' new found capacity to fall 
in love with their thinking. Ideas are not merely 
comprehended, they are at times passionately felt. 
Understanding such concepts (e.g., peace) necessitates a 
capacity for abstraction, deductive thinking, and 
reflective thought which only emerges during the 
adolescent years. Consequently, when utilizing formal 
thinking, "the adolescent goes injecting himself into 
adult society. He does so by means of projects, life 
plans, theoretical systems, and ideas of political 
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or social reform" (Piaget, 1968, p. 67). These ideas 
are woven into a rudimentary yet personally meaningful 
theory of society. "These theories are often taken 
quite seriously, with the result being a new coherence 
of judgment and opinion, deriving from an arduously 
thought-out system of beliefs" (Damon, 1984, p. 119). 
With respect to the foregoing, however, attention must 
be given to the question of whether a social morality is 
universally obtainable in adolescence. That is, a 
considerable body of research has noted that formal 
thinking is not experienced by all adolescents (e.g., 
Elkind, 1975; Keating & Clark, 1980). This objection is 
answered by how social morality is defined. Although 
many adolescents might be unable to articulate a 
sophisticated understanding of the social system and 
base their behaviors on these understandings, the 
experience of empathic concern and the encounter with 
numerous opportunities for prosocial actions in both 
home and school environments allow virtually all 
adolescents to consider the possibility of engaging in 
behaviors which aid those suffering from social 
injustice. 
It is unlikely, however, that this awakening 
concern for social morality can exist as isolated from 
the larger developmental needs of identity which are 
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salient issues for adolescent maturation (Miller, 1978; 
Marcia, 1980). Further, the linkage of psychosocial 
development and formal operational thinking is likely 
mediated by factors unique to the adolescent period 
{Rowe & Marcia, 1980). 
Erikson {1963, 1968) has offered the dominant 
theory for understanding the adolescent's identity 
quest. This identity search, framed in the context of 
crises and commitment, has received operationalized 
success through the use of the identity status paradigm 
developed by Marcia {1966). Central to the adolescent's 
achievement of identity is the experience of an 
ideological crisis which necessitates the adolescent's 
successful negotiation of newly acquired ideas and 
values with formerly sacrosanct and unquestioned 
childhood beliefs. This potentially traumatic 
experience of reevaluation entails a fundamental 
reexamination of political, religious, and social 
beliefs. 
Although the secondary school years represent a 
time when identity issues are initially considered, the 
extant research has focused almost exclusively on late 
adolescents (college undergraduates) (Marcia, 1980). 
Recently, attempts have been made to apply identity 
paradigms to secondary school adolescents (Mielman, 
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1979). Raphael and Xelowski (1980) have questioned the 
validity of such an approach. Characteristically, 
secondary school students are neither likely nor 
expected to have experienced the developmental concerns 
or the environmental situations which are requisite for 
the crisis and commitment struggles which may preoccupy 
the college age adolescent. Raphael and Xelowski argue 
that a more profitable approach to identity measurement 
during the high school years is to assess the 
adolescent's familiarity with salient issues as well as 
the openness the adolescent evinces towards new 
experiences. In this regard, a morality framed in terms 
of prosocial behaviors appreciates the age appropriate 
level of the secondary school student's identity search. 
The fashioning of morality in the context of everyday 
prosocial situations allows for a universal experience 
that is appropriate for the high school adolescent 1 s 
initial exploration of social issues. 
Thus the adolescent's awareness of the political 
world, engendered by cognitive maturation and 
developmental strivings, sets the stage for the initial 
yet tentative steps toward ideological commitment; on 
the other hand, failure to confront ideological demands 
relegates the adolescent to a confused and ambiguous 
state (Erikson, 1968). The presence of formal thinking 
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prepares the adolescent to attend to complex political 
stimuli whereas the capacity to reflect on a personal 
life history allows the adolescent to encounter a world 
that is both complex and changing. 
It is only with increasing maturity that the 
adolescent becomes able to form generalized 
concepts, to understand the role of history 
and the impact of the present on the future, 
to get some feeling for social change and the 
possibility that man and social institutions 
may alter and be altered, to weigh up the 
wider costs and benefits of actions and 
decisions, and to develop principles and 
frameworks for judging particular events. 
(Feather, 1980, p. 281). 
The acquisition of formal thinking also makes 
available to the adolescent a higher level of empathic 
experience. Hoffman (1980, 1984) has tied the 
adolescent's greater empathic sophistication to the 
ability to imagine the plight and suffering of wider 
social groups such as the poor, the retarded, and the 
oppressed. He has stated that "empathic affect combined 
with the perceived plight of an unfortunate group may be 
the most advanced form of empathic distress" (1979, p. 
963). Clark (1980) has echoed Hoffman's assertion. 
While criticizing the dearth of research on the topic of 
empathy, he has stated that "the highest and probably 
the least frequent form of empathy is that in which the 
individual is compelled to embrace all human beings" (p. 
189). In a particularly forceful passage he goes on 
228 
to state: 
It is the level of empathy that when real and 
functional cannot be used to justify the naked 
use of power, tyranny, flagrant or subtle 
injustices, cruelties, sustained terrorism, 
killings, wars, and eventual extinction ... This 
lack of simple expanded empathy is in the eyes 
of this observer the basis of social tensions, 
conflicts, violence, terrorism, and war (pp. 
189-190). 
During adolescence there develops what some 
researchers (Adelson & O'Neil, 1966; Leahy, 1983) term 
the sociocentric perspective. This perspective entails 
a widening understanding of social relationships. Leahy 
has noted that the emergence of an understanding of the 
concept of "social class" for example arises from these 
developmental changes. Initially, the child defines 
difference between "rich and poor" (social class) in 
terms of "peripheral" characteristics (e.g., physical 
characteristics, amount of wealth). By adolescence, 
these conceptions have become more sophisticated with 
descriptions of psychological features as well as 
sociocentric understandings (how social structures 
influence individuals). "Sociocentric concepts reflect 
a more abstract decentering in that they indicate a 
refocusing from individuals or groups to their 
relationships within a social structure" (Leahy, 1983, 
p. 97). 
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Relatedly, the entrance of socio-cultural factors 
in the adolescent's conception of social morality is 
mediated to a large extent by cultural attitudes and 
norms. Individuals are socialized to believe that "they 
can accomplish". "The overwhelming majority of children 
from all social strata are convinced that they 
personally can succeed in a system where everyone cannot 
succeed" (Hall & Jose, 1983). Social psychological 
explanations which help to explain such a cultural 
belief include status attribution theory which argues 
that in light of unknown characteristics of another, 
those known characteristics become the basis for 
inferring other qualities. Thus, individuals of the 
upper class who are financially successful (what is 
known) are also expected to have high abilities in other 
areas--personality attributes, successful in 
relationships, etc. Another candidate for this 
socialized belief in personal success is the just world 
theory (Lerner, 1975). Thus, individuals who are in the 
lower class "deserve" what they have whereas personal 
efforts allows those more advantaged to "deserve" their 
advantage. 
At the same time, these culturally held beliefs 
must compete with developmental changes that enable the 
adolescent to move beyond commonly accepted cultural 
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beliefs in their evaluations of social reality. Damon 
{1975) has shown that with age there is an increasingly 
complex understanding of "positive justice" which is 
concerned with the fair allocation of goods and 
resources. At its highest level, which is obtainable by 
adolescence, one's view as to how goods and services are 
to be allocated takes into account the special needs of 
others as well as special circumstances which mitigate 
right or wrong {e.g., a person's physical 
limitations--blindness). Relatedly, Lapsey and Quintana 
{1985} have shown that the notion of retributive justice 
bec~~~s more complex with age. In this regard, they 
note that by adolescence, applications of 
punishment are no longer simply a "tit for tat" 
phenomenon. Rather, there exists an increasingly 
sophisticated understanding of relationships and a 
corresponding sensitivity for mitigating and 
extenuating circumstances which influence one's 
behavior. 
All in all, although cultural socialization is 
powerful within the adolescent years, developmentally, 
the adolescent is capable of recognizing complex social 
phenomenon and victims of social injustice. When 
combined with levels of empathy which allows a felt 
distress for the disadvantaged, a situation is createo 
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for the fostering of social morality. 
The point made by both Clark and Hoffman is that 
empathy has a specifically social dimension which leads 
it to be inextricably tied to questions of social 
injustice, political decision-making, and cultural 
values--indeed, the same concerns which are central for 
social morality. This level of empathy is dependent 
upon cognitive maturation and expresses itself in a 
universal sensitivity towards society's disadvantaged. 
Moreover, Hoffman (1980) has hypothesized that many 
middle class and affluent adolescents often undergo a 
sense of existential alienation as a result of their 
advanced empathic experiences. Their growing awareness 
of others' plight in contrast to their own advantaged 
state creates a sense of "existential guilt'' and for 
some adolescents it leads to distancing or disavowal 
from their own cultural milieu. In effect, tacit 
beliefs and assumptions concerning society are called 
into question through their empathic concern towards 
those who are suffering. Their empathic stirrings also 
engender a personal perplexity as they must now 
successfully negotiate their earlier socialization 
experiences which prized the conventional values of a 
competitive and success-oriented society with their 
newly experienced feelings of care and concern for the 
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socially oppressed. For some, this entails the 
beginning of rudimentary ideological formulations. He 
notes 
that adolescents often search for moral 
ideologies that foster a sense of identity. 
Ideologies are the ''guardians of identity" 
because they locate oneself in the world and 
provide coherence to one's affective and 
cognitive experiences. If one succeeds in 
finding or constructing an ideology fitting 
one's empathic leanings, then one's new moral 
viewpoint is an advancement over the simple 
empathy-based moral norm of childhood because 
it incorporates social realities previously 
ignored. In this way, one's ideology may 
become an integral part of one's moral system 
rather than an abstraction lacking moral 
force. (Hoffman, 1984, p. 292}. 
In a similar vein, to discuss the possibility of a 
social morality is to bring to the forefront the 
relationship of youth to the political system. Easton 
and Dennis (1965} have provided data analyses which 
document children's attitudes toward government. In 
essence, the Easton and Dennis data uncover a gradual 
shift of the child from a "political primitive'' who 
views government in an almost magical way, dominated by 
personable leaders, to a maturing understanding of 
pluralism, complexity and the multi-functionalism of the 
American political system. Interestingly, the 
researchers note that increasing comprehension of 
governmental authorities leads to a diminution in 
positive attachments towards governmental leaders. Thus 
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greater understanding of government diminishes an 
uncritical infatuation with the components of govern-
ment. In other research (Easton & Dennis, 1967) the 
emergence of a sense of "political efficacy'' is noted 
as early as the third grade. Although children do not 
comprehend with any depth the realities of the political 
system, it appears that an incipient conceptualization 
of an individual's power to influence the political 
process occurs in young children. Consequently, child-
hood socialization might well provide a preparatory 
stage for the later internalization of norms and 
feelings requisite for a sense of political efficacy. 
It should be noted that the child does not actually 
believe that he or she can influence the system, rather 
he or she construes an image of citizen which prepares 
the child to assume this adult role in later years. 
The formation of political attitudes leads to 
inquiry as to the source of this formation. Not 
surprisingly, evidence suggests that parents exercise 
the dominant role in the child's development of a 
political sense of self. "Within the family the child 
has his first experience with authority 
relationships which he may generalize to larger 
political systems. Political loyalty, patriotism, 
national heroes, and devils are all seen as developing 
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early in life" (Langton, 1969, p. 22). Parents provide 
a reinforcing environment wherein positive ties towards 
authority are promoted. Likewise, if parents profess 
political loyalties (partisanship or party affiliation) 
then these loyalties are likely to be transmitted to 
their children. Further, with increasing education the 
child is more able to differentiate correctly 
ideological conflicts between political parties (Hess & 
Terney, 1968; Lane & Sears, 1964). All in all, there is 
a growing constellation of childhood needs, parental 
influences, and educational opportunities which shape 
the child's political attitudes. In sum, a predominant 
view in socialization studies is the child's acceptance 
of personable political leaders. Only with time is the 
child able to adopt a critical perspective of 
government. Further, this positive attachment to 
government and its leaders holds across social class and 
intellectual ability (IQ) (Hess & Terney, 1968). 
Two points can be drawn from such findings. First 
many researchers take a psychodynamic interpretation; 
that is, they view the child as a helpless person who 
gladly substitutes positive and uncritical acceptance of 
authority figures for his or her own helplessness. 
Second, it is assumed that all children adopt a positive 
attachment toward government and its leaders. 
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This latter point, the unanimity of social classes' 
feelings towards governmental leaders, has not gone 
without challenge. For example, Connell (1971) speaks 
of an intuitive political sense which children possess. 
Based on in-depth interviews, Connell note that children 
can sometimes develop a starkly honest and critical 
sense of their government. This view is shared by Coles 
(1975). The Harvard educator notes "the poor or those 
who belong to the so-called working class always live 
close to the law, close to the whims and fancies of 
political authority" (p. 24). Using an in-depth 
interview format with lower class white and black 
children, Coles documents a much more negative and 
fearful view of government, even among children five and 
six. Recent research (Leahy, 1983) has documented the 
child's ability to perceive gender, racial, and social 
differences. Thus it might be that germinal political 
attitudes are framed from nascently formed perceptions 
of inequality and social differences. 
In the secondary school years, adolescents begin to 
develop both a deepening understanding of political 
realities and the capacity to think critically about 
social phenomena. In the early high school years, these 
evaluations are elementary and simplistic. Through the 
later high school years and during the undergraduate 
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years of college, however, adolescents are capable of 
developing a rudimentary ideology and philosophy of life 
that aids them as they evaluate political and social 
institutions. At the same time, the ideological 
groundings for most adolescents are unstructured; that 
is, the overwhelming number of adolescents display 
thought patterns in which complex and hierarchically 
ordered belief structures are lacking (Adelson, 1971, 
1975; Gallatin, 1980). 
The adolescent's disinclination to form an 
ideologically structured belief system arises from 
several factors. Adolescents, like children, form 
political thinking patterns which reflect adult beliefs; 
therefore, because most adult Americans are 
non-ideological in their political belief structures, it 
stands to reason that adolescents, too, will reflect 
weak ideological commitments (Adelson, 1979; Conger, 
1976). Furthermore, the adolescent's awakening to 
serious political issues is influenced by numerous 
socializing factors which include parents, teachers, 
peers, and the media (Jennings & Niemi, 1974). It is 
highly likely that these numerous influences offer at 
times contradictory and opposing interpretations of 
political realities which in turn lessen the 
adolescent's attempt at forming political commitments. 
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Finally, the nature of political reality itself is often 
complex and variable. Adelson (1975) has captured the 
essence of political events and their accompanying 
ambiguity. He notes when discussing political phenomena 
we have gone from a one-on-one collision of 
values to far more complicated issues; the 
relation of variable means to variable ends; 
the relation of uncertain means to uncertain 
ends; the relation between short- and long-
term ends; the relation between individualistic and 
collective goods; the distinction between 
particularistic and universalistic orientations; 
the collision between values, and also the 
collision between interests, and between interests 
and values (p. 76). 
Consequently, the adolescent must attempt to make 
sense of a vast array of information and in the midst of 
this complexity construct a personally meaningful value 
system. No doubt this venture is often frustrating and 
for some adolescents leads to adoption of a 
nonreflective ideological position (this could be 
construed as an example of identity foreclosure) whereas 
for other adolescents this confusion leads to the 
abandonment of any attempt at political commitment. It 
is likely that most adolescents fall between these 
extremes. Unlike the privately encountered moral 
choices which adolescents face concerning questions of 
personal morals--should I lie? Should I 
steal?--questions relating morals and politics are 
inherently complex and often lack moral clarity. 
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Furthermore, the certitude and moral simplicity that so 
often preoccupies the moral beliefs of children yields 
to the confusion and questioning which characterizes the 
political world of the adult. 
The framing of morality in a prosocial context 
offers the adolescent a respite from the moral confusion 
emanating from political controversies. Although 
adolescents might evince uncertainty as to which of 
several political choices are moral, their familiarity 
and socialization to prosocial behaviors provides a 
resourceful means for creating interest in and 
commitment to socially important issues. 
Adolescent Social Morality and a Morality of the Heart: 
A Case Study 
No research exists which explores the meaning of 
Rest's ''fully developed morality" to the adolescent 
experience. Equally important, no literature exists 
that discusses the model of Rest and the development of 
a social morality. This being the case, in this 
section, we attempt an integration of the Morality of 
the Heart, the adolescent, and social morality. This 
integration is made more difficult by the fact that 
research studies which show prosociality and the 
adolescent are wedded to personal and interpersonal 
concerns rather than "social'' factors and related 
issues. 
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Although speculative in nature, in all likelihood 
one can assume that the empathic distress which develops 
with cognitive maturation not only forms the center of 
the component one process but it is significant in 
focusing the adolescent's attention on the disadvantaged 
and unfortunate. Moreover, empathic stirrings most 
likely foster one of the first critical intrusions into 
tacitly held conventional beliefs which, until 
adolescence, allow for an acquiescent adoption of 
societal beliefs. 
An example illustrates this process. John is a 16 
year old junior in high school. He has recently 
finished reading a book (for a social studies course) on 
race relations in the United States. John comes from a 
middle class background and is white. He has had few 
interactions with minorities. The stark accounts in the 
book he has read, however, have troubled him. Although 
he finds it difficult to articulate his feelings, John 
experiences discomfort as he thinks about the treatment 
of minorities in general and, in particular, the extent 
of discrimination that exists in his own city. Further, 
these feelings are confirmed by what he has recently 
read in newspapers and stories he has viewed on tele 
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vision about white-black relations. 
John's empathic concern suggests a salient 
experience for the development of social morality. 
There is some level of aroused affect (empathic 
distress). In turn, his emotional arousal is made 
possible by his cognitive maturation--that is, John's 
awareness that a problem exists. Although he himself 
has not been the victim of discrimination, he perceives 
that others have. This arousal highlights Hoffman's 
assertion that empathy is experienced at the level at 
which one cognizes the other (with the understanding 
that the other can be not only an individual but a group 
or wider body of people). 
The question does arise as to "why'' John does feel 
this empathic arousal whereas other peers might not. 
One likely answer, is that John possesses a higher level 
of empathy. Instruments such as the IRI (Davis, 1980) 
could substantiate this fact. Further, these empathic 
expressions most likely are fostered from socialization 
experiences, specifically parental practices (Hoffman, 
1979). Additionally, John attends outwardly to his 
environment; thus cognitive egocentrism (Elkind, 1980) 
does not preclude his awareness of other problems, 
especially of wider social groups. In all likelihood, 
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John also evidences a life history that enables him to 
empathize with others. This includes a sustained 
experiences of peer interactions and friendship 
formations. Noting Youniss (1980) studies in this 
regard, the mutuality and reciprocal functions of rights 
and duties could well form the basis for perceiving the 
rights and duties of others in social contexts. 
Friendships and meaningful peer interactions promote 
mutuality and a more mature understanding of reciprocity 
and equality. Thus, as Berndt (1982) notes, evidence 
suggests "that close and stable friendships can enhance 
altruism and self-esteem" p. 1458). The interaction 
among adolescents in peer relationships might well be a 
crucial determinant in obtaining adolescent concern for 
disadvantaged groups. Unless the adolescent can 
understand and experience the reciprocal rights and 
responsibilities inherent in personal relationships, and 
the caring and empathic concerns requisite for personal 
friendship, then the focus on broader groups and people 
might be unproductive. In other words, it is arguable 
that the seeds for a social morality exist in the 
fertile soil established by already existent nurturing 
personal relationships. Further, the disappointments, 
inequalities, and hurts sustained in these interpersonal 
contexts provide the cognitive schema by which the 
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plight and disappointments of larger social groups are 
experienced. Building on the work of Karinol (1982), 
hurts experienced in personal relationships provide a 
repository for experiencing the hurts and pains of 
others experienced in wider social contexts. That is, 
the empathic distress engendered through exposure to 
social injustices activates previous stored knowledge 
which provides an interpretable context for the now 
broader understanding of the other's plight and one's 
personal distress over the other's pain. 
Moreover, experiencing personal hurt is likely to 
foster an empathic bonding with those who are less 
fortunate and who are suffering. That is, as Staub 
(1978) notes, "people frequently respond more 
empathica11y to others 1 when they themselves have had 
similar experiences.'' p. 138). Even though John has not 
been a victim of racial discrimination, he most likely 
has experienced other forms of disappointment, perhaps 
some of which are discriminatory. He might have 
personal characteristics which have made the 
accomplishments of his own goals problematic (e.g., too 
short for the basketball team, not perceived as having 
talent for the school play). Even disappointment in 
personal relationships (experiences of betrayal, broken 
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confidences) might provide the requisite psychological 
experiences for ~mpathizing with a wider social group. 
At the same time, the adolescent's experience of 
personal disappointment and hurt must not be overly 
burdensome. If this is the case, then the emotional 
vicissitudes of adolescence (Larson, Csikszentmihalyi & 
Graef, 1980; Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986) and personal 
disappointments inherent in friendship formations 
(Youniss, 1980) foster defensive reactions and over 
preoccupation with intrapsychic and interpersonal needs. 
Indirect support is given this interpretation when, as 
noted in Chapter III, needy individuals are less likely 
to engage in prosocial responses. In sum, there exists 
the need for what might be termed a 2sychological 
vulnerability in the adolescent. On the one hand the 
adolescent must have experienced personal disappointment 
and hurt, most likely some of which is felt to be 
unjust. On the other hand, this hurt must not be of 
such immensity that it induces a level of defensive 
reactions which inhibit the ability of the adolescent to 
perceive distress in others and center one's focus 
solely on the self. 
One other piece of evidence seems to offer support 
to this assertion concerning psychological vulnerability 
as it pertains to social morality. Shelton (1985) 
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confirmed Hoffman's (1981) assertion that empathic 
distress inhibits prosociality. He found that for both 
a private morality as well as interpersonal morality, 
empathic distress was unrelated to helping. This was 
not the case for social morality. On the contrary, 
distress was highly significantly related to prosocial 
responding. It is unclear exactly why this would be the 
case. It might be that if viewing someone in need of 
help whether the person is unknown or known to the 
observer is accompanied by emotional distress than 
defensive reactions or an egoistic quality might enter 
into one's decision to help. That is, one's own 
internal distress takes priority over the hurt of 
another. On the other hand, to envision or imagine 
large groups of people suffering social injustice might 
turn one 1 s inner turmoil into a cause or ideological 
commitment that demands one's response. In sum, the 
inclination to respond prosocially in cases of social 
morality appears to contradict the assertion that all 
affective overarousal inhibits prosocial actions. It 
might be that Hoffman's theory of empathic distress 
applies more to interpersonal situations whereas more 
socially oriented concerns are influenced by a different 
dynamic. Thus an individual when exposed to a 
distress-filled interpersonal situation might fail to 
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respond to another's plight. on the other hand, the 
overwhelming distress one feels when reflecting on 
social injustice might lead one to constructively 
channel energies into efforts to eradicate such 
situations. 
To continue the discussion. John is distressed by 
what he reads. Yet, his sensitivity to this moral 
problem must include reference to Component II--the 
understanding that "something must be done." If John's 
socialization experiences has taken place in the context 
of a religious background, this "oughtness" can be 
understood in terms of conscience (e.g., Nelson, 1973) 
or a conversion experience (e.g., Conn, 1981). 
Regardless, there is some prescriptive focus to John's 
thinking. There exists some internal standard (norm) 
which provides an evaluative stance for what "ought to 
be done." Research evidence does support the notion of 
internalized norms as predictors of prosocial behaviors. 
A wide range of studies have demonstrated this 
to be the case. Individuals with highs scores 
on paper-and-pencil or verbal measures of 
social responsibility, other-oriented values, 
or moral reasoning tasks, were more likely to 
engage in prosocial behavior than those with 
lower scores on the same tests. (Rushton, 
1981, p. 262) 
Rushton quotes 16 studies that show this to be the case 
(for a list of some of these studies see Chapter II). 
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We have also noted that the underlying psychic 
mechanism that gives impetus to this value formation is 
the ego ideal which, in its normal course of 
development, fosters the growing adolescent-parent 
separation. Initially this separation transpires 
through idealized friendships (Blos, 1962) but a 
parallel process and eventually a more functional way 
for this to occur is through the gradual adoption of a 
coherent and meaningful system of beliefs and attitudes 
which express what one "ought to be." 
The standards and values formerly attributed 
to the parents thereby become parts of a 
guiding ego ideal, and the lost perfection of 
the parental imagoes is transmuted into the 
felt perfection of these now internal 
standards and ideals. (Wolf, Gedo, and Terman, 
1972, p. 267) 
This gradual development of a personal set of ideals 
(values) fosters the "transformation" of the adolescent 
self. Even so, this increasingly personalized values 
system is most likely more readily disposed to 
evaluations in terms of personal and interpersonal moral 
concerns (Should I lie? Should I steal?) than to 
questions of social morality which include the necessity 
to evaluate social phenomena as well as political and 
social issues. Some evidence for the difficulty of 
responding in the context of a social morality is 
provided by Torney-Purta (1983) which shows that 
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questions of social and economic equality are perceived 
less clearly by children and adolescents than questions 
of political freedoms (e.g., free speech). 
Although civil and political rights are 
clearly perceived as essential in a just 
society, situations where social or economic 
justice is involved or where rights come into 
conflict are considerably more problematic for 
young people. (p. 300) 
Further, evidence seems to indicate that solutions to 
political and social problems are arrived at with more 
difficulty than the ability to recognize a problem. 
11 There is little evidence that understanding of remedies 
for inequality or injustice progresses in a parallel 
fashion to (or as rapidly as) awareness of injustice or 
inequality 11 (Torney-Purta, 1983, p. 308). 
Although John appears sensitive to the plight of 
those who suffer racial discrimination, he must 
determine how he will respond now that he knows that his 
own standards have been violated. In short, John must 
decide what he will now do. At this point, John's 
behavioral choices must confront the complexity of 
social realities. Is the injustice that John seeks to 
respond to the result of complex social conditions? He 
might, for example, have various interpretations of the 
reasons for racial discrimination which are conflictual 
and lead him to a tentative response. He might be 
overwhelmed by the amount or the complexity of the 
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social problem or feel he does not have enough 
information. Further, as John formulates his own 
philosophy of life which includes increasingly 
well-thought ideas of society and a moral evaluation of 
them (Damon, 1984; Erikson, 1968), there emerges the 
potential for conflict with parental ideas and beliefs. 
John might favor wholeheartedly the consequences of 
actions consonant with a social morality in order to 
distance himself from parental values and beliefs. 
Thus, John might opt for some choices not so much 
because he believes them, but because they psychically 
establish his identity and ease separation struggles 
with parents who perhaps think differently on such 
issues. On the other hand, some adolescents might 
resist choosing behaviors consonant with a social 
morality in order to assuage their own separation fears 
from parents. Some other adolescents might believe they 
lack the ability to respond to issues important to 
social morality. Still others might be disinclined to 
adopt a social morality because of reactance (Brehm, 
1966). Thus, in adolescence, where freedom to form 
one's own beliefs and values is crucial, parental or 
authority demands to adopt such positions can create 
opposition to such views thereby making problematic the 
development of a social morality. 
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Finally, for some adolescents, parental support of 
social morality might provide a fertile socialization 
for the adolescent's adoption of this morality. 
Ideally, the most developed understanding of social 
morality includes not only behaviors which respond to 
distressed others, but an increasingly sophisticated 
value system which provides a coherent conceptual 
framework in order that John's behaviors can mirror his 
values. Furthermore, the set of values which mirror 
choices made is not rigidly held (Marcia, 1980) but 
defined and flexible in order to accommodate new 
experiences and challenges to currently held beliefs 
(Raphael & Xelowski, 1980). 
Finally, what fosters John's prosocial behavior to 
the actual stage of execution of a prosocial act? The 
ability to carry out the prosocial act is considered to 
be a function of John's maturity level. This maturity 
includes the ability to fulfill one's goals and carry 
out one's desires. Also, a sense of self-efficacy 
regarding one's own behaviors. In regards to performing 
of prosocial acts, Staub (1978) notes "belief in one's 
ability to influence events and bring about desired 
outcomes seems important in leading people to initiate 
action and actively pursue goals, except when the 
required action is easy and straightforward" (p. 55). 
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Future Research 
This study offers a conceptual understanding from a 
psychological vantage point of everyday morality. The 
advant~ge of this conceptual framework is that it 
identifies discrete factors at a distinctive 
developmental level which are essential components for 
the adolescents prosocial response. 
As such, this framework offers a variety of 
research possibilities. For one, there exists the 
question as to whether the value oriented and 
empathically based morality described herein is a better 
predictor of prosociality than the 
cognitive-developmental perspective set forth by 
Kohlberg. If Rest is correct that a morality must take 
into consideration each of the four components in order 
to be a "fully developed morality," then one research 
strategy is a comparison of adolescents who score at 
various levels of these four components with adolescents 
who score at various levels on the DIT. Dependent 
measures in such a study could be either the paper and 
pencil instruments (e.g., the VMS) or a set of 
behavioral situations which measure the student's 
prosocial response. 
Other research might attempt to measure whether 
indeed certain distinctive personality variables such as 
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loneliness in adolescence inhibit prosociality. 
Research could be conducted either cross sectionally or 
longitudinally in order to ascertain differences in 
prosociality between the beginning and end of the middle 
adolescent period. 
Other areas of research that might prove fruitful 
include ascertaining the role of political efficacy and 
political awareness. For example, are these concepts 
significantly related to social morality? In other 
words, does a high level of social morality necessitate 
a level of political competence? Further, are 
adolescents who experience personal hurts in friendships 
and peer relationships more likely than their peers to 
be open to empathizing with the hurts and pains of wider 
social groups (e.g., the poor, oppressed)? In other 
words, does there exist some linkage between the quality 
of interpersonal functioning and a Widening moral 
concern for social questions and issues (e.g., the 
plight of the economically disadvantaged)? 
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